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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is a sociological case-study of the two-channel television 
system in New Zealand from its inception in 1974 to the present day. It 
focusses in detail on the period 1974-80 when the two public channels were 
in direc~ competition with each other. The study examines three sets of issues 
and ambiguities which this competition threw up. One was the conflict 
between administrators and programme-makers over the best way to manage 
the severe ambiguities produced by this unusual mixture of state and market. 
The second concerned the attempts by programme-makers to pursue the 
production of programmes as they wished with minimal interference from 
either the state or other organisational bodies. The third concerned the kinds 
of programmes and schedules they produced, the types ,of potential public 
these constructed and the response of audience groups to these activities. 
Drawing on recent theoretical debates in the area of organisations, professions 
and culture, the study argues that it is the shifting relationship between all 
three areas which explains the development of television through this period. 
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PART ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCfION 
My original impulse to tackle the subject of television in New Zealand from 
1974 onwards came from my own experience as a working broadcaster, particularly 
during the period from 1977-80. What, I wanted to know, had happened to me and 
my colleagues then; why was it such a turbulent and confusing period and why, after 
1980, did a sense of vitality and urgency seem to have gone out of television 
production? To ask such questions, of course, is to invoke a kind of topos, whether it 
arises out of a sense of organisational experience (viz Larson, 1979) or out of the 
familiar sociological invocation of private troubles and public issues. 
Perhaps inevitably, the questions I set out to answer are not the ones which, 
finally, are addressed in the thesis, although there is a relationship between them. 
Instead, they focus on three interlinked areas. First, how television is constituted as a 
specific kind of organisational activity; secondly, the role of producers or programrne-
makers both within this organisation and with the production of particular programme 
materials. Thirdly, and finally, the linkage of both these entities to the wider context 
of institutions and society. 
The inter-relation of these three areas provides a very similar 
conceptualisation to a tentative one developed by Elliot and Chaney in 1969. 
Drawing on organisation theory and the sociology of art, they produced a parallel 
framework for the relationship between Organisation, Medium (occupational cultures) 
and Culture ('the society') in 'the social contexts of media production' (1969:365). As 
they observe, 'there are no water-tight boundaries between these areas' (1969:365) and 
what I have set out to examine is the tensions and ambiguities which arise both within 
and between them. 
Within the organisation there have been two kinds of tension. One is a very 
central and continuing conflict between programme-makers attempting to maintain 
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their collegial, discretionary and often informal practices, and bureaucratizing 
administrators and managers intent on codifying and regulating organisational 
I activities primarily in the interests of efficiency (see Crozier, 1964). Clearly, as will 
become evident, these are arguments over the most effective way to achieve a rather 
vague set of objectives: in a word, 'good' television. The other conflict is between 
two competing, partially-commercial television channels through the 1970's, and the 
differing organisational identities and cultures this produces. 
Within the professional or programme-making area, the tensions emerge as the 
struggle of programme-makers to constitute themselves as a professional body with a 
significant area of autonomy separate from the state - but also to accommodate the 
different orientations of its members which threaten to en~anger what Larson (1979) 
would describe as their joint professional project. 
The area of social and cultural factors is the most difficult to summarise. It 
concerns, in one important way, the shifting construction and representation of 
regional, national, commercial and public service discourses through the production 
of specific television programmes and programme schedules. In another, it is about 
the reaction of various groups and publics to these representations, the unstable social 
context out of which these arise, and the consequences for the organisation, its 
constituent occupational groups and emergent cultural production. 
Obviously, and as Elliot and Chaney recognise, one sphere overlaps almost 
continuously with another to crystallise - especially in New Zealand circumstances -
into specific but seemingly temporary organisational and cultural configurations. 
Unavoidably, this makes for a complex analysis, particularly given the 
additional hazard of interweaving a historical narrative out of a recent history which 
has, its,elf, been subject to a wide range of interpretations (see James, 1986, for 
example). The result, in terms of individual chapters, has been an alternation of 
thematic or sociological analysis and historical narrative, developed within a context 
of both American and English literatures. 
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The time-frame, as a period for study, suggests itself. The beginning of two-
channel television, in 1975, arose out of a set of new national impulses contained in 
the Adam Report of 1973. This dual-channel blueprint reflected broader social 
changes, and the way these were worked out at a social and organisational level, up to 
" the merging of two competing networks into a single corporation in 1980, forms a 
natural focus of attention. This is where the most detailed analysis is located, up to 
the end of chapter eight. Chapters nine and ten discuss these developments and 
describe more recent changes, from 1980 up to the present day, with the dissolution of 
the state monopoly of broadcasting on which the original organisational structure was 
premissed. 
As a whole, the study is divided into three parts. The first, covering chapters 
one and two is introductory, and outlines the main conceptual dimensions of the 
study. The second contains the bulk of the narrative and the detailed descriptive 
materials, and runs from chapters three to eight. If it might be described, in some 
senses, as being written in a more realistic mode (White 1979), then the last part 
might be described as adopting a more ironising approach in reflecting on the broader 
social and cultural configurations which appear to emerge over time. This part 
includes chapters nine and ten, although in some ways it also includes the 
methodological appendix which extends the mode of commentary adopted in these 
chapters. 
In more detail, after a review of the literature in chapter two, chapter three 
focusses in considerable detail on the way the Adam Report was translated into 
organisational form in 1975. Its emphasis is predominantly organisational. Chapter 
four picks up the linkages between profession, organisation and culture from 1974-76, 
concentrating on the role of the profession, while chapter five analyses some of the 
emerging issues which arose from programme-makers' control of the new 
corporations. Chapter six examines the 1976 Broadcasting Act, and especially the 
complex social circumstances which underpinned it. Again, each of these chapters, 
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and all those up to chapter eight, make intensive use of internal broadcasting 
documents, amongst other materials, to establish a very detailed examination of the 
events under discussion. 
Chapter seven assesses the changes imposed by the Act and the consequences 
for the relationship between administrators and programme-makers, and the way that 
- - -
the balance shifted against production staff. Chapter eight looks at the role of the 
newly-instituted full-time executive chairman as a charismatic institutional figure, and 
his unexpected impact on the relations between administrators and programme-
makers. In particular, it examines the shifts across all three spheres outlined above 
produced by the 1979-80 restructuring, and the formation of Television New Zealand 
in 1980. 
Chapter nine adopts a broader historical and comparative approach to assess 
television briefly both in terms of Australian, British and American systems, and in 
terms of New Zealand broadcasting history, to identify the relationship of cultural and 
technological forces. It also advances the historical narrative from 1980-88. The 
final chapter discusses some of the changes, under the deregulation of broadcasting in 
1989, for television in terms of the themes which have been developed in earlier 
chapters. Lastly, the methodological appendix provides a discussion of the 
procedures and issues involved in dealing with the very extensive, if disorganised, 
broadcasting documentation that was made available to me. It also takes up some 
issues of representation posed by the problems of sociological analysis and historical 
narrativization. 
4 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Literature on the media as organisational systems is notable more for its 
scattered and diverse nature than for its consistency (see Hirsch, 1977: 14 and 
McQuail, 1987 on this point). In part this is a result of contradictory pressures from 
widely varying intellectual disciplines that treat various aspects of the media as 
instances of political economic theory (viz. Curran et al 1977) or as culture-bearing 
institutions within a sociology of culture framework (Petersen, 1975) or, alternatively, 
from within a critical theorist (Gitlin, 1979) or Marxist perspective (Murdock and 
Golding, 1977). In part, too, it arises from the fundamentally different organisational 
principles evident between English and American broadcasting models which are a 
consequence of the very different social systems in which they have emerged and 
which, in turn, have led to very different modes of theorising about them. (See Allen, 
1986, Carey 1979 and Rowland and Watkins 1984, for examples of the commentary 
which these differences have prompted). 
This poses a considerable problem for a study of New Zealand television in a 
context where there is no developed indigenous research tradition (Lealand, 1988a) 
and where the system itself is an amalgam of the Reithian English model and free-
market American principles adapted by way of Australian influences. Nonetheless, 
this chapter sets out to review three areas of literature as they bear on New Zealand 
television in order to show how their approaches highlight some of the central 
tensions and ambiguities that have influenced the formation of this particular 
organisational arrangement. 
The three areas under review are (1) aspects of organisation theory; (2) the 
sociology of the professions, and (3) the sociology of cultural production. In broad 
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form this follows Hirsch's (1977) three-level categorisation of occupations, media 
organisations as a whole, and interorganizational and institutional analysis. 
This chapter's focus of interest within organisation theory is two-fold: on the 
, relationship of the organisation to its institutional and market environment, and on the 
key question of bureaucratic and expert modes of organisation. This second focus 
naturally introduces the problem of broadcasters' attempts to professionalise 
themselves: to win and maintain control as an occupational group over the 
determination of their work without interference - in this case from other 
organisational groups. The success or failure of this strategy which, it is argued, 
flows from changes in the organisation's market or institutional setting then has clear 
consequences for the third area under review. Cultural production is strongly 
influenced by the degree to which mass communicators have discretion over their 
individual output, but also over the broader patterning of programme schedules. 
Obviously enough, the degree to which broadcasters match or articulate public tastes, 
perceptions or aspirations affects their own futures and so some attention must be paid 
to literature on the formation of publics and the differentiation of cultures. Lastly, all 
three areas need to be related to existing New Zealand literature with particular 
attention to work on television as an organisation and as a producer of culture. 
Central, however, to the operation of broa~casting organisations is the key 
problem of uncertainty:how they can guarantee and reproduce a consistent output, or 
, 
service, which in tum would support their own conditions of stability (Ettema et al., 
1987). This is a paramount condition not just for broadcasting organisations but 
organisations as a whole, as a wide variety of commentators have acknowledged (see, 
for example, Meyer and Associates, 1978; Thompson, 1967 - and Morgan, 1986, for 
one review of the organisational literature ). The characteristics of uncertainty will be 
explored later in the chapter, but the ability to control and manage it is crucial to the 
career both of broadcasting organisations and those occupational groups who can 
capture the right to determine its dimensions where possible. As a consequence, an 
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occupation's competence in this regard will determine its place in the social structure 
and the financial and status rewards which follow. The differences can be striking. 
Where Hirsch (1977) depicts the routinised process of American cultural production 
and implies that media professionals are, in effect, largely craft workers who remain 
subservient to the dictates of market mechanisms manipulated by organisational 
managers, Cardiff and Scannell (1987) paint a very different picture of BBC 
professionals. Here, through their pre-war success in representing a new sense of 
common purpose and national unity which also reproduced the existing social order, it 
tied them and the organisation firmly into an elevated position in the established 
social structure (1987:109): 
'By the end of the 1930s the BBC had acquired the patina of tradition. 
It seemed as entwined with immemorial ivy as Oxbridge, the public 
school system (itself a recent but remarkably successful case of new 
wine in old bottles) or the Bank of England.' 
In organisational language, the BBC constitutes an example of control over a 
resource (or, more accurately here, over a potential by virtue of its undefined 
symbolic possibilities) which is both uncertain and highly valued (or, in the market-
based terminology of organisational literature, scarce). Clearly, other dimensions are 
also implicit in this illustration, to do with monopoly or, alternatively, conditions of 
deference, some of which will be discussed in due course. What is primary, however, 
is the role of uncertainty in the career of broadcasting organisations (Gitlin, 1984) and 
occupations, and it is this which forms the starting-point for the following discussion. 
2. TELEVISION AND ORGANISATION THEORY 
The sheer ubiquity of the media and their ambiguity of purpose has, in itself, 
sometimes been a source of confusion and even dismay to some researchers (e.g 
Rosengren, 1981) and which, in turn, has generated a wide array of explanatory 
approaches (see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1987 for one recent and extensive 
overview). The bafflement this variety and purpose can produce is perhaps best 
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typified by Me Quail in what is generally regarded as the standard survey of the field 
(1986:306-7): 
'These purposes are a mixture of the sacred and the profane, material 
and spiritual, the enduring and the ephemeral. The media are also 
inextricably tied in with questions of social control and order and with 
processes of social change. Sometimes they are about nothing in 
particular ... While such objectives do not need to be in conflict or 
mutually inconsistent, there are usually considerable elements of 
unresolved contradiction and latent tension in media activity taken as a 
whole. Together with multiplicity of purpose goes ambiguity of 
meaning .. .!t is not clear what media content can tell us about its own 
producers, about society, or about its audiences ... the message of media 
theory seems to be that we might better regard media content as a 
unique cultural form .. .' 
Ettema et al. take up the same theme of ambiguity in a wide-ranging review of 
the role of professional mass communicators but concentrate on the problem of 
selection of content within different media industries (1987:752): 
'Network producers must select producers and series, and publishers 
must select authors and titles, that fit their markets. However, the 
criteria for selection, even in concentrated and relatively 
noninnovative industries, are not well defined. It is unclear who can 
generate content that meets market requirements. Further, it is not 
even clear what those requirements will be; consumer tastes seem 
unstable, even unknowable.' 
It is this root ambiguity, however unclearly expressed, which provides the 
major instability for broadcasting as organisational form. A major theme of 
organisation theory is that all organisations attempt to routinise and stabilise their 
working practices (see, for instance, Cohen, March and Osen, 1972; Cyert and March, 
1963; Lindblom, 1959; March and Olsen, 1972; March, 1981; March and Olsen, 
1976). 
Yet the key difficulty which this presents is that not all of what Harris (1980) 
terms primary productive practices can be readily differentiated, contained and 
replicated within a complex division of labour. This produces a fundamental 
bifurcation of organisational practice ordered around what Burns (1981) calls the 
distinction between the 'collaborative system' and the 'managerial structure.' As 
described by Reed (1985:128-129) the 'managerial structure' constitutes the 'various 
bureaucratic systems and regulations' imposed under conditions of impersonal 
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operation and which relies on 'formal control and coercive sanctions to secure routine 
compliance with its dictates.' Such a concept is very close to Weber's (1968) ideal 
type of bureaucracy. Likewise, Reed's description of the 'collaborative system' 
(1985: 128-129) bears similarities to Weber's concept of expertise, being 'sustained by 
commitment, trust, and the habits of mind and conduct inculcated through the 
appropriate socialization processes.' In short, where bureaucratic systems rely on 
rigidity and predictability to accomplish stability within an organisation, expert, 
professional or collaborative systems rely on the application of common 
understandings, and the exercise of discretion to achieve the same end. They 
correspond to what Reed (1985:136) terms the instrumental and mora:! modes of 
action. 
The need to maintain stability implies change taking place beyond an 
organisation's boundaries and it is the attempt to contain and manage this which 
produces not only these two broad systems but also the conflicts between them. As 
Crozier observes (1964:186): 
'Every organisation, however, must continually adjust to some kind of 
change. It must be flexible. To achieve this vague but primary end, it 
must rely on individual and group ingenuity and cannot discourage it 
too much. The organisation must consider this goal when devising 
ways to impose conformity, since it is counter to the other primary 
goal, predictability. What will be the outcome of these two conflicting 
aims? Its environment, its goals, the kind of fluctuating reality to 
which an organisation must adjust, will be the most important factors 
to be taken into consideration in this perspective.' 
Television, and media organisations generally, as indicated, are especially 
prone to this uncertainty (Ettema et al., 1987). Yet this environmental ambiguity 
may, in itself, vary along a number of dimensions (for example see Dill, 1958; Emery 
and Trist, 1965; Hall, 1982; Hickson et aI, 1971; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Scott 
1981 and Weick, 1979). 
What remains undisputed, though, is that the ability of any sub-group's ability 
to maintain or enhance an organisation's stability reflects on its power or dominance 
within the organisation (Pfeffer, 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Pugh, 1969, and 
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Starbuck, 1976). Hirsch (1969, 1972, 1975) and Petersen and Berger (1971, 1975) 
have developed the application of this perspective within media industries (and see 
Turow, 1982 and 1984 a and b for studies of American television). This approach in 
general falls within contingency theory or a resource dependency perspective (see 
Perrow, 1979 or Pfeffer, 1981 for an elaboration) and it has enabled Engwall (1986) 
to argue that the control exercised over key resources has important consequences for 
newspapers' goal-setting and, subsequently, for their 'organisational drift' in the face 
of changing circumstances. What, precisely, these resources are for a newspaper or, 
for that matter, any organisation is more difficult to define (Mintzberg, 1983). In the 
first instance it is often taken to be financial but it may be any set of requirements 
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necessary to completing an organisation's operational practices satisfactorily and· 
which, consequently, may become sources of power when their acquisition is difficult 
or uncertain. Morgan (1986:159) lists 14 sources of power but also acknowledges 
that the concept of power is an exceedingly amorphous one, and difficult to define. 
(1986:363-364). For present purposes, the analysis offered by Crozier, which evolves 
from a Weberian formulation, is sufficient to highlight the relation of environmental 
uncertainty to bureaucratic managers and experts (1964:164): 
'Comparing the competing claims of the different individuals and 
groups within an organisation, one can state that, in the long run, 
power will tend to be closely related to the kind of uncertainty upon 
which depends the life of the organisation ..... As soon as the progress of 
scientific management or of economic stabilisation has made one kind 
of difficulty liable, at least to a certain degree, to rational prediction, 
the power of the group whose role it is to cope with this kind of 
difficulty, and of the people who represent it, will tend to decrease.' 
This statement returns us once again to the opposition between instrumental 
and moral modes of action but also illustrates the constant encroachment of the 
rational or predictable i.e. the bureaucratic - on the domain of the discretionary - i.e. 
the expert or professional (Crozier, 1964:165): 
'The invasion of all domains by rationality, of course, gives power to 
the expert who is an agent of this progress. But the expert's success is 
constantly self-defeating. The rationalization process gives him power, 
but the end results of rationalization curtail this power.' 
If these remarks emphasise the contrasts between routinized and discretionary 
practices, they say little about the different goals and aspirations of experts and 
bureaucratic managers. Whereas the interests of managers are generally to the 
organisation as a whole, those of experts may be limited to their own professional 
projects (see, for example, Goldner and Ritti, 1967; ~aplan, 1965; Perrow, 1979; 
Pettigrew, 1973). While this has been a consistent theme within organisational 
literature (viz Perrow, 1979:50-57) it has important consequences for the relationship 
between managers and professionals, as Freidson observes (1986:168-169): 
'While the professional employee has discretionary power and 
exercises it either to grant goods or services directly ... he or she has 
little control over the amount and type of goods and services 
available .... it follows from the fact that resource allocation, which 
influences both what can be· done and how it can be done is 
everywhere the centrarpower retained by management that is also the 
central source of conflict between the rank and file and management, 
whether management possesses professional qualifications or not.' 
What bedevils this analysis is that, in some organisations, professionals are, to 
all intents and purposes, also the management. This is no less true of broadcasting 
(see Leapman, 1986, on the BBC for instance) and was certainly the case in New 
Zealand from 1974. Freidson provides two solutions. He argues first, that where 
professionals are also managers, there is still a fundamental division between 
managerial (and inherently allocatory) functions and employee functions (see 
Freidson 1986:149-155 for a detailed discussion and especially p.150) which 
distinguishes their formal roles and which distances managerial professionals from 
their colleagues on the basis of task differentiation. His second solution which, again, 
is relevant to this study is to point to the gap between Weber's ideal type of rational-
legal bureaucracy and actual organisations staffed and controlled by professionals 
(and see Stinchcombe, 1959 for an earlier discussion) (1986:160): 
'Studying doctors in an outpatient clinic, Goss (1961, 1963) advanced 
the idea of "advisory bureaucracy" to fit what she found. Studying 
lawyers in large law firms, Smigel (1964) employed the concept of 
"professional bureaucracy". Montague (1968) employed the term 
professional organisation for large accounting firms, as did Bucher 
and Stelling (1969) for hospitals and Scott (1965) for social agencies.' 
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These concepts are important in an organisation such as New Zealand 
television where professional involvement at all levels was high and where strictly 
formal definitions of bureaucracy were minimised. 
Before turning to the nature of professional activity and self-definition which 
is clearly implied by Freidson's discussion two further issues need first to be dealt 
with: the role of technology in defining the professional task environment and the 
place of organisations in an institutional or state environment as opposed to a market 
setting. For reasons of clarity, the second issue is discussed fIrst. 
3. PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS, THE STATE AND TELEVISION 
Much of the literature on organisations is directed towards them as market 
entities rather than public bodies (Ring and Perry, 1985; Wortman, 1979) which is 
problematic for organisations such as television which may be either private or public 
and certainly exist in both settings (McQuail, 1986). Much of this literature, 
moreover, is American in origin and frequently begins from quite different cultural 
assumptions to British or European work, particularly with regard to the growth of the 
post-war 'administrative science' movement in the U.S. (Thompson, 1956; Reed, 
1985). The result, with media analysis, is that the alternative kinds of discussion 
which these perspectives produce is generally far from complementary or 
coterminous. Ettema et al.'s(l987) thorough discussion of the processes of American 
cultural production, for instance, undercuts its analysis by concentrating only on mass 
communications within market constraints, and while there has been a recognition of 
the distortion this neglect can produce (for example, Becker, 1984; Marchetti, 1989 
and Turow, 1985), and an attempt to reconcile differing research traditions (e.g. 
Streeter, 1984 and Fiske, 1987), nonetheless there has been a continuing difference of 
emphasis. 
Where American literature has not continued with an administrative science 
perspective on public sector settings or management (see, for instance, Allison, 1983; 
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Bower, 1977; Lindblom, 1979; Nakamura, 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979; 
Rainey et al, 1976; Whorton and Worthley, 1981) or adopted what Perrow (1979) 
calls a 'neo-institutional' approach (see, in particular, Meyer and Rowan, 1977 or 
Meyer and Scott, 1982) that has also been applied to the media sector (e.g. de Fleur, 
1970; Ettema and Whitney, 1982), it has turned to a critical or Marxist perspective 
(viz Benson 1977a and b; McNeil, 1978; Perrow, 1979), an initiative which has been 
followed with studies of the media, most commonly from a political economy 
perspective (see Gitlin, 1983; Good, 1989; Jhally 1989; Molotch and Lester, 1973; 
Tuchman, 1978 and Turow, 1984a and b, 1985 as examples). 
Marxism and critical theory has been equally influential in the development of 
a political economy of mass communications in .England and Europe (for instance, 
Curran, 1986; Curran and Seaton, 1985; Garnham, 1979; Murdock and Golding, 1977 
and 1978; Rosengren, 1981) and clearly accounts for the role of the state and the 
place of public regulation in the constraints on, and management of, media 
organisations. However, a political economy approach does not necessarily imply 
that these organisations are public bodies, merely that they operate in a political as 
well as an economic environment. For accounts of public broadcasting organisations 
the primary sources are English (e.g. Burns, 1964, 1969, 1977; Curran et aI, 1977: 
Garnham, 1974; Hood, 1979; Scannell and Cardiff, 1982, 1987 - but see, for example, 
the European Journal of Communications, 1985-89, for recent European accounts), 
which indicate the nature of the complex, refractory and often ambiguous ties 
between the state and broadcasters through the mechanisms of social rather than 
directly economic control. 
Finally, what these research traditions suggest is a number of dimensions 
within which television can operate. The economic environment may range from an 
effective condition of monopoly to a turbulent and competitive marketplace. At the 
same time, broadcasting organisations are faced with sets of constraints and control 
which may range from a mix of clear economic dependencies to broad, often implicit, 
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but nonetheless powerful social controls and moral ties. Given the uncertain nature of 
the symbolic product of broadcasting, the way that these complex environmental 
features are perceived and interpreted by organisational members will determine to a 
large degree the relationship and conflicts between the managerial structure and the 
collaborative system. However, this interaction is constrained by one further, 
important factor: the technology of broadcasting. 
4. TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY 
To portray an organisation as being a combination of two opposed modes of 
action (the instrumental and the moral, to return to Reed's (1985) phrase) is to 
constitute it as a field of social forces. The problem which then arises is: how are 
these forces arrayed or structured, and how are they internally organised in order to 
actualise the productive work of an organisation? Engwall, (1986) argues that one of 
the key dimensions which differentiates organisations from each other is their 
technology (1986:328): 
', .. differences exist in the actIVIty processes, or technology, of 
organisations. These, like differences in the environmental state, 
impose requirements on organisations.' 
In support of this view he cites the work of Crozier (1964), Hickson et al 
(1969), Thompson (1967) and Woodward (1965) from within an open systems model. 
Morgan describes the linkage between Bums and Stalker's (1961) typology of 
mechanistic and organic organisational forms (which echoes the instrumental and 
modes of action noted above) and Woodward's findings where (1986:51-54): 
'She showed that...different technologies impose different demands on 
individuals and organisations, that have to be met through appropriate 
structure Her evidence suggested that bureaucratic-mechanistic 
organisation might be appropriate for firms employing mass-
production technologies, but that firms· with unit, small-batch, or 
process systems of production needed a different approach.' 
What these production tasks might be depended on both organisational and 
departmental environments, as he pointed out with respect to Lawrence and Lorsch's 
(1967) findings (Morgan, 1986:55): 
'Production departments typically face task environments characterised 
by more clear-cut goals and shorter time horizons, and can adopt more 
formal or bureaucratic modes of interaction than sales departments. 
Research and development departments ... face even more ambiguous 
goals, have even longer time horizons and often adopt even less 
formalised modes of interaction.' 
The problem facing many media organisations is, as McQuail (1987:145) 
observes, that they are 'both making a product and providing a service,' so they are 
faced with 'mixed goals.' This was fundamentally true of New Zealand television 
which both provided a public service as it simultaneously generated advertising 
income. Within newspapers, as Engwall (1978) found, it produced clear functional 
divisions to deal with various sections of the political and financial environment. 
This, in turn, produced sharp internal occupational differentiation and work cultures 
between four different groups: a news-oriented group, Gournalists) a politically-
oriented group (editorial and feature writers), a business group (management, 
administration, circulation and advertising) and a technically-oriented group 
(compositors, lithographers and printers). The differences between these groups then 
led to patterns of conflict which Engwall (1986) summarised as issues of flow, 
technology, publication and allocation. 
The value of emphasising technology, then, is to show how it organises 
patterns of internal activity based on the demands provided by the broader 
environment and how these patterns are translated into practices that differentiate 
occupations and cultures and throw up sources of conflict and alliance around 
distinctive sets of issues. It is technology, therefore, which leads to the patterned 
mobilisation of social forces, themselves organised around patterns of bureaucratic 
and collective practices. As McQuail points out, Engwall's work is the most 
developed (indeed, the only extensive) application of these sets of organisational 
ideas within tbe media, and it is particularly useful as far as the present study is 
concerned, because New Zealand television has been one of the few in the world to 
incorporate such mixed goals as Engwall's Swedish newspaper organisation 
(Docherty and Barnett, forthcoming). The precise differentiation of functions that 
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television technology produces are considered in later chapters, but it is enough to 
point out here that Freidson's (1986) distinction of managers and professionals 
constitutes the basic division of instrumental and moral action. This is within the 
context of what Tunstall (1971) has described as 'non-routine bureaucracy', and the 
presence (McQuail 1986:144) 'of an above-average degree of compromise, 
uncertainty' and 'displacement of goals' by comparison with other types of complex 
organisation. How these affect the position of organisational 'experts' and their 
attempts to insulate themselves through professionalization is considered next. 
5. PROFESSIONS, BUREAUCRACY AND PROGRAMME-MAKERS 
One obvious and much discussed arrangement of social forces which 
corresponds to the division between management structures and collaborative systems 
is that between bureaucracy and professions. As a pair of linked ideas these have 
undergone considerable analysis (see Davies' (1982) review) but for reasons which 
will become clear, we need to treat them as useful but heuristic concepts. What the 
concepts enable us to do, however, is to elucidate some of the problems faced by 
occupations attempting to secure claims to authority and autonomy within particular 
work settings and how these relate to the problems faced by broadcasters as an 
occupational group. 
Although Davies (1982) points to Scott (1966) as providing a particularly 
concise statement of the sources of conflict between bureaucrats and professionals, 
both she and Perrow (1979) acknowledge that the notion originally arose out of 
Parsons' (1954) analysis of Weber's description of bureaucracy as an abstract form. 
The problematic developed by Parsons was summarised into four major differences of 
practice and hence potential conflict by Scott (1966) that might be given as 
differences over rules, standards, supervision and demands for loyalty. From this has 
flowed a considerable body of research on the nature of these conflicts (see for 
example, Engel 1969, 1970; Miller, 1968; Scott, 1969; Sorensen and Sorensen, 1974; 
16 
Wilensky, 1974), or over the way professionals might be incorporated within 
bureaucratic or managerial contexts (for example, Etzioni, 1964; Galbraith, 1973; 
Litwak, 1961; Goldner and Ritti, 1967; Scott, 1965; Walker and Lorsch, 1970). 
However, Davies illustrates how this relatively simple conflict model was 
widely conceived to be inadequate (1982:180-181) and argued that, in any case, 
professionals and bureaucrats co-operated quite satisfactorily under some 
circumstances, a point echoed by Perrow, (1979) and Zald (1972), amongst others. 
Over recent years the result has been a thorough reconceptualisation by theorists not 
only of the idea of profession itself (see, for instance, MacDonald and Ritzer's 1988, 
recent review) but of the antithetical idea of bureaucracy as a fixed, static form 
(Davies, 1982:181): 
'They contest the assumption that organisations are reasonably 
autonomous, stable and equivalent across time and place. Instead, they 
propose that organisations are the outcome of struggles, reflect the 
social relations of society, and are thoroughly permeated by the 
inequalities and contradictions of that society.' 
Likewise, Johnson, in arguing for the importance of understanding the 
relationship between professions and the state disposed of the notion that professions 
themselves are relatively stable sets of attributes (1982:207-208): 
'The view that professionalization is not a single process with a given 
end-state also suggests that the relationship with changing state forms 
is in flux. This in turn gives rise to constant social ambiguity and 
ambivalence which under specific historical conditions may well be of 
crucial importance in the wider relations of class and state.' 
Davies sums up the implications of this retheorising in a way which echoes 
Friedson's (1986) views quoted earlier (1982:188): 
'All this is to suggest that there is no inexorable logic which turns an 
organisation into a 'bureaucracy' and constrains an aspiring 
occupational group to make 'professional' demands which bring it into 
conflict with bureaucracy.' 
On the contrary, her arguments coincide with those of Larson (1977) in an 
American context, in seeing professions and bureaucracies as having common 
historical origins, and in seeing professions as attempting to translate their ascribed 
attributes (insofar as they possess them), through the mechanism of occupational 
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exclusivity, into achieved characteristics that bound both market and organisational 
context (viz Johnson, 1980; MacDonald, 1984; Portwood and Fielding, 1981). 
What this discussion strongly suggests, then, is that both managers and 
professionals use organisations as arenas in which to contest their competing claims to 
authority (and, consequently, organisational dominance), and that these claims are 
based on the differing forms of rationality which derive from the technical 
requirements of their particular occupational areas. It is in these ways that the social 
forces within organisations are organised and articulated, and particularly so in the 
case of 'professional' organisations such as television, where organisational objectives 
are less clearly defined. 
Nonetheless, this formulation 'says .little about how professions are internally 
organised. As MacDonald and RitzIer (1988) point out, a Weberian perspective 
assumes that occupational groups attempt to assert exclusive control over a market for 
their services and which they then attempt to transform into social closure through 
persuading the state to grant them licences or credentials which, effectively, limit 
access to their occupational area (and see, for example, Larkin, 1983; MacDonald, 
1985 and 1986; Starr, 1982). This constitutes an occupation's professional project 
(Larson, 1977) and an effort at continued social mobility which necessarily requires 
clear connections to social elites through the state (Fielding and Portwood, 1981). 
This requires, in turn, a combination of characteristics drawn from what Elliot (1972) 
describes as two types of professions: status professions (those that derive their 
position from their close relation to social elites) and occupational professions (those 
that derive their position and power from claims to expertise and technical 
competence). He argues that in England that there has been a widespread shift from 
status to occupational professions since the ~eginning of the nineteenth century driven 
primarily by the development of capitalism (1972:14-58), Johnson (1972, 1982) is 
largely in agreement but sets out a three-part model of professions of which the least 
powerful are the 'mediative' professions, whose role is most closely defined and 
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regulated by the state. Fielding and Portwood (1981) broadly concur but establish a 
typology of bureaucratic professions of which one key dimension is the profession's 
dependence on, or autonomy from, the state. The issue here is that where professions 
are unable to define and mark out a technical area of competence, they are weakly 
placed either to defend their exclusive domain or to demand state licensing without 
also suffering state regulatory interference, an issue which constantly dogged New 
Zealand broadcasters in the period under study. 
It is precisely this problem which is faced by all broadcasting occupations 
(Elliot, 1977; Gallagher, 1982), and they have fared best when they can demonstrate 
close ties and clear deference to social elites, as Burns (1977) has shown at length. 
Burns (1977) has also shown the transformation of broadcasters from status to 
occupational professions under the clear protection of state regulation; indeed, it is the 
dismantling of this very regulation which has produced recent sharp warnings about 
the imminent demise of 'quality' television (viz Garnham, 1989;). But, where 
programme-makers have had to demonstrate evident technical control over the 
slippery interpretative processes of symbolic production, and usually in a market 
setting, they have generally been subject to some form of managerial interference or 
direction (see, for instance, Ettema and Whitney, 1982, Ettema et al, 1987). In this 
American context, Friedson (1986) has no hesitation in dismissing mass 
communicators' claim to regard themselves as a self-evidently professional body. 
Similarly, Christian (1977) has shown that U.K. newspaper journalists have had to 
abandon professional aspirations within a market setting. 
It follows, then, that where broadcasters have been unable to make the 
transition from attributed (status) to achieved (occupational and technical) 
characteristics then, unlike the case of accountants (MacDonald, 1984), they have 
been unable to establish their acceptability as a new professional group which could 
then be used as the basis of social and legal closure (MacDonald, 1985). Given the 
shifting state and market conditions in which New Zealand television broadcasters 
IY 
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found themselves, this analysis suggests that they were likely to face considerable 
difficulties both in establishing their legitimacy as a profession and in claiming state 
protection without attendant state interference. Underlying this discussion is the 
question, typical of any professional body, of how to constitute an appropriate set of 
clients and how to constitute an adequate knowledge base with which to supply them 
to the exclusion of competitors. Put differently, this represents the problem of media 
audiences and the production of socially-sanctioned culture. This is the final element 
which needs to be examined of the three areas of discussion with which we began. 
6. PUBLICS, AUDIENCES AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE 
If broadcasters could define an audience then this presented an opportunity to 
construct a body of symbolic (programme) material for it. The importance of this for 
broadcasters is emphasised by Gans (1963:322): 
'It can be shown that the role of the audience extends beyond the 
creation and the contents of the mass media product, but affects the 
structure and culture of the mass media themselves .... Every mass 
media creator, whatever his skill, is to some degree dependent on the 
validity of his audience image for his status and standing in the 
industry.' 
From here, two dimensions of audience and culture can be identified. One 
extends from the conception of audience as an aggregate to audience as a socially-
defined group (McQuail, 1986). The other is that culture can be produced for 
particular pre-existing publics (elite, popular or folk cultures) or, alternatively, for 
conglomerations of individuals defined by the differentiation of the cultural output 
(mass culture). Obviously, these are extreme simplifications as McQuail (1986) 
warns, and Clausse (1968) outlines some of the complexities which varying degrees 
of involvement and participation produce. For present purposes, however, it enables 
us to differentiate between enduring socially-organised, stratified elements of the 
social structure (publics) and collectivities brought into existence (e.g. as 'fans' or 
'taste groups') by the operation of the media (Blumer, 1939; Mills, 1956). Clearly, 
this second definition more readily lends itself to redefinition as a market (see, for 
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instance, Ang, 1986; Chagall, 1981; Morley, 1980; Smythe 1977) on the basis of 
different socio-economic profiles, tastes and preferences. In short, we can refer to the 
distinction of public and market as alternative audience images. Where broadcasters 
can identify given publics then they are in a position to fulfil the typical professional 
role of 'serving' those publics and particularly in identifying themselves as part of 
dominant social elites. The best developed models of this relationship exist with state 
broadcasting organisations, whether in Britain, Europe or Japan for example, (Smith, 
1973; Williams, 1974) which generally exist in a monopoly, non-market setting. 
Under these conditions it is possible to organise even diverse publics into an image of 
collective national unity as Cardiff and Scannell detail with pre-war BBC radio 
programmes (1987: 109): 
'For the corporation they fulfilled, at one and the same time, 
instrumental and idealistic intentions. They were idealistic in that they 
sought to provide a fragmented audience with a common culture, an 
image of a knowable community. They were instrumental in that they 
were one means by which the BBC sought recognition for itself as a 
member of the establishment. 
As they argued elsewhere, this involved linked conceptions of elite culture and 
nationalism (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982: 167): 
'This ideal of cultural enlightenment operated within a larger ideology 
of nationalism, for the best meant the best of British.' 
And, as they also pointed out this cultural ideal was constructed out of very 
precise demands for the audience (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982:185): 
'The whole concept of public service, of raising the level of knowledge 
and taste, had rested on a set of expectations invested by the BBC in 
"the great audience" .... "If you only listen with half an ear, you haven't 
a quarter of a right to criticise." Leaving the radio on all the time, as 
background noise, was frowned on .... (and) both programme continuity 
and programme-building (i.e. scheduling) were so arranged at first as 
to inhibit lazy listening.' 
These passages illustrate both the concept of professional calling or service -
helping listeners to better themselves - and a particular set of moral obligations that 
broadcasters demanded which reflected and articulated given values within the 
existing social system, albeit organised around particular elitist assumptions. Yet, as 
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Scannell and Cardiff illustrate, this audience image was ultimately inadequate and 
could neither contain the variety of uses for radio (as for example, a convenience, or a 
commodity, or a cheerful noise in the background) nor retain non-elitist sections of its 
audience - as symbolised by 'the drift to Luxembourg' by large numbers of working-
class listeners (1982:186). 
If this was the problem in a non-market, state monopoly arrangement, the 
problems faced by broadcasters in a competitive, market-driven environment are 
readily understandable. To buffer the sources of uncertainty surrounding the tastes 
and types of audience, Ettema et al. (1987) point to a variety of 'boundary spanning' 
devices and 'brokerage' systems employed by media organisations (and see Hirsch, 
1972; Di Maggio, 1977; Cantor, 1979, 1980; Montgomery, 1981; Turow 1984 a and 
. 
b). They also point to the relative prominence of other media occupations in defining 
audience characteristics (public relations bodies, advertisers, market researchers and 
media management personnel), although Pekumy (1982) points out that despite a 
variety of strategies, the industry is still not fully routinised, (and see Gitlin, 1983, for 
a vivid description of the unending problems this causes broadcasters). 
Inevitably, this generates changes, not only in the relationships of various 
media groupings, but also in the kinds of cultural production which is undertaken. 
This shift from an institutional to an industrial framework where 'the need to find new 
products continually tugs against the attempt to make business stable, predictable and 
thus more manageable' (Ettema et aI, 1987:754) alters the relationship between 
programme-makers and managers. In the U.S., networks minimise in-house 
production and contract out programme production to competing production houses, 
depend heavily on audience research (Gitlin, 1983) and work through formulas 
(Pekumy, 1982). The result is that, while producers may have considerable power in 
some creative spheres (Newcomb and Alley, 1983) they must 'work within, around 
and through' sets of organisational constraints (Newcomb and Alley, 1982) in the 
form of 'schedules, budgets, and other creative controls imposed by the networks' 
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(Ettema et al, 1987:754). Under these circumstances, programme-makers may opt to 
imbue 'some personal visions and values in a show' (Newcombe and Alley, 1982:69), 
but this is a different understanding to the sense of 'calling' noted above (and see 
Cantor, 1971, 1980). In brief, programme-makers, by reason of their different 
circumstances, diverse patrons, and restricted opportunities cannot so readily - if at all 
- organise national publics around sets of moral obligations which would enable them 
to articulate and so assume elite status characteristics. On the contrary, their 
industrial setting demands the production of mass or popular cultures differentiated by 
the construction of various markets for the consumption of the cultural products of 
broadcasting (Gitlin 1987). It is around this process, and how it is best 
conceptualised, that debate has arisen, and which is briefly reviewed in the next 
section. 
7. THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 
The term 'mass culture' has a long history as Bennett (1982) outlines, but it is 
only with its conjunction with recent Marxist thought, and particularly the work of the 
Frankfurt School (viz Adorno, 1974; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Marcuse, 1968) 
that it has gained its modern usage. As Bennett (1982) notes, it is very difficult to 
summarise the Frankfurt analysis succinctly, especially when it is confused with other 
broadly similar critiques. Amongst these, he mentions (1982:45) the left-wing 
popularity accorded to Benjamin's (1970) argument that the mass reproduction of 
cultural artifacts dispossessed them of their sacred, unique qualities. A more general 
version of the mass culture critique, however, is advanced by Ewen and Ewen 
(1982:262): 
'The displacement of collective modes of living, work, ritual and 
'sensibility makes room for the elaboration of a media panorama, 
consumed and understood by people individually. Ultimately, within a 
rising, universal marketplace, consumerism is the basic social relation-
ship replacing customary bonds ..... .It is secularized as the social form 
of a mass culture, of modernization. The universe of the commodity 
looms large with pain and promise over the consumer. 
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McQuail (1986:65) indicates the commodity as being 'the main ideological 
instrument of this process' because 'fine art and even critical and oppositional culture 
can be marketed for profit at the cost of losing critical power.' To sustain this view, 
there has been considerable work to show how ideological and hegemonic processes 
(deriving from the work of Gramsci, 1971) operate to maintain the consent of 
subordinate classes to this form of continuing domination and exploitation by 
capitalist classes (e.g. Dunn, 1986; Hall, 1982; Gitlin, 1987; Good, 1989). However, 
as Kellner (1987:473) comments, it is not yet clear 'how television constructs and 
conveys hegemonic ideology and induces consent to advanced capitalism.' 
One well-developed set of answers has been that it is through· the 
appropriation and reconstitution of popular culture. This assumes, of course, that 
popular culture can be isolated as a distinct, pre-existent entity available for 
appropriation. As Bennett points out, the notion is derived from a variety of usages 
and, in the sense implied here he concludes, (1978:28) 'there is no such thing as 
popular culture,' but only a construction which operates within a whole set of other 
cultural terms and relationships ('elite', 'mass', 'folk' cultures). Nonetheless, Kellner 
argues that television narratives and images are inherently contradictory, 'reproducing 
the conflicts of advanced capitalist society and ideology' opening up spaces for the 
insertion of radical and 'emancipatory popular culture.' (1987:473), (and see Jameson, 
1979; Wren-Lewis, 1983). Dunn (1986) discusses Debord's (1977) and Baudrillard's 
(1975,1981) attempts to theorise television as a metalanguage of consumerism that 
pacifies and dehumanises the spectator but concludes that the very intensification of 
this process may serve to produce detachment and resistance on the part of the viewer. 
This hardly equates to Kellner's emancipatory popular culture, but does leave the 
contradictory nature of television messages as an open question (and see, as further 
contributions to this debate, Browne, 1987; Carey, 1989; Cantor, 1987; Corcoran, 
1987; Fiske, 1988), and the notion of how popular culture is to be conceptualised. 
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The starting point for this discussion was the relationship of television and its 
key occupational groups to its audiences, and how this was translated into the 
production of culture. Because the figure of the audience is such an amorphous 
concept, any analysis of it involves not only an analysis of how programme-makers 
may represent it to themselves, their organisation apd patrons, but also an analysis of 
how the concept has been discussed meta-theoretically by researchers (in terms of 
'elite', 'mass' and 'popular' cultures). Browne comments that the account of television 
discourse (and hence of medium and audience) is fundamentally different in the U.K. 
(largely as a result of the Birmingham Cultural Studies School - viz Gurevitch, et aI, 
1977; Hall et al, 1980; Hall and Jefferson, 1975) than it is in the U.S. (1987:586-587). 
As he points out, while British accounts are founded on the basis of a 'non-
commercial' (and here he excludes lTV) public service system (1987:586): 
'The premise of the American, advertiser-supported system is grounded 
in a radically different relation between the form of the television text 
and the processes of economy and culture.' 
If Browne identifies major differences between English and American 
television (and, equally centrally, see Williams 1974 for an influential analysis in 
terms of culture and technology) it is on the basis that they are fundamentally separate 
systems. The interest in the case of New Zealand is that these opposites were married 
during the period under study and in such a way that they shifted across all the main 
dimensions of organization, profession and cultural production outlined here. Before 
developing this point, however, we need to consider discussions in New Zealand 
literature of these areas. 
8. NEW ZEALAND LITERATURE 
New Zealand does not have a long-established social science tradition 
(Spoonley et aI, 1982), nor an extensive development of media research (Wood, 
1984), and most discussion follows international trends. As far as organisational and 
work literature is concerned, Perry (1982) traces and reviews the main lines of 
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thinking arguing, in part, that researchers have had to struggle to establish themselves 
as a noteworthy body in the face of a traditionalist and unreflective social order. Such 
work, he argues, has amounted to promoting critiques of this order or describing the 
fit between New Zealand organisations and transnational corporations. McLennan et 
al (1987) survey New Zealand literature from a perspective which seems to derive 
predominantly from classical management theory. Designed primarily as a teaching 
reference (1987:11) it sets out to illustrate key management principles by reference to 
New Zealand rather than foreign examples, and largely rearticulates current existing 
theoretical premisses within a local context. Broadly speaking, the same strategy is 
evident in other literature whether it derives from the administrative field (e.g. 
Gregory, 1982; Mascerenhas, 1984) or management literature (e.g. Inkson et aI, 
1985). 
In terms of broadcasting organisations, the main study has been Gregory's 
(1970, 1982) analysis of New Zealand television from 1962-1973, although there 
have been a number of limited case studies of particular aspects of production such as 
news (e.g. Rimmer, 1975; Vintiner, 1976). Pauling (1984) provides an analysis of 
broadcasting policy. However, the main point of interest is Gregory's work (1979, 
1982) which adopts an administrative science perspective to show who were key 
actors within television's first eleven years and the way that tensions developed 
between administrators, the broadcasting board, journalists and engineers at different 
stages (and see McLennan et aI, 1987:164-167). 
As far as the New Zealand media generally is concerned there have been a 
number of studies (Day, unpublished bibliography) although these range from the 
purely historical (e.g. Downey and Harcourt, 1976; Hall, 1980; Ross, 1971, for 
example) to broad survey assessments (e.g. Toogood, 1969, 1969-70) to 
organisational (Cleveland, 1970). Atkinson (1989) has developed a political economy 
critique (and see Simpson, 1984) but, as with organisational research, most of this 
work has only attempted to place New Zealand media within prevailing theoretical 
27 
discussion. One exception is Wood (1982, 1984) who has adopted an Althusserian 
critique in an effort to develop a cultural studies problematic. His work has arisen out 
of the project at Massey University to reconstitute the work of the Birmingham Centre 
for Cultural Studies, within the particular conditions experienced in New Zealand and 
primarily through the journal Sites. Wood attempts to show the linkage between the 
state, media institutions and cultural production, particularly by analysing the 
production of ideological hegemony through current affairs representations of the 
1981 elections. His work is discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
Another, and important exception, is Perry who has discussed not only the role 
of television in the production of culture but also the tensions in both cultural 
formation (1984,1989) and cultural (albeit mostly literary) analysis (1987). His 
relevance to the present study is evident in his defiriition of the social processes 
involved in the mounting of Telethon (1984:101): 
'Television in general, and Telethon in particular, are culturally central 
phenomena. They presume the presence of, and are driven to locate, 
the middle ground of New Zealand life. But when things fall apart the 
centre doesn't hold, and Telethon is edging closer to basic lines of 
cultural cleavage and hence social controversy.' 
Inherent in this statement is a concept, however fragile, of national unity 
organised around and produced by 'a tension between the communal and the 
commercial,' (1984: 101). To articulate this cultural identity is to capture 'broad-based 
public involvement' but render it 'compatible with a system of organisational control 
and a strategy of professional dominance' (1984:91) and which indicates the same sets 
of ambiguities investigated by this study. What is striking here, of course, is that 
unlike Scannell and Cardiffs (1987) analysis of the BBC cited earlier, this cultural 
image is refracted through a commercial framework. It also depends on a dominant 
culture which is inverted from the English pattern so that it reproduces populist (or 
perhaps popular) culture as against the elite culture of the British model (Perry, 1984: 
99; 1987). 
9. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, Perry's work brings us full-circle and returns us to the 
relationships between organisation, profession and cultural practices and production. 
In a sense it seems a long distance to have travelled from the arrangement of social 
forces within organisations to the articulation of particular cultural identities but, as 
this review has attempted to show, there are important and irremovable linkages, 
nonetheless. As it has also attempted to show, some of the intervening difficulties are 
as much metatheoretical as they are relational, a point which is made equally by Reed 
(1985) in his discussion of organisational theorizing, and Perry (1987) in his 
discussion of New Zealand theoretical tropes. Aside from the linkages between areas, 
however, and the ambiguities which these have generated, each area exhibits its own 
tensions. These range from the organizational problems of assessing and responding 
to the differences between market or institutional settings, or the conflicts between 
bureaucratic and professional modes of organising, to the problems of self-
constitution of professions as coherent, authoritative occupational entities and the 
difficulties for media professionals in identifying and managing a clientele through 
the peculiarly elusive figure of the audience. 
Beyond this, what we can point to is the fundamentally different sets of 
relationships which emerge between all these practices when television operates in a 
. . 
market as opposed to a state broadcasting setting. In a way, these alternatives are 
posed as heuristic devices, as a means of understanding how an organisation and a 
profession responds when it is placed in both settings simultaneously. Clearly, the 
New Zealand cultural setting in which this takes place is very different to the English 
or American environments from which they are drawn, and this is discussed in 
Chapter 8. For the time being, however, we can turn to see how the particular 
tensions of recent New Zealand television were set in place through the mechanism of 
the Adam Report in 1974. 
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PART TWO 
TELEVISION FROM 1974-80 
CHAPTER TIIREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TWO-CHANNEL TELEVISION SYSTEM 
'The key to good broadcasting is good programming and the key to 
that is to concentrate on good programme planners and producers'. 
R.O.Douglas. February, 1973 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The quote by Roger Douglas during the period in the early 1970's when he 
was Minister of Broadcasting is significant for two reasons. One is that it goes to the 
heart of a dichotomy which has continued to plague broadcasting - and television 
broadcasting in particular - in New Zealand since its inception: whether it should 
. ' . 
operate as a bureaucratic or a professionally-controlled system. In practice, there has 
had to be an accommodation between the alternatives, but the degree to which one 
has predominated over the other has had distinct consequences for every important 
aspect of its operation, from its structure to its performance and its programme output. 
How it has come to be organised in this hybrid fashion and the consequences, both 
internal and external, which flow from it form a major theme of the thesis. 
The second significant reason is that, as the Labour Minister of Broadcasting, 
Douglas was very much in a position to impose the results of his analysis on 
Broadcasting as it then existed. The implications of his views are clearly defined in 
his statement: broadcasting should be primarily the preserve of programme-makers, 
and it was these implications which stood at the heart of the major reorganisation 
designed and carried out during Labour's one-term administration. Indeed, this 
reorganisation proved to be the most radical restructuring of television broadcasting 
since its introduction in 1960 both in terms of the shift in organisation and control 
within broadcasting, and in terms of the introduction of a second channel. 
What these arrangements were to replace was a single, publicly-owned 
television system controlled by the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (the 
NZBC), a corporation which also ran public radio. This system, governed by the 
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publicly-appointed NZBC board, operated four stations in Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch and Dunedin. Since the early 1960's, the NZBC had pressed for a 
second channel, which had been consistently refused by the prevailing National 
government, (Boyd-Bell, 1985). It was not until the early 1970's that a Commission 
of Inquiry was established to assess tenders for a second channel from private and 
public applicants. The award of a warrant to a large private conglomerate was only 
overturned by the return to power of a Labour government in 1972 with a manifesto 
pledged to retaining broadcasting in public hands. 
The focus of this chapter, consequently, is on the restructuring and its 
consequences for television: specifically, to examine the outcomes of attempting to 
reorganise a highly bureaucratic system so that it was managed and controlled by a 
group with a primarily expert/professional orientation. Also, to examine the tensions 
which the reorganisation introduced as far as internal groups were concerned and, too, 
with respect to its external, or environmental relationships. 
The analysis begins with a description of the new structure which was set in 
place and the organisational arrangements which that entailed. It also looks briefly at 
their implications as far as the main external relationships within which television 
exists. It goes on to examine the way in which programme-makers were given control 
of the system and the tensions which this produced in terms of control over decision-
making. Finally, it examines some of the problems with the reorganisation which 
were to form key issues and a basis of the next reorganisation in 1976. 
2. TIlE NEW BROADCASTING STRUCTURE: TIlE ADAM REPORT 
The new broadcasting structure came partly into force in December 1973 
through a combination of the 1973 Broadcasting Act and the Broadcasting Act 
Commencement Order 1973. However, it was not until 1975 that both the newly 
constituted television corporations began operation. The detailed planning which led 
to their introduction was in three phases: the initial Government announcement in 
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January 1973; a Committee on Broadcasting, commonly known as the Adam 
Committee after its chairman, Professor Kenneth Adam, which produced, between 
April and July 1973, the general machinery needed to implement the government's 
proposals and, finally, groups of broadcasting personnel whose recommendations, 
mostly in the form of working party reports, were discussed by the newly-formed 
Broadcasting Council and, in one form or another, became the detailed operational 
arrangements for the Council and separate corporations. 
The broadcasting structure and its implications are best summed up by the 
Adam Report (1973:6): 
'The plan provided for the separation of the two television channels 
and radio into three independent public corporations and tp.e creation 
of a new central body to provide common services for all three. The 
guiding principles in the proposed restructuring were those of 
decentralization, independence, and the introduction of competitive 
enterprise within publicly owned broadcasting services.' 
It then sets out to emphasise why this objective is so central (1973:15): 
'The structure seeks first to give independence to the corporations so 
they can present a real choice to the public in programme style and 
content. The structure aims next to guarantee independence in 
resources to allow the two TV services and radio all to set their own 
priorities and pursue their own improvement and development. By its 
design the structure is planned to extend independence from ministerial 
control and from indirect pressure exercised through close capital 
works supervision. In the individual corporations the structures 
outlined are shaped to promote creative independence by focussing the 
organisation on those who produce the programmes in the studios and 
on the stations. Finally, the structure pursues independence from the 
unitary, centralizing tendency, which gathers as much as it can into 
one place and one pyramid of power and resources, thus over-riding or 
neglecting the country's spread of talent and its regional variety.' 
Many of these objectives also contain an implicit criticism of the existing 
NZBC order; nowhere more so, however, than its replacement of an administratively-
dominated regime with one explicitly designed to favour prograIl1Il'l:e-makers. The 
point is already made in the foregoing passage, but is made elsewhere equally 
strongly (1973: 14): 
'In other words, the producer, who is the key figure in broadcasting, 
needs protection. He is not just an instrument of task performance. 
For him, a command which is authorative without being authoritarian 
is most appropriate.' 
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In elevating the position of producers, the Committee also observed that 
'Programmes are seldom made to order. Not good ones, anyway' (1973: 14). In 
recognising this, the Committee sought to introduce as flexible and responsive a 
system as it could devise, remarking (1973: 14): 
'Organisation is not an end in itself, but a dispensable means. It cannot 
afford·in broadcasting to be either static or mechanica1.' 
What it envisaged was an organisation with the 'right climate of reference' 
with producers 'both creatively and technically efficient' supervised by 'heads who are 
both accessible and experienced in the programme field.' As it continued (1973: 12); 
'It should be a two-way flow, free without being too free and easy. But 
the top administrative positions should be ideally filled by programme 
men who understand the true meaning of feasibility. The reluctance of 
staff to go through cumbersome working relationships to which the 
Committee has been referred again and again, has reduced 
productivity.' 
It is perhaps necessary only to note that while the Committee increased the 
control of producers and programme-makers, it did so in a setting which implied a 
strong professional or craft orientation. There are references to norm-oriented over 
codified procedures and an acknowledgement that organisational structures should be 
fluid rather than precisely ordered. It also suggested a less obviously hierarchical 
arrangement and one which preferred the activation of common understandings over 
administrative regulation (1973: 12): 
We cannot stress too firmly our view that the complexities or modern 
programming .. , require decisive action up to the moment of going on 
air or screen and indeed after that moment. Management, as such, 
cannot hope to interfere in news bulletins and its ability to do so in 
current affairs programmes is also limited.' 
Clearly, its point of reference is to the execution of professional codes of 
judgement understood and exercised as much by operatives as by higher-level 
executives. As such, it is an explicit craft or professional formulation which depends 
on the idea that immediacy of decision at an operational level is critical to 
organisational performance. This notion of effectiveness of a group's occupational 
judgement is congruent with the idea of occupational control over an area of technical 
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expertise (viz Elliot, 1977). The Committee's assertion, in other words, is that only 
programme-makers are properly competent to judge programme decisions, especially 
in the heat of the moment, and that on these judgements stands the success of the 
organisation: it is, in short, an acknowledgement of occupational autonomy. 
At the same time, it also implies the fundamental uncertainty underlying 
programme-making; to what ends, and for whom, are such programme judgements 
made? The notion of judgement in this context, implies the notion of a known or 
definable audience whose tastes, interests and satisfaction can be readily identified 
and fulfilled by the operation of professional expertise. Yet, as quoted earlier, the 
Committee indicated that good programmes are seldom made to order; nor, in that 
context or elsewhere does it attempt to define 'good' programming. The closest it 
approaches is to advocate the importance of interpreting New Zealand society 
(1973:8): 
'There must be a will to assist and foster the New Zealand 
consciousness. There must be recognition and acceptance of the 
money this will involve. There must be operators' policies which are 
publicly stated and publicly examined.' 
Elsewhere, however, the Committee's proclamations possess a more 
contradictory character. In commenting on the continuing mix of commercial and 
non-commercial objectives, which was inherent in the NZBC's operation and was to 
be extended under the two-channel system (in the guise of 'competitive enterprise' 
referred to earlier), the Committee remarked, somewhat uncertainly, that 'the wider 
aspects of public service broadcasting can be lost sight of in the struggle for revenue' 
(1973:18). It went on to declare, though, (1973:17): 
'The assignment of a non-commercial role to both television services 
will therefore act as a constant reminder to them that they exist "to 
inform, to educate, and to entertain" and that their commercial 
activities are solely a means to an end.' 
Put differently, there is a conflict of aims towards both public service and 
commercial ends - a 'mixed system' which the Committee hoped could be steered 'on 
a middle course between unfettered show business and the restrictive apparatus of the 
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state.' (1973:7). In fact, the dichotomy may be more complex than a public-
commercial trade-off, and may be experienced particularly acutely by the very 
occupational groups which the Committee elevated to resolve the conflict. As Elliot 
suggests (1977: 149): 
'The dilemma may involve a distinction between high and low culture, 
between professional or craft. standards and commercial judgement, 
between self-regulation and close bureaucratic control of the work 
situation ... between using one's talent for a purpose and having them 
used for none except the survival or commercial success of the 
organisation for which the work is done.' 
In the New Zealand context the Committee, in commenting on popular preferences 
with regard to radio and light entertainment, remarked that 'the audience has 
consistently divided with a large majority on the light side,' (1973: 18) which had 
become a form of segregation .. Mixed broadcasting objectives, it went on to argue; 
must therefore be beneficial in television (1973:18): 
'Mixing the character of both TV channels and alternating their 
commercial and non-commercial programmes must have the effect of 
reducing this self-segregation and minimising the division of 
communicated experiences within the community.' 
Viewers would be hard put to escape to 'the lightest option' but would run 
across alternatives, such as minority programmes, which would serve, 'because there 
will always be eavesdroppers, to introduce others to social and cultural experiences 
which are new to them' (1973:9). In a nutshell, television would be good for one. It 
was predominantly for these reasons that the Committee developed the organisational 
blueprint as it did. As the final NZBC Annual Report summed it up (1974:3): 
'The report placed great emphasis on the independence of the 
corporations, competitive but complementary television programmes, a 
resurgence of radio, and efficiency and economy ... The committee 
also stressed the need for simple organisational structures with "lean" 
administration and the delegation of responsibility for programme 
decisions "as near to the actual operation as possible".' 
The broad means to implement these policies were set out in the remainder of 
the report, which is outlined in the next section. 
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2.1 Detail of the New Broadcasting Structure 
The essential structural details were designed to be uncomplicated. Each of 
the three corporations had a board consisting of a chairman and two other members 
appointed by the Governor-General on Ministerial recommendation. The chairman 
was appointed for 5 years, one member for 4 years and the other for 2 years to provide 
a continuity of experience and independence. All members were part-time 
appointments, and it was acknowledged that, as a consequence, the chairman's role, 
especially, 'would be a particularly responsible, busy, and onerous position' (1973:19). 
The three chairmen also sat as members of the Broadcasting Council along with three 
other publicly-appointed members: 'an independent chairman, deputy chairman and 
additional member' whose presence was to be 'a moderating and balancing element' 
(1973:23). In effect, they prevented the domination of the Council by the combined 
corporations (1973:24), although the Council chairman was intended to act as a 
consensus-seeker rather than a leader. 
The Council's function was to agree a development programme, allocate 
licence revenues, draw up a 3 year budget incorporating the corporations' budget 
priorities, and undertake year-to-year planning (1973:23). Also present at Council 
meetings were to be the three corporation Directors-General, (see appendix 1), who 
could speak but not vote. Each Director-General was envisaged to be 'the key staff 
appointment' for a corporation (1973:20), and apart from the stipulation of a 
retirement age, no other limitations were placed upon how the appointment was made. 
2.1.1 Council Functions 
The Council had two pnmary functions: (1) the provision of 'overall 
development finance', and (2) the provision 'of common services', which left each 
individual corporation 'free to manage and operate its own service within licence 
revenue, its earnings by advertising, and any capital assistance for projects which 
Council may have assigned' (1973:25). However, all land and buildings were owned 
by the Council and rented out to the corporations. 
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The Council's financial role was sketched out in 3' pages. Each corporation 
was expected to prepare a 3-year financial programme, subject to annual review, 
which was to serve as the basis of licence fee appointment and decisions on 
borrowing requirements (1973:137) by the Council. The committee recognised that 
'in an ideal situation' each corporation should be entirely independently resourced: 
'sent on their separate ways with all their present needs and the assurance of earning 
enough on their own for a constantly expanding future' (1973:23). However, it 
argued that resources and capital were inadequate to do this: in fact, that a $24 million 
expansion programme for conversion to colour and second-channel coverage was 
required which demanded 'a phased development programme' (1973:23) that was 
centrally managed. Ironically, in those few remarks, the report encapsulated many of 
broadcasting's future conflicts: inadequate finance became a major site around which 
competing claims to management were organised, while the centralised development 
programme cut across the independent, competitive objectives of programme-makers. 
2.1.2 Common Services 
The provision of common services covered a number of different areas. First, 
the council was to retain centralised control of electronic data-processing and 
audience research, whilst acknowledging the possibility of limited special research 
(1973:27). Secondly, the Council was to act as a common negotiator not only with 
the respect to overseas broadcasting organisations, such as the Asian Broadcasting 
Union, but also in three other areas in which, in effect, it would maintain a monopoly. 
The first was overseas programme purchasing, to prevent cross-channel bidding 
which might drive the price of foreign programming up. Here, TV-l and TV-2 were 
bound to an internal tendering system, but could indicate individual preferences for 
potential Council purchase which would then be assembled into a common list 
available for subsequent bidding. The second and third covered common negotiation 
for categories of news and sports material. With news, in particular, a non-editorial 
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manager was to be appointed to manage the gathering, but not the selection, of news, 
which was to be the prerogative of the rival news editors, working out of Avalon. 
The third common service was advertising and programme standards. 
Essentially, this continued the role of the former New Zealand Broadcasting Authority 
'to say what was permissible and what was not' including 'that phrase of a thousand 
meanings, a "proper balance in subject-matter'" (1973:29). While the Committee 
announced the intention to extend the codification of standards and to continue 
programme monitoring, it also emphasised that 'beyond finding and establishing 
patterns of performance and reporting it, the Council will not go' (1973:30). Most of 
the role of the judgement of standards, therefore, rested with programme-makers 
inside the corporations. 
2.1.3 Transmission services 
Besides these common services, the Council's other main role was control of 
the transmission facilities. As it emphasised early in the report, 'from the point 
outside the walls of the studio where the programme is made, all engineering from 
there to the audience is the control of BCNZ,' (1973:26). As a consequence, all non-
studio engineering control was centralised within the Council's engineering section. 
What transpired from the Committee's recommendations, then, was a system 
, 
in which it was intended that Council staff provide a purely utilitarian. and service 
function of for the pre-eminently active and dominant roles of the corporations. 
The presence of the Council itself, however, also illuminated two other general 
principles of central concern to the Committee: responsibility and economy. As the 
report summed it up (1973:22): 
'New Zealand is too small a country, broadcasting revenues are too 
. slim for all the needed developments, and the public interest in the 
efficient use of those resources is too great, to permit any unnecessary 
duplication or waste of assets.' 
In brief, maximum economy could be obtained through a managed, rather than 
a market, system. Although audience research or electronic data-processing facilities, 
for example, were readily available outside broadcasting, as were private programme 
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purchasing possibilities (as a later detailed offer to the Council from the Spectrum 
Group (1973) highlighted), the Committee indicated a clear preference for internal 
arrangements. Its statements on responsibility begin to provide an explanation. In 
proposing annual reports to Parliaments for each corporation, it commented that these 
organisations are 'creations of Parliament and servants of the public', as could be 
recognised not only through the licence fee system, but also was 'just as true 
ultimately of advertising revenues' (1973:22). More explicitly (1973:22): 
'The corporations and the Council have a plain duty to exercise 
responsibility in making the optimum use of these public revenues in 
serving the public interest.' 
However, since alternative economic methods received no obvious analysis, it 
is fair to assume that responsibility weighed more heavily iri the balance than 
economy. The system, as noted earlier, was one of 'guided' competition; that is, one 
with clear social controls built into it. 
2.1.4 Other Features 
Having said that, the report allowed for two further features in the broad 
organisational structure. One was to recommend the abolition of any political 
dependence and the end of 'the confusion in the public mind' (1973:31) over the 
respective roles of the Minister and broadcasting. Remaining Ministerial 
responsibilities, such as the authorisation of major borrowing requirements, were left 
to the Postmaster-General. 
The second feature concerned the employment and payment of staff. It 
advocated increased specialisation in production groups, salary scales outside the 
State Services (i.e. the public service) rates, promotion on merit, a single salary scale 
for all broadcasters and the introduction of contract employment, particularly at senior 
levels. It also urged the formation, following the Minister of Broadcasting's 
preference, of an all-encompassing Broadcasting Union (1973:13). It also dispensed 
with the idea of grievance machinery and appeals against appointment (1973:25). 
However, apart from emphasising that production personnel's salaries should be 
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raised, particularly over those of 'the supply team' in television, in contradistinction to 
the NZBC (1973:46), most of the proposals were to be the subject of protracted 
negotiation within the later Working Parties. 
2.2 The Television Corporation Structure 
Assigning a servicing and co-ordinating role to the Council was to emphasise 
the primary production role of the corporations. In this respect, the committee 
enunciated a set of guide-lines and principles which underpinned an essentially simple 
organisational design, and which was acknowledged to be schematic. Its principal 
elements defined a hierarchy running from the Board to the Director-General, with the 
Controller of Programmes as a 'deputy in all things' (1973:45). Both positions 
required programme-makers, and there was to be 'a close association' with producers 
and directors which underlined 'the correct relationship with both management with 
the "housekeepers'" (1973:45). The central concept, however, was one of a 'family 
tree' so that board members who, themselves, the Committee hoped, might 'in their 
time have broadcast', would 'move freely and without formality among the staff at any 
time', so that staff would know 'what they look like, where their special interests lay' 
(1973:45). The reason for this was clear (1971:45): 
'Creative processes thrive on decisiveness, not on doubt, on warmth 
within the organisation, not negation, on communication inside for 
those who are charged with communication outside.' 
The scheme was recognised to be appropriate only for a small organisation but 
was, nonetheless, expected to engender loyalty not only in the main centres but also in 
regional stations. In these latter places 'the key figure will obviously be the manager', 
but this would be someone with 'both programme and administrative experience' 
(1973:46). In this case, as elsewhere, though, the plan encouraged 'not professional 
managers but professional broadcasters who graduate to management' (1973:45). 
Enlarging on the primacy of producers, the Committee set out the relationship 
between producers and financial management (1973:46): 
'Within the production-direction teams themselves, responsibilities 
must be clear and partial controls from outside disappear once a budget 
has been agreed as fIrm'. 
This was because (1973:46): 
'The producer is in a very real sense a patron but he is an intelligent 
one if he knows how his patronage is being exercised in terms of total 
cost to this employer.' 
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In other words, producers were to become the key personnel in the. 
organisation who jointly arranged and controlled the corporation's financial direction 
on the basis of judgements about programme needs. In itself, it is a fairly clear 
statement of the dominance of professional expertise in determining organisational 
priorities, and is supported by a hierarchical structure which reinforced programme-
makers' centrality in terms both of hierarchical control at all levels and a 
professional/craft ethos in its execution. It also emphasises the fact that a far greater 
degree of decision-making control was given at a lower organisational level. The 
Committee had explicitly criticised the long chain of command exercised in the 
NZBC before a programme idea was approved, preferring 'a short and decisive chain 
of command.' (1973: 44). 
In total, the report devised a system in which producer-director dominance 
was emphasised, where promotion was based on merit, not long service, and which 
was 'lean and streamlined in its management profile.' (1973:44). It was expected to 
engender a high degree of rapid communication between levels and a sense of loyalty 
leading to programmes being seen as 'professionally acceptable' and receiving 'open 
encouragement' (1973:47): 
'Original ideas must always in television carry an element of risk; that 
risk must be taken at the top. In the long run a nucleus of people, 
meeting, arguing, and collaborating, is the least wasteful method of 
producing programmes, not commodities.' 
The final structure o~ the corporations, as given in the organisation charts 
(appendix one), differed to some extent to the Adam Report. Under the Director-
General were five controller positions which represented the major organisational 
divisions: programmes, sales and marketing, programme services, engineering and 
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management services. Under each controller were a number of departmental heads 
which differed slightly between TV-I and TV-2. Under the heads were supervisors or 
producers and then departmental staff. The Director-General attended monthly Board 
and Council meetings, while Controllers attended Board meetings to present monthly 
reports on their section. TV-1 and TV-2 differed in that TV-1 also established a 
Dunedin programme manager position, slightly lower graded than the controllers, and 
TV-2 an Editor of News (which, in TV-I, fell under the Controller of Programmes). 
The Council framework was broadly similar (appendix one) in that four 
Controllers (of Engineering Services, Programme Services, Management Services and 
Finance) were responsible to the Council Secretary, along with a Personnel Manager 
and the News General Manager. As with the corporations, this was established during 
the Working party phase; indeed, the report was largely silent on the shape of the 
Council's structural divisions. 
2.3. The Adam Committee: Summary 
The Committee's report clearly introduced structural arrangements which preferred 
programme-making over administrative dominance. It did this by separating the 
television systems from the bulk of their administrative services, and by elevating 
, 
production groups to control of the new corporations, which was the first time in New 
Zealand television that these groups had enjoyed such prominence. It also developed 
career lines which encouraged specialisation - particularly in separating television 
from radio programme-makers - and enabled television producers to rise to the top of 
the organisation. Previously, under the NZBC, former programme staff who had risen 
in the organisation had come exclusively from radio. 
At the same time, the report cut across rigidly bureaucratic NZBC procedures 
by shortening the lines of command and introducing a mode of professional/craft 
organisation in the corporation's structures. It also encouraged notions of reward for 
merit; commonality over strict hierarchy, risk-taking and contract over purely career 
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employment. More problematically, it offered very limited and ill-defined alternatives 
to the established career structure and provided no clear recommendations on how 
duplications and inefficiencies between the services were to be avoided: all 
corporations, for example, contained many of the same administrative areas as the 
Council. 
The report also allowed the retention of services, some of which maintained 
monopolies over key organisational dependencies, such as programme purchasing, 
but others which largely established internal monopolies within the system. In other 
words, corporations were obliged to purchase or hire these services - such as audience 
research - which might have been cheaper or more efficiently obtained outside 
broadcasting. More importantly, the common services established both control over, 
and limits to, the independence of the corporations. The Council's role also 
established the basis for sharp and often bitter competition - and division - over the 
allocation of costs and revenue: most particularly, over the allocation of key licence 
fee revenues. 
In sum, while the report erected a principle of independence and production 
pre-eminence, it was only in terms of the difficult concept of guided enterprise -
which then re-introduced ideas of management and control, and considerable 
ambiguity about precisely where, how and by whom that control might be exercised. 
The result was the creation of a hybrid system which had to attempt to manage two 
quite different key environments: a political one through ideas of responsibility and 
accountability to the state, and a market environment through the need to generate 
advertising revenue. 
3. WORKING PARTIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-
CHANNEL SYSTEM 
The first new television corporation to go to air was Television One on 1 April 
1975. In effect, there was a period of approximately twelve months from the 
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formation of the Council to the emergence of the new networks, during which the 
Council and the NZBC co-existed, often in the same buildings. The working parties 
met mostly in the second half of 1974, being drawn from staff relocated in the 
Council from the NZBC, or as new corporation appointments. In some cases, 
particularly with finance staff, they were obliged to shuttle between the two bodies, 
even after the formal demise of the NZBC to complete administrative matters. 
Negotiations settled within the Working Parties were then presented to Council 
meetings as recommendations. At the same time, the boards of Television One and 
Two met to discuss the details of operational establishment. 
As far as television was concerned, the working parties traversed the areas of 
news, sport, programmes, advertising, audience research, Council functions, 
engineering, personnel and finance. Generally, there was one representative from each 
corporation and the Council - usually their respective heads - but sometimes with 
other senior executives in attendance. Personnel discussions differed in that there 
were a series of meetings and negotiations with the Public Service Association, 
usually with 5 or 6 representatives on each side. At finance meetings either one or 
two Treasury officials were also present. 
Through the working parties and subsequent Council discussions a number of 
issues emerged which defined both the precise shape of the new organisation 
. arrangements in terms of their outcome. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
3.1 Personnel 
The first issue to be resolved was the question of senior appointments where, 
after negotiations with the PSA, agreement was reached that, for first appointments 
down to third-level positions - generally, Heads of Departments, the recommendations 
of the Directors-General applied, or of two Controllers for third-level positions. 
Effectively, this enabled the Directors-General to control all key appointments within 
the corporations. Much of the groundwork for this had already occurred, in fact: the 
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television Directors-General, Alan Morris and Alan Martin, were good friends 
(Martin had been the best man at Morris's wedding) and, on being appointed, in 
Australia, they went to Paradise Palms and planned details of the channels' operations 
down 'to whom we might appoint and what the gradings would be', as Alan Morris 
put it. According tO,Alan Martin these were, principally, 'a group of young, talented 
producers who were bubbling up but were trapped by the NZBC system.' 
If these appointments were within their domain, the remainder fell within the 
strict guide-lines of a career service. The elements of this were negotiated at length 
with the PSA: 'long, boring, laborious discussion,' as a senior executive described it. 
The main features of these were contained in a letter to the PSA Secretary on 9 
December 1974: 
recognition of association; 
protection of salaries and conditions; 
appointment of a restructuring grievance officer; 
a unified career service; 
appeal rights against appointments and transfers; 
the establishment of appointment committees; 
limitation of contract employment to 7.5% of total staff; 
controls on the nature, length and occupational categories of contract 
employment (i.e. largely limited to 'performing or creative' staff) 
no redundancies from the NZBC. 
The unified career service, in particular, defined a controlled internal labour 
market. It consisted of two elements, as notes of a meeting of Council and PSA 
members on 30 September 1974 confirmed. One was that positions were advertised 
internaJly and filled from existing staff, unless 'there is a significantly better outside 
applicant.' The other was that applicants were treated as being of equal status, 
regardless of the corporation from which they came: in other words, corporations 
were tied to each other through their staffing arrangements. On top of that, the 
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combination of no redundancies and largely internal appointments was at odds with 
the idea of a lean administrative system, especially as a system-wide arrangement, and 
bearing in mind the report's criticism that the NZBC was already administratively top-
heavy. The result was that there were plentiful accounts of 'horse-trading' and of 
accepting 'dead wood' along with desirable staff, or of the creation of numerous 'non-
positions.' Both Radio New Zealand and the Council were particularly prone to this, 
especially where there were parallel administrative posts in different organisations. 
As one respondent remarked: 'I used to meet seven or eight people who all said they 
ran Computer Services, but I never knew who did.' 
In effect, the agreements over staffing reintroduced a codified set of 
procedures which limited the discretion available to the Directors-General. As one of 
them observed: 'it was very difficult to move people and appoint people who we 
wanted' because, if they neglected established procedures 'we would lose on appeal 
and not get the staff we wanted.' This codification was further embedded in the 
adoption of the NZBC Staff Manual, which contained detailed rulings on shifts, 
allowances, working hours and other matters. The agreement of a unified career 
service also centralised broad control of personnel matters in the hands of the 
Council's Personnel Manager through delegation by the Council Secretary 
(Broadcasting Council Minute 74/10/3), as it had done with industrial negotiations on 
the corporations' behalf (BCM 74/8/16). Salaries, likewise, were centralised and 
codified and, indeed, adopted for pragmatic reasons: sections 30 and 58 of the 1973 
Act obliged the four broadcasting bodies to consult with the State Services 
Commission on appropriate scales. As the Council Secretary commented (paper to 
BCM 74/8/16), if nothing was to be formalised 'every appointment or group of 
appointments ... will have to be subject of consultation with the State Services 
Commission regarding salaries.' So, to protect broadcasting's control over 
appointment the NZBC scales were adopted as legitimate in themselves. In any 
event, it is unlikely that the corporations could have offered an alternative: at this 
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early stage of their existence they had neither the staff nor the expertise to challenge 
the broad personnel formulations nor the General Council claims to territorial control. 
Essentially, they were able to influence detail rather than total policy. 
In this respect, they succeeded to some extent with senior management 
gradings. 
The positions of Controller in the corporations were all regraded, by way of 
new appointments, at generally higher levels than their equivalent Council counter-
parts. The Controllers of Programmes for each channel were separated by a grade 
from all other controllers and emerged marginally better placed than the equivalent 
top Council position (the Controller of Engineering). 
Below these positions, there was a pattern of senior executive placements, 
which saw the establishment both of higher gradings and greater spans of control, 
than equivalent positions in the Council. For example, the Controller of Programme 
Services (a position responsible for all the key technical and production support 
services in television) supervised, in TV -1, three Heads of Department graded 
between G 14-17, as against two supervised by the similar Council position, holding 
grades between G 13-16. 
Within more general staffing it is worth noting that producers were the only 
group who continued to set their own grading levels, through a Producers' Assessment 
Panel. 
As a whole, therefore, the distribution of positions reinforced the greater 
weighting given to production over administration between the corporations and the 
Council. Grading patterns and the distribution of personnel also highlighted the fact 
that administrativeness leanness was to be found primarily in the corporations. 
Besides the actual grading patterns it is important to recognise that the 
restructuring also involved some marked occupational rearrangements. This had been 
a matter of; great concern to the two Directors-General as TV -2's Director-General 
recalled: 
We sat in a room just like we are here and planned for; the next six 
months. We planned and drew diagrams and tried out structures and 
threw them away. We didn't want a repeat form of the structures in 
England or Australia, or in the NZBC.' 
This included, for example, the location at the ABC of: 
' ... all camera-men, floor managers and some others under the 
Engineering Department. Instead, we wanted them under production 
department control.' 
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This, in fact, occurred by redrafting film staff, formerly located at the bottom 
of a long chain under the NZBC's Controller of Programmes, to join studio operations 
staff under the newly-created Programme Services area. Likewise, television 
production departments, which had formerly been mingled with radio staff, 
(particularly with rural broadcasts, drama, news and current affairs), were separated 
and combined with formerly isolated departments such as documentary production. 
Presentation and promotions officers were also shifted to join a new Head of 
Presentations, Promotions and Publicity. This subsequently led to grading problems 
since the area lacked a coherent career structure. A clear career path was established 
from production staff up to the position of Controller of Programmes. In other areas, 
the corporations' Head of Finance was responsible solely for finance: even in the 
Council he lost control of a large stores section, which was moved to management 
services. 
Indeed, the restructuring generally led to the simplification of the Council 
positions, even if no staff were lost in the process. For television, though, it clearly 
signalled new orientations: the primacy of programme priorities, as noted earlier, but 
also an emphasis on local as against overseas programmes, and internal as against 
external production. Moreover, the enhanced presentation area and sales and 
marketing department all indicated an increased priority as far as the public 
environment w~s concerned: it was to be a key factor in terms of winning public 
approval and support for new, often risky programme and presentation initiatives, and 
in generating revenue through advertising sales, against competition from a rival 
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channel. Both channels reflected these priorities in the broad similarities of their 
structural patterns. 
3.2 News 
If the structural arrangements reflected new and generalised priorities, the 
conflict in the news working party highlights the ideological positions and 
interpretative differences which were to emerge between administrators and 
programme-makers over the next five years. Essentially, these revolved around 
divisions between professional/craft understandings as opposed to adherence to 
specified and codified bureaucratic procedures. While they are most clearly 
illustrated by the news case, a testy letter from the Secretary of the Council, Keith 
Hay, to the corporation Directors-General on 19 March 1975 indicates that divisions 
were emerging in 'news, finance, sports and a number of other areas' over agreements 
on the common services. It was apparent, the letter stated: 
'that either intentionally or through a lack of understanding ... attempts 
are being made to circumvent these agreements.' 
Specifically, in a meeting on 25 March he referred to a meeting between the 
newly-appointed news heads and the Council news manager in February, where the 
television heads had abrogated previous agreements. The Secretary mentioned 
concerns over developing costs and explained that 'the Council had a responsibility' to 
ensure arrangements were on an 'economical, orderly and agreed basis'. The TV-2 
head, on the other hand, thought that 'the statement could have been couched in 
broader terms.' In effect, these were to act as statements of position between the 
Council and the news heads: the Council emphasised procedure; the news heads rule 
of thumb, speed, common understandings, freedom of movement and friendly 
competition. The following extracts from the meeting notes indicate the differing 
positions: 
'Both television news heads felt they should place their own satellite 
orders if they were on an ad hoc basis. They expressed a willingness 
for intercorporation liaison on this matter ... Again the NFM (the 
Council News Film Manager) indicated this was contrary to the 
agreement reached and any variation would require approval of the 
Council and the Directors-General.' 
'Mr Crossan (the TV-2 news head) expressed a desire to employ his 
own overseas correspondents. Again this was seen as being contrary 
to the Act and the agreement. 
'Furthermore if necessary the television news heads felt they should be 
free to each cover the same incident, each with their own aircraft if 
necessary ... They felt there would be no competition if they could not 
have a freedom of choice as to method of coverage. Each had a 
common duty to dig news out.' 
'There was a declared attitude by the television news heads of a 
willingness that there be mutual co-operation, Mr Crossan: "The hand 
of friendship is extended".' 
The final agreements which emerged from the. Working party saw the 
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Council's role strictly defined as that of a limited provider of resources and· 
. information, generally available to offer services at the request of the news heads, and 
sometimes on a 24 hour-a-day basis. Over three meetings, the corporations gained 
virtually total control over the gathering, selection, organisation and presentation of 
news. As the October 1974 minutes had already rather lamely concluded: 
'The role of the Council so far as News was concerned appeared to be 
restricted to organising news facilities at the request of the 
corporations.' 
In that respect, a very broad area of discretion, on the grounds of editorial 
needs, was created over the demand for codification and deference to a higher 
authority. It is also worth noting that the agreement also confirmed the total 
separation, for the first time, of television and radio journalists, principally through 
the argument that these staff would quickly specialise and become identified with 
their own corporations. 
3.3. Engineering 
If news saw the imposition of professionalizing control in the corporations, 
then engineering saw the imposition of professionalised control in the Council. While 
each corporation retained its own engineering section, the Council engineers created a 
monopoly over their services, not only over the tasks they performed, but over the 
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materials that were to be appropriated for them. All planning, costing and 
development was to be undertaken by Council engineers: there was to be no outside 
tendering, no contracting, and no contractors or temporary staff. All diesel 
maintenance, outside Avalon, became a Council function; corporation engineers were 
to act as assistants to Council engineers on major installations; the corporations were 
to pay for advisory and specialist services as needed and stores were to be organised 
through a Council base store: 
'The need for coordination, standardization of stock listing procedures 
and standardization of spares wherever possible, with consequential 
savings in specification writing and procurement time was stressed by 
Mr Sharp' (the NZBC Acting Chief Engineer).' 
As a subsidiary point, it is worth observing that the language in which this is 
expressed is very similar to that of Council administrators, with its emphasis on 
coordination, codification and economy. As discussed in more detail elsewhere, 
Council engineers shared common perspectives and understandings with 
administrators in a way which differentiated them from a programme-making 
ideology. 
3.4 Finance 
In this area there were three issues: the treatment of broadcasting as a financial 
totality; the charging of Council services and the allocation of licence fee revenue. 
3.4.1 Broadcasting as a Financial Totality 
The key point, where this was concerned, was that there was a centralization of 
financial procedures which invariably limited corporation independence. In 
particular, it re-introduced a co-ordinated capital budget which functioned in tandem 
with the corporations' operating budgets. In practice, this meant two things. One was 
that a formula for repaying interest charges on loan 'moneys of approximately $14 
million had to be found, where current and future loans (as projected by the Adam 
Report) were likely to be unevenly incurred. Secondly, it entrenched the position of 
engineers at the heart of the budget process, since they were primarily responsible for 
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the preparation and costing of the capital budget. Moreover, it was eventually agreed 
that repayment of loan charges was a first call against existing revenue, which meant 
that, from the corporations' viewpoint, their operating budgets, on which production 
depended, was automatically limited by the cost of the Capital Expenditure 
programme. Worse, from their perspective, they would be unable to control the 
general costing of capital expansion, since that fell within the domain of the 
engineers' technical expertise. 
Perhaps curiously, there was, in fact, relatively little formal objection by the 
corporations to this. The most probable explanation is that broadcasting was still 
regarded, as Gregory (1985:77) terms it, as a capital expansion organisation, where 
engineers domi.nated 'as the organisational heroes of the time.' In any case, further 
capital expansion, merely to get TV-2 underway, was inevitable and it is likely that 
the corporation felt themselves faced with no real alternative. 
3.4.2 Cost recovery 
It was quickly agreed that common service costs should be charged on a user-
pays basis (14 November 1974). In effect, however, this was to reinforce two other 
trends. It was to introduce a set of internal monopolies for services which might easily 
have been purchased more cheaply or effectively externally, and it was to site the 
control of those costs within the Council and beyond corporation reach. When it is 
borne in mind that the corporations could also not influence capital costs or wage 
costs, through the imposition of the salary structure, it begins to become clear that 
their chief area of discretion and control lay solely in the programme area, with strict 
(if, at this stage, implicit) limitations on their real autonomy beyond it. What is more, 
with a lean administrative structure, as senior executives subsequently argued, they 
were weakly placed to challenge an increasingly established structure and were, under 
any circumstances, often over-committed to fulfilling the demands generated by 
increased programme production. 
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3.4.3 Licence Fee Allocation 
The growing realisation of the importance of the precise allocation of licence 
fee revenue as the central source of funds outside the uncertainties of advertising 
income led to increasingly firmly-held divisions about an acceptable allocation 
procedure. On 13 November 1974, minutes from the Working party stated that: 
'the licence fee revenue should be divided between the three 
corporations on the basis of need after meeting a first call for loan 
servicing charged.' 
Briefly, Radio New Zealand demurred from the proposed split on the grounds 
that it was undercompensated for its public service functions and produced several 
alternatives at a meeting in February 1975. The differences between the corporations 
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had first arisen, however, at the Council's January meeting and prompted the 
preparation of a report by the NZBC's Chief Accountant, Russ Sadler. By March, it 
had been joined by two further proposals from the television corporations, a detailed 
argument from RNZ, a Treasury recommendation incorporated in the Chief 
Accountant's report, a written commentary from the Minister of Broadcasting and a 
summation by the Council Secretary. In total, 5 proposals were considered by the 
Council. 
Finally, a four-point recommendation was accepted which igno~ed the 
Minister's arguments and allowed RNZ a small surplus and TV -1 and TV -2 a small 
deficit. As Russ Sadler pointed out, this meant the formula should have been revised 
in the following year. It remained, in fact, in this form for several years. 
3.5 Finance: Conclusion 
What emerges from the process of licence fee allocation is not only the degree 
to which the corporations become tied to the Council and dependent o~ its centralised 
budgeting procedure, but also the close involvement at all stages of both the Treasury 
and the Minister of Broadcasting. As far as the Treasury was concerned, it could play 
a crucial role, not only in defining appropriate or desirable accounting practices, but 
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also in the degree of financial assistance or hardship it could directly or indirectly 
bring to bear. This was particularly so as far as the Capital Works budget went. This 
required approval by the Cabinet Works Committee both for the forthcoming twelve 
month period (1975n6) and for the four-year development programme (1975-79). In 
both cases, the Council discovered that a Treasury report had recommended declining 
the application for 1975n6 and revision of the 1975-79 programme downwards. 
(Attachments to BCM 75/19/8). Similarly, the Treasury made it clear in a letter on 4 
April 1975, and at a meeting on 17 April, what its views on the appropriate financial 
structure for broadcasting should be, which were to facilitate 'rational decision-
making.' As Council executives p~rceived it, this meant that there was no possibility 
of interest-free finance and 'no financial relief to the broadcasting structure as a whole' 
(paper to BCM 75/17/21). Capital expenditure up to $100,000 was agreed, but with 
conditions which emphasised close financial codes of practice and, until TV -2 was 
revenue-earning, 'financial surveillance' and a capital expenditure limit of $5000 per 
proposal. 
In other words, not only was television explicitly linked to the Council and 
subject to varying degrees of financial control, so, too, was broadcasting as a whole to 
the Treasury. This is a self-evident instance of what Pfeffer and Salanak (1979) 
would describe as an external resource dependency; but it was more. Contained 
within the Treasury's requirements are assumptions which are, in substance, forms of 
social control based around the same notions of responsibility, economy and 
codification espoused by Council administrators. Obviously, the Council was also 
bound to general Government policy through the approval required for major capital 
works; the Treasury relationship illuminates the nature of the ties involved. It is also 
worth making the observation that, insofar as it appears here, the Treasury attitude 
clearly appeared as thrift-driven: broadcasting was expected to make good out of its 
own resources; all loans from Treasury 'will, as in the past, be interest-bearing' as 
would those from the Council to Corporations (barring TV-2 initially), at a suggested 
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rate of 8.5% (paper to BCM 75/17/21). The point is not taken further at this point but, 
along with some of the Adam Committee recommendations, it suggests the shape of a 
broader ideological or cultural perspective. 
4. GENERAL SUMMARY 
In the distance between the Committee on Broadcasting's proposals, and the 
final structure as it was implemented, there were important changes, with implications 
for the dominance of a production - or an administratively-oriented organisation. In 
effect, the corporations were clearly programme-making domains, of a kind which 
had not formerly existed in New Zealand. On the other hand, there were sets of ties 
and limitations embedded in the development of the structure which, if tested, and 
under different environmental conditions different to the corporations' establishment, 
were self- evidently resistant the degree of independence which programme-makers 
expected to possess. 
4.1. Working Parties 
Generally speaking, the working parties consisted of the Directors-General of 
each corporation, the Council Secretary and assistants drawn primarily from the 
NZBC. Obviously, the working parties were central decision-making bodies, and the 
majority of their recommendations were taken up by the Council. Yet, the television 
corporations, in particular, were disadvantaged. RNZ had expert advice and opinion it 
could call on: so did the Council administrators. In contrast, both television 
Directors-General operated with largely phantom staff: not until late 1974 were third-
level appointees in place who could advise and support their respective heads. Both 
Directors-General, too, were expatriates and likely to be out of touch with the 
particular long-practised subtleties of local broadcasting politics. Furthermore, their 
expertise was - in line with their appointments - about production, while here they 
were expected to negotiate complicated logistical and organisational questions. At 
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the same time, they were attempting to establish new patterns and values against the 
weight of precedence and experience of established NZBC procedures, whilst 
surrounded by ex-NZBC personnel (and working out of ex-NZBC premises). 
4.2 Summary 
Under those circumstances, it is easy enough to see that, where there were 
areas of uncertainty, those groups with the greatest resources (knowledge, 
administrative support, social or organisational custom) would be likely to succeed. 
The outcome is largely true in these circumstances. Where the Adam Report or the 
Act was unambiguous, then there was little room for interpretation (with, moreover, 
dubious or obviously inequitable decisions. being later over-ruled by Council 
members) so that operational details tended to reflect the production-orientated Adam 
Committee recommendations. The news outcome is typical: news heads could, and 
did, point to clear rules of practice to bolster their case (and news also illustrates the 
support of third-level executives in redefining control boundaries in programme-
makers' favour). 
On the other hand, where recommendations were ambiguous (as in the general 
comments on personnel, or contract arrangements in the Adam Report), 
administrators with expertise (in other words, control of a knowledge-base) could 
translate that into centralised control of an administrative field. 
Lastly, developing a Committee's recommendations into organisational 
standard operating procedures employs a rule-based process and requires skills of 
strict rule-based interpretation which falls squarely within administrative expertise. 
Broadcasters' interpretative skills, on the other hand, involve judgement-calls and 
value-interpretation organised around commonly-accepted normative standards. In 
short, one should expect administrators to be better 'players' under these 
circumstances: they were better placed to define ambiguity in their favour, and the 
general shape of final structural details suggests this was, in fact, the case. 
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What emerges, then, perhaps unexpectedly, is that despite the clear 
encouragement given by the Adam Report to produce a new organisational system 
with new orientations and priorities, the final outcome suggests how an accumulated 
administrative knowledge-base could be mobilised to minimise incursions into 
established bureaucratic routines and practices. This transpired principally because 
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the original Adam Report blueprint was sufficiently ambiguous, or ill-defined, to. 
enable the reproduction of existing practices by skilled administrators within the new 
framework. 
Seen from the opposite viewpoint, programme-makers possessed self-
evidently inadequate resources, or knowledge about bureaucratic practices to define 
operational procedures in their favour. In many respects, the logic for the return to 
unified television system was embedded in the system even before the chamle1s began 
transmission. In total, it can be seen as a salutary example of the process whereby 
superior administrative knowledge could be translated, in ambiguous circumstances, 
into administrative power (Crozier, 1964). 
CHA.PTER FOUR 
1974-76: THE LINKS BETIVEEN PROFESSION, ORGANISATION 
AI\D CULTURE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
If the claims advanced by broadcasting administrators revolve around 
traditional bureaucratic preoccupations of centralization, codification and careful 
monitoring of organisational processes, then these are confronted by the customary 
expert claims of broadcasters to special knowledge, autonomy and room for 
discretion in the pursuit of their craft. Laid out in this fashion, both positions appear 
abstract and isolated from each other. What motivates them in practice, and brings 
them into conflict, are the issues around which they evolve, and which are thrown up 
by shifts and changes in the organisational environment. 
What this chapter examines are the bases for programme-makers' claims and 
how these are linked to broader social configurations. It also examines how these 
inter-relationships define the kinds of claims which, on the one hand, programme 
producers can make and, on the oth.!r, how this potentially influences the kind of 
cultural production which they cre:ate. It goes on to look specifically at the 
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developmemt of the two new channels and how they interpreted the Adam Committee 
blueprint in practice, and the problems which this subsequently began to throw up. 
These problems, inherent in the initial restructuring plan and becoming increasingly 
pressing over a relatively short time. were the issues around which the competing 
claims to competency emerged. In broad terms, they developed into two issues: 
financial and political, and it was the opposed claims to be able to manage these 
principal uncert~nties which determined the progress of the two-channel system over 
the following four or more years. 
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2. PROGRAMME-MAKERS AND PROFESSIONALISM 
2.1 Professionalism and ambiguity 
The primary dilemma with broadcasting, as discussed in chapter two, is that it 
is non-routine, producing an ambiguous, constantly changing product. Television 
programmes are arrangements of symbols, essentially unstable, often contradictory in 
their meaning, and available to a variety of readings and misreadings (see, for 
example, Fiske and Hartley, 1978; Hall, 1980; Kellner, 1987, and Marc, 1987). This 
central ambiguity makes predictable and routinised production hazardous at best, at 
the same time as it divides and re-divides viewers on the basis of the irresponse to 
different programmes and programme-types. As Turow observes (1984:222): 
'Simply put, there is no guarantee the audience will respond to new products 
as it responded to the old ones.' 
Nonetheless, the problem of ambiguity remains undiminished, particularly in 
tenns of the certainty of commanding large audiences on a consistent basis. As a 
result, this crucially affects the programme-makers' claims to competence and special 
skills, since the success of a programme cannot be fore-ordained. 
However, as a number of commentators have pointed out, the occupational 
response to this problem is, in itself, ambiguous. Gallagher (1982:166) remarks that 
professional goals involve 'inexplicit and diffuse criteria to characterise "good 
television" or "good journalism'" while Tunstall, in a study of specialist 
correspondents asserts that 'uncertainty is inherent in both the news values and the 
degree of discretion in relation to news values' (1971:263). He argues, moreover, that 
journalism in particular lacks 'a clear core activity' (in Everett Hughes' tenninology) 
and is, in effect, 'an indetenninate occupation' (1971:10). Elliot (1977:150) holds a 
similar view: 
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"Professionalism in media occupations therefore is an adapting to the 
dilemmas of role conflict by which skill and competence in the performance 
of routine tasks becomes elevated to the occupational ideal. " 
These routine tasks he defines as punctuality, meeting deadlines, objectivity and 
impartiality, arguing that these are strategies which (1977:150): 
"are not only means of achieving professional status for the individual but 
means by which the organisation may hold its ground in the wider society". 
As Gallagher sums it up, claims to professionalism (1982:163): 
"represent, on the one hand, an occupational adaptation or response to the 
dilemmas of role conflict and, on the other, an organisational strategy to meet 
the demands of significant constituents in the environment of media 
institutions. " 
All this bears heavily on the ability of media professionals to define and 
manage a -distinct area of occupational practices and knowledge without serious 
challenge. If this is important in terms of fundamental occupational activity it is far 
more so if a significant claim to control of an organisation is to be launched, and 
especially where that organisation holds a monopoly on the frequency spectrum. In 
brief, if producers not only have to establish themselves as a separate, autonomous 
occupation with rare skills, they also have to be able to assert their professional 
values as the only appropriate ones to control a central state organisation, and one, 
moreover, which will give them the right to control a monopoly over a key area of 
cultural and ideological production. 
In many respects, as outlined, in the previous chapter, the Adam Committee 
attempted to confer a large part of that professional control. Yet, as noted above, it 
was to anoccupation unsettled within itself. Even more so, in New Zealand: it was to 
an occupation which had been heavily controlled until then and was newer, smaller, 
less experienced and less specialised than its counterparts in many other countries, 
and therefore possessing less established and developed occupational procedures. In 
a phrase, media experts were considerably less expert than they might have been to 
confront the challenge which their new circumstances pushed towards them. 
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In contrast, British broadcasting, in particular, assembled many of the 
attributes of professional monopoly which, in Williams' words, amounted under 
Reith, to 'an authoritarian system with a conscience' (1962). Its elements were 
described by Elliot (1977:153): 
'Professionalism, however, has . links with high culture, especially in senses 
such as a mastery of technique, a style and cultivation, a hierarchy of taste, 
which have been most acceptable in British culture ... .!t was one tactic by 
which the BBC was able to win its place as a central institution in the national 
culture and a particularly important one when the organisation's main 
constituents were the people and institutions of the 'establishment', the British 
status elite.' 
Yet this occupational elevation was still due less to special knowledge and 
skill, as Fairlie (1959) points out, than in being able to balance its various political 
and cultural constituents. If broadcasting professionals make claims to leadership, 
then it is only with the continuing support of elites who, in turn, will expect a 
representation of their value systems and priorities, in other wsords of a particular 
moral order (Martin, 1984), for their continued support: in this case, the high culture 
to which Elliot refers. However, Coase, in his study of monopoly in British 
broadcasting, referred to a combination of forces, alongside Reith's initial influence, 
which has interesting implications for this period of New Zealand broadcasting 
(Coase, 1950: 195): 
'Had the Labour Party been in power at the time of the fonnation of the BBC; 
had independent broadcasting systems not been associated in the minds of the 
Press with commercial broadcasting and finance by means of advertisements; 
had another department, say the Board of Trade, been responsible for 
broadcasting policy; had the views of the fIrst chief executive of the BBC 
been like those of the second; with this combination of circumstances, there 
would be no reason to suppose that such a formidable body of support for a 
monopoly of broadcasting would ever have arisen.' 
Broadcasters in New Zealand were to lose their political patron; advertising 
was viewed differently; Ministerial responsibility for broadcasting shifted from 
department to department, and the views of the fIrst Board chainnen were almost the 
reverse of Coase's description. 
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If there are conclusions to be drawn about broadcasters and professionalism, 
they can be reduced to two main points. One is that programme©makers' claims are 
based around an imperfectly defined body of knowledge and practices; the other is 
that their legitimacy and status as organisational leaders depends on continuing 
linkages with external elite groups whose attitudes they must implicitly reflect (or 
broker, to use Hall's (1972) term) to provide in part, at least, the legitimacy which 
they cannot fully define for themselves. 
2.2 Programme-makers and Cultural Production 
While it is true that producers may depend on cultural and political elites to 
remain dominant in the medium, the relationship inevitably changes when television 
operates in a commercial environment. Here, producers must claim to be able to do 
two things: to create a market for their particular kinds of symbolic productions, and 
to produce legitimate - that is 'accurate' or 'faithful' representations of the society in 
which they operate. This second role appears similar to the claim to neutrality or 
impartiality but in fact.it stands further examination. 
2.3 Programme-makers and Complaints 
If we adopt, for the moment, a ritual view of communication process then, 
following Carey (1975), communication becomes the 'symbolic process whereby 
reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed'. Television producers, in 
this view, become 'hucksters of the symbol' as Sahlin (1976;217) puts it or, to use 
Newcomb and Hirsch's formulation (1987:456-457): 
'cultural bricoleurs, seeking and creating new meaning in the combination of 
cultural elements with embedded significance. They respond to real events, 
changes in social structure and organisation, and to shifts in attitude and 
value ..... At each step of the process they function as cultural interpreters.' 
The utility of this approach is that it portrays television as a distributor of 
symbols available for a variety of readings and responses - as Eng (1984), for 
example, has demonstrated with the apparently simple case of 'Dallas', but contained 
within several basic modes of interpretation which Hall (1980) terms 'dominant', 
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'oppositional' or 'negotiated'~ Although this view, itself, has recently been challenged, 
(Scannell, 1989). If readings differ sufficiently, they may lead to sharp disagreement 
(Newcomb and Hirsch, 1987:465): 
'if television threatens the sense of cultural security, the individual may take 
steps to engage the medium at the level of personal action. Most often this 
occurs in the form of letters to the network or to local stations, and again, the 
pattern is not new to television. I 
Indeed not, but the point is crucial. New Zealand television receives a 
constant flow of popular feedback; receptionists keep a log of telephone calls, and 
there is a steady stream of correspondence. During 1975, Avalon was receiving 
letters at the rate of a thousand per week containing queries, complaints and, more 
rarely, praise. What is important is that only a tiny fraction of this feedback is 
translated into formal complaint. Of these, an even smaller number develop into 
substantial issues within the system, but it is these which may constitute a major 
challenge to producers' claims as legitimate and accepted cultural interpreters. If 
formal complaints continue to emerge at an unusually high level, it can affect not 
only professionals' standing but even the organisation's legitimacy. Essentially, this 
may occur because groups challenge producers' interpretive practices; Newcomb and 
Hirsch go so far as to see, in the US, special interest groups as 'representative of 
metaphoric "fault lines" in American society. Television is the terrain in which the 
faults are expressed and worked out.' (1987:466). From an organisational viewpoint, 
complaints are the costs produced by risk-taking and, ultimately, where the risks - or 
level of complaints are perceived to be too great - these offer the opportunity for 
administrators to argue for a redistribution of power so that they may impose 
predictability and efficiency for the sake of the organisation's survival (Turow, 1985). 
If programme-makers set out with an agenda, as was the case here, actively to pursue 
those forms of innovation, then they also draw the attendant risks. 
In other words, the frequency and force of complaints IS an interesting 
variable in the standing of media professionals, and so for television as a whole. That 
they may also reflect broader social changes (viz Hall, 1972) does not affect this 
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proposition; rather, it illuminates the nature of the legitimacy on which broadcasting 
is founded. Furthermore, it suggests - as the customary view of broadcasting 
impartiality is less able to do - that any form of textual production by television 
whether current affairs or drama even, its formatting and scheduling is open to 
challenge under particular conditions. 
2.4 Summary 
Professional control is threatened by two problems. One is that the move 
from a state to a market setting raises the question of what constitutes appropriate 
production, and by whom tht should be determined - and a mixed institutional setting, 
as in New Zealand, compounds these fundamental uncertainties. The other is that 
programme-makers' moral mission - their undertaking to represent New Zealand to 
itself - may deviate from socially accepted norms. If these draw persistent complaints 
then it may undermine their legitimacy and eventually even that of the organisation 
itself. 
Both these conditions existed between 1975-1980 in varying degrees, and 
formed two important components of the pressures faced by television. Complaints 
were to form a constant series of issues in terms of broadcasting's political 
environment and were eventually to boil over and focus not just on individual issues, 
but on the legitimacy of the complaints procedure as a whole. On the other hand, 
financially, the increaSirig reliance on advertising revenue - i.e. the market - and the 
growing financial difficulties faced by broadcasting suggested economies better 
supplied by accountants than producers, but also different programme scheduling 
strategies which irritated viewers. 
3. 1974-76: THE RELATIONSHIPS IN OPERATIONS 
How did the relationships outlined above work under the conditions of the new two-
channel system? This section loks at the role and status of programme-makers, 
particularly as defined by the leading occupation of producers and directors, aned the 
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developinbg strategies of the two corporations in respect of the issues outline earlier. 
First, however, we ned to consider briefly what groups constitute programme-makers 
(and, by implication, administrators), within television. 
3.1 The Programme-Making Group 
To some extent, the terms 'programme-makers' and 'administrators' are 
loosely-defined categories (viz Gregory, 1979). Ettema et al (1987), for example, use 
the term 'mass communicators' to delineate a similar group of American production 
personnel. 
Engwall (1978, 1986), however, develops a technological model as a way of 
diferentiating personnel within newspapers, and his approach is broadly applicable to 
television. Both media depend on a tightly-co-ordinated production cycle with a high 
degree of differentiation between groups to cope with the complexity and variability 
of the production flow (i.e. the publication of newspapers or the presentation of 
programmes). With television, the bringing programmes to air involves cycles of 
pre-production, production and post-production phases as programmes are planned, 
shot and assembled for transmission, on a daily, weekly, monthly or serial basis. 
Around these phases is a quite differently-paced, largely non-cyclical work 
flow that involves three groups: administration (personnel, stores, records, accounting 
and related activities); engineering (either on capital works or with transmission) and 
sales and marketing (the sale of advertising time or merchandising of programmes), 
The production cycle involves a core group which consists, according to 
programme type, of producers, directors, journalists, researchers, other creative staff 
(such as writers or musicians) and secretarial staff. As a programme evolves, it draws 
on a wider range of production personnel who vary according to the programme's 
particular demands (whether, for example, it is filmed or videotaped; recorded in the 
studio or on location; is pre-recorded or live; is non-fiction or fiction). This technical 
or craft assistance includes designers, wardrobe staff, graphic designers, studio crews, 
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technical producers, camera and sound operators, editors and various post-production 
personnel, amongst others. 
This description readily suggests two broad groupings of personnel within 
television, based on differences in work pattern and time-frame. A cyclical work 
flow lends itself to the development of a broad occupational community, with many 
personnel thrown together for an intensive period, often with limited regard for a 
regular working week, in order to complete a common project (and see Burns, 1972; 
1979). Administrative, sales and marketing, and engineering staff, however, more 
commonly work to a 40-hour week with a more ordered, routine work flow. 
Consequently, programme-makers can be identified principally as the core 
programme production team. But, as indicated, this readily expands to encompass a 
number of related occupations. Within this arrangement, producers and directors 
stand as the leading figures (Burns, 1972) and, because their activities define the 
limits of programme-making activity, their role forms the focus of attention for the 
following discussion. 
Producers and directors in the new structure were relatively small in number: 
the 1975 occupational listing names 22 producers on permanent establishment lists, 
as part of a total NZBC staff in excess of 3000. With the two-channel restructuring 
they represented 22 producers amongst a total television staff in early 1976 of 
approximately 1600 television employees. By 1979 there were 31 accredited 
producers out of a total television staff of 1665. In relation to general programme 
staff, they represented 8% (22/268) of 1976 staff and 11 % (31/294) of 1979 staff, a 
growth of 36% over 3 years during a period in which programme numbers grew by 
9% (268/294) and total establishment numbers by 4% (1596/1655). In terms of their 
place in the occupational hierarchy, they stood at the apex of the production process -
planning, managing and co-ordinating the division of labour which resulted in the 
creation of programmes. They also became viewed as the top of two reference 
groups used by the Public Service Association in industrial negotiations. The craft 
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area, the Film Operations Group, w~s seen as the lower reference group. Both during 
the 1975-80 period, and beyond, producers led what one industrial negotiator termed 
as 'a charmed life - they were never seriously knocked back' which was one 
significant reason for their linkage as an upper reference point for other groups by 
negotiators. Producers' individual gradings were scrutinised by an independent 
Producers Assessment Panel which was responsible not only for accrediting 
production personnel as producers but also for enforcing the sole use of accredited 
personnel to direct or produce programmes. Accreditation itself might only occur 
after personnel, who were specially selected, had undergone a sometimes punishing 
training programme. On this they were expected not only to demonstrate sufficient 
technical skills and authority over a crew to assemble programme material, but also to 
display a vaguely-defined editorial sense. Invariably, this was a normative evaluation 
which involved instilling both a sense of mystique about what constituted producerial 
qualities, and a strong sense of loyalty to the producer ethic. In other words, they 
become part of an implicitly elite club within broadcasting who could - particularly 
within the 1974-79 period - look forward to rising to occupy top positions within the 
Corporation. 
At the same time, they had to defend their position against several closely-
related groups. There were three in particular: presentation directors (who were 
responsible for handling the presentation and transmission of completed 
programmers); news directors (who assembled and put to air all news bulletins), and 
commercial producers (who mostly assembled commercials to advertisers' 
instructions). Presentation directors were least threatening, since they were small in 
number and lacked any clear career-structure. Along with news directors, they were 
portrayed as primarily a craft or technical sub-group with little editorial knowledge, 
and a defence was generally mounted on those grounds. This was despite the fact 
that news directors were sometimes more proficient than programme directors in 
specific areas - principally live studio direction. Commercial producers' claims were 
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rejected on the basis that their creativity and management skill was 'at a significantly 
lower level', as a management memo put it. They controlled fewer staff, smaller 
budgets and needed to exhibit less 'creativity and flair'. Even the management memo 
clearly viewed some of these unsupported assertions as debatable, but the emphasis 
on the central mystique of creativity was unequivocal and, indeed formed a prime 
claim to a producer's or director's special status. 
These were also generally supported by the Directors-General, themselves ex-
producers, but also by the Television Producers and Directors Association (hereafter 
the TVPDA). Indeed, this association is further evidence of the move towards 
professionalism. It was limited, however, in several important ways. 
(1) Producers did not have their own salary scale, but were merely ranged at 
higher points than other groups on the G (General) scale. Some other New Zealand 
professional groups, such as doctors, have their own specially elevated scales. 
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(2) The TVPDA did not represent producers at industrial negotiations; they were 
merely associated to the PSA, who made representations on behalf of all television 
occupations. This position worsened during the 1970's as the PSA adopted a more 
explicitly industrial stance, which excluded the TVPDA, who preferred to retain a 
Guild position in their negotiations. More than that, as a late 1980 memo 
emphasised, this relationship meant it was perceived by the BeNZ as just one· 
amongst 'other craft groups on staff matters, eg Floor Managers Association, TPA's 
Association etc.' 
(3) The TVPDA lacked any formal, institutional training scheme; there were (and 
are) no formal qualifications or extended means of training, or clear means of 
recruitment - and certainly none that the TVPDA can control beyond the bounds of 
television, (and see Larson, 1979, for the significance of this for the advancement of 
professional projects). 
3.2 Professional Self-Perception 
Regardless of the degree of professionalization by producers, it was backed by 
a professional ideology. Its key feature, as noted earlier, was a claim to autonomy. 
As expressed in a remit to a TVPDA meeting in August 1979: 
'the ultimate responsibility for each local television production must lie in the 
hands of an assessed and designated producer.. .requiring of its organiser skills 
beyond the basic journalistic skills in the selection and editing of source 
material.' 
Clearly, this is less than definitive about what these skills might be. Another 
TVPDA document refers to 'excellence, efficiency and originality.' Nonetheless, the 
TV-l Director-General, in the text of an interview for the TVPDA's occasional 
journal, Voiceover, in 1975 provided .. more detail: 
' .. .1 think that every producer must have a strongly developed sense and be 
able to judge instinctively that a close up is called for or that a two-shot is 
going to punctuate or relieve the oppressiveness of too close a visual 
exchange.' 
This statement, while it still retains the mystique of judgement, illustrates the 
key interpretative role of producers and, equally importantly, the sense that the 
producer works on behalf of the viewer, as a kind of visual or cultural advocate. 
Morris, in the same interview, expands on some other central ideological features: 
'we are, or should be, committed to the principle that the programme's the 
thing. That's what we'll finally be judged on, that's what we're in business for.' 
He also referred to the importance of 'raising standards' and the importance of 
reference to peers for a validation of a programme's worth (the TV-2 Director-
General, in an interview for the NZ Listener (June 28, 1975), referred to the 
importance of international standing as part of television's development which 
suggests the local/cosmopolitan distinction raised by Gouldner, 1972). 
In a press statement in August 1979, the TVPDA also emphasised the place of 
quality, and to their claim to represent the public interest. It is interesting to compare 
these professional claims to those Bums (1979) found at the BBC. As he indicated, 
there were three primary orientations to professionalism which could be summarised 
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(McQuail, 1983: 119) as craft-oriented, (ie to a peer reference group), public 
organisation-oriented (to a cultural mission, or the public interest) and pragmatic (to 
ratings). Both of these first two orientation are clearly represented in these 
statements. The third was most clearly represented by the TV-2 interview noted 
above as an awareness of their strategy. In this context, however, these definitions 
are being offered as public statements of claims to special status. The TV-2 remarks 
refer to orientations within the occupation. 
In short, New Zealand producers demonstrate professional aspirations in 
common with those of other countries. It is worth noting, though, that their claims 
are more explicitly aligned with public service or monopoly broadcasting than to the 
orientations noted by Cantor-(1971) in her study of American television producers. 
The point, again, however, is that her study is of orientations rather than claims. 
3.3 Producers and the New Channels 
Whatever the case, producers undoubtedly dominated the two new channels. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, this was principally through the control of key 
. positions within asmall, closely-knit organisational framework. They were supported 
by Corporation Boards who attempted to institute the Adam Report as fully as 
possible. As the TV-l Chairman put it, 'Our Bible was the Adam Report.' Equally 
importantly, the two Directors-General assumed a role of paternal benevolence over 
the structures which they were predominantly responsible for creating and 
motivating. Alan Morris, in a letter to the Higher Salaries Commission in December 
1975 summarised their role: 
'Allan Martin of TV -2 and I were charged with the responsibility of 
establishing two new Corporations which in the event were quite dissimilar in 
structure, character and direction from the NZBC. We personally framed the 
infrastructure in almost complete detail, set production priorities and 
negotiated terms and conditins of employment with the PSA ... Thus, because 
of the comparative lack of expertise in international terms of so many of our 
people, a major function in the role of the Director-General is as teacher and 
advisor from the factory floor upwards.' 
If the Directors-General held a paramount position, there was little doubt that 
the Controllers of Programmes were also significantly powerful, through their control 
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of programme scheduling, as several respondents from both channels noted. 
Scheduling determines the audience for individual programmes and consequently 
affects the visibility and careers of producers and production staff; it also determines 
the placement and duration of advertising breaks and so influences the channel's 
financial performance, and the opportunities available to advertisers as well as sales 
staff. As one cynical TV-I film servies officer remarked in a 1978 memo: 
'There is a feeling amongst some staff that there are not five Controllers but 
one Controller of Programmes and four assistants.' 
The priorities of the Controller of Programmes could be transmitted rapidly 
through the channel, not only because of the centralization of key decisions in his 
hands, but also because each channel was small (TV-l employed 860 staff in 1976; 
TV-2 approximately 680) and tightly knit, organised around. the small-unit cluster of 
programme production. As a senior TV -1 executive observed, directives could travel 
from the top to the bottom of the Corporation and carry a response back up within the 
space of a week. In this sense, the organisations resembled the 'family' structure 
recommended by the Adam Report. In other ways, however, they diverged sharply 
and in ways which were reflected in their widely differing organisational cultures. 
3.4 The Development of Organisational Cultures 
TV -1 took over the Avalon facilities and Dunedin as its second station, which 
it turned into a specialist station, eventually producing mainly children's programmes. 
It also took over many of the experienced NZBC staff, largely as a result of 
geography: shifts to TV-2 would frequently have meant relocation for individuals. As 
a consequence, it began operations in fundamentally well-equipped brand-new 
facilities with a core of experienced administrative staff (the 'lean' administration 
recommended by the Adam Report). It had full national coverage at the outset, 
operated from a largely familiar base (Wellington) and contained the majority of its 
staff within one complex. Understandably, its older members, especially, tended to 
look on themselves as the natural successors to the NZBC; also, by virtue of being 
located in the political capital of the country. 
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TV2, on the other hand, began as a brand-new operation. Its base was 
Auckland, with Christhcurch as a second operational centre, but with no particular 
division of programme responsibilities. Not only could it claim fewer television staff, 
but its facilities were, to some extent, cramped ex-radio headquarters. Certainly, 
operations were scattered across Auckland, on both sides of the harbour, in a variety 
of loosely-connected buildings. At its inception it had no broadcasting facilities 
whatsoever: seven major transmitters had to be imported over the first years of its 
existence to give 75% national coverage as Stage One of complete development, each 
coming on air one after the other. 
The result was that, under a broadly similar framework, each channel evolved 
a very different strategy of development to ensure its survival. However, before 
turning immediately to these, it is important to list some of the other pressures and 
responses which emerged during the 1974-76 period. These could be summarised as: 
understaffing, technical shortages and malfunctions, high productions stresses and 
long working hours, and high intake of new staff. On the other hand, there was clear 
evidence of high morale, especially among production departments, and a feeling of 
enthusiasm, loyalty and sense of stake in the new structure. TV -l's 1976 Annual 
Report to Parliament is quite remarkable for its vibrancy in what is nonnally an 
occasion for studiedly grey prose (F.ll, 1976:3): 
'With these problems solved, the cop oration surged forward on a tide of 
creative and innovative broadcasting which in retrospect at the end of 12 
months can only be described as astonishing. Any changes the future may 
bring to TV -1 will never obscure the achievement of its first year as a vintage 
one in the history of television in New Zealand.' 
It went on to state that this was due to (F.11, 1976:3): 
'the executive and personnel, who were obliged to work very long hours in the 
arduous shakedown period and who demonstrated a morale and enthusiasm 
for their channel which was beyond praise.' 
TV2's report was more sanguine (F.12, 1976:4): 
'the enthusiasm of our staff in meeting the challenge of pioneering New 
Zealand's second channel was evident with the start of our transmission in 
Auckland and Christchurch .. .' 
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In many respects, this process reflects what Schein (1985) regards as the key 
aspects of internal integration of new groups: the growth of relationships and sense of 
accomplishment. What was undoubtedly true was the wide degree and depth of 
commitment in a way which was altogether absent with the NZBC. 
It is interesting to see how this process was fostered and shaped within 
Television One, and illuminates how internal departmental power influenced the 
channel's image and strategies. As a series of Public Relations memos between 1975 
and 1978 showed, it was an explicitly planned undertaking, which aimed to link 
external management and internal staff ideological control. Externally, TV-1 
personnel began a process in 1975, a surged by the Information Services section, of 
addressing 40 groups and organisation's, mainly in the Wellington area. Critical 
letters received 'polite and friendly' replies, which, one memo claimed, was 
sometimes turning criticism to television's advantage (without actually stating how). 
The media was also fed publicity information, particularly television critics, and 
members were invited to Avalon to meet 'executives, producers and personalities.' 
Internally, the memo acknowledged the importance of 'good internal staff relations', 
commenting that the Information Section was being used by 'various groups for 
advice, information and assistance with the preparation and release of information.' 
A weekly newsletter was initiated. 
These same strategies, once introduced, were to endure and expand -
externally, to reinforce a positive image; internally, to enhance staff co-operation. At 
the same time, the Information Services sought to extend its influence, in order to 
reinforce what it saw as the Corporation's objectives. It rejected the use of outside PR 
assistance - on which TV-1 had originally relied - and late in 1975 began to claim the 
sole right either to speak for, or to manage, all external contact on programme 
matters. Internally, it attempted to portray all television personnel as PR agents by 
implication: 
'All members of the staff of Television One are responsible for, and are part of 
the Corporation's public relations.' 
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It recognised, however, that operational stresses were counter-productive, 
with staff appearing 'lethargic, bemused and negative.' Nonetheless, it pursued a "'9th 
Floor" getting down to the "ground floor" policy', endorsing a proposal for a 
'sounding-board group', where staff regularly met executives . 
. In a 1978 plan, it assembled a group of external and internal strategies. These 
supplemented existing initiatives with proposals for a regular Listener column, bi-
annual Press conferences at Avalon involving metropolitan press critics, use of the 
newly-formed Programme Advisory Committees, wider deployment of television 
personalities, and a regular Director-General's lunch. Staff relations were to be 
enhanced by fortnightly get-togethers with the Director-General, seminars and 
'devices for "keeping people busy'" between productions, and various improvements 
for top-down communication. 
The importance of these suggestions was considerable. Televison One 
received, as will be detailed in a later chapter, considerable criticism, particularly 
through the press and needed to maintain not only a defined, positive presence but to 
reduce the damage that continued criticism could cause morale. A majority of the 
proposals were, in fact, taken up. However, there are two points of interest here. One 
is that aside from the obvious control issues involved (see, for example, Dunkerley 
and Salaman, 1986; Salaman, 1979), the process of PR image construction, while it 
emerged out of an organisational culture that developed and defined itself against the 
NZBC, was a consciously constructed and marketed image. By an emphasis on 
responsibility and public service, it was implicitly addressing a broadly high culture 
audience. In the process, it was linking organisational culture to national culture. 
Moreover, it was - at least to some extent - manufacturing the organisational culture 
by the very effort of managing it. In short, this was an effort at internal and external 
representation of a particular set of values and understandings. On the one hand, 
these spoke to staff and informal groupings; on the other, they asserted a particular 
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external identity - which in turn would be re-absorbed and recycled by the staff of the 
channel from which it emanated. 
The second point is that these: proposals accompanied a claim for an increase 
in status (in the form of the creation of a new Public Affairs Department), with a 
corresponding dominance over allied groups (the presentation and publicity sections 
were depicted as undertaking largely technical functions). The claim was rejected 
(after Board level discussion), and for obvious reasons. This degree of management 
would have encroached on production discretion, and was at odds with producers' 
perceived right to represent their programmes as they wished. As it happened, 
producers took either little, or varying account of these management initiatives in 
promoting their productions. On the contrary, they continued to comment publicly 
not only about them, but about a variety of Corporation' policies, earning increasingly 
stern rebukes and reminders of regulations; these, indeed, recalled that, at root, the 
overall broadcasting structure was still hierarchical despite the efforts to produce a 
sense of (:quality and informality. Nonetheless, the fact that a large number of 
suggestions were taken up indicates both the influence of the area, and the way in 
which it inflected the dominant programme ideology through its attention to 
important ,external pressures and sensitivities. 
TV-2's culture was likewise inflected, although in a different direction. Its 
primary requirement - as clearly stated in its objectives (TV -2 Board Minutes, 29 July 
1976) - was to increase its transmission coverage in order to increase its sales 
capacity. With a relatively small and indeterminate coverage, its advertising rates 
were inevitably lower, and it was unable to draw big, consistent national advertisers. 
This not only determined its strategy, it also affected the relationship amongst key 
deparlments (in sum, it elevated the position of Sales and Marketing), and shaped 
both its organisational culture and its cultural production which became, in effect, 
aimed towards a more generally mass or popular culture audience. 
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The cornerstone of the strategy was founded on regionalism - in explicit and 
conscious contrast to Avalon's national coverage. This had two dimensions. One 
was a specific conception of local community (NZ Listener 28 June 1975): 
'Community. TV-2 will draw its character from a community approach, a 
deliberate regional integration, a direct response to people and a subtle 
Polynesian blending.' 
This would involve 'a dialogue, a talk-back feeling' so that 'we will be 
showing people what's going on in their own backyard,' (NZ Listener 28 June 1975). 
The other dimension involved parochialism (NZ Listener 28 June 1975): 
, "In the 7 pm bulletin we will be unashamedly parochial" says Bruce Crossan, 
head of news and current affairs.' 
-This was also the stated aim of TV -2's Controller of Sales and Marketing, to 
take account of transmission coverage, but also to develop retail trade advertising. 
Previously, this had been estimated to account for 3% of all advertising It was 
therefore considered to be a potential source of untapped revenue, and was 
confidently expected to generate considerable income. However, it involved an 
entrepreneuerialism and inventiveness both in promoting a channel without an 
established image, and in wooing established advertisers or creating a new market. 
This policy, in essence, set the direction of TV-2, and was one which 
depended on piecemeal development of markets, communities and even the 
organisation's facilities around a concept of locality. It therefore also aimed to draw 
the maximum audiences to the channel as fast as possible to offset its coverage 
deficiencies. This, in turn, required favourable audience research. One of the 
eventual results, widely noted by commentators, was of the development of so-called 
'snob-slob' programming between the channels. It also heightened conflicts and 
rivalries. To secure maximum advantage and to retain ,audiences through the effects 
of programme flow (Williams, 1975), TV-2 increasingly ignored common junction 
agreements (which enabled viewers to switch channels without missing part of a 
programme), attempted to by-pass complementary programming rules,and argued 
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vehemently for the right to choose its own Audience Research agency in preference 
to the Broadcasting Council's. TV-I came to be viewed in some TV-2 circles as a big 
brother gifted with all the advantages; likewise, TV-2 was regarded at TV-l as 
unreliable and dragging on the coat-tails of its financial success. 
The differences, however, extend further. As one TV-2 respondent pointed 
out, they reflected local cultural identities: 
'TV-2 was a product of Auckland. It reflected the city in its outgoingness and 
openness, unlike TV -I's institutional character .. '!t worked out of Wellington -
you know, that institutionalised city bureaucracy which spills over into 
programming, and into the journalists' retinue of contacts ... Auckland, on the 
other hand, is different. It's innovative, adventurous, materialistic. There are 
no nuances. It's upfront. People are out to make a buck.' 
In total, this set up a wide number of opposed categories into which TV -1 and 
TV -2 respectively fell: national/regional; centralised/diffused; high/19w culture; 
public service!commercial; tightly/loosely co-ordinated and so on. 
Yet, if this was one set of oppositions, there was a second set which cut across 
them. Both channels were clearly urban organisations, yet both were very conscious 
of rural constituents - TV-l as part of national coverage; TV-2 because of the loud 
complaints of rural viewers who couldn't receive them. Yet their metropolitan 
location also signalled a switch in implicit priorities. TV -1, for instance, sought to 
establish a sense of national community, as a Public Relations memo argued: 
'TV -1 must establish the NCTB approach. North Cape to Bluff - in that 
anything that's anything in New Zealand can be seen by everybody, only on 
TV -1 .... the community concept is fine. - a sort of three-island network of the 
people'. 
At the same time, it was important 'to establish an image of a national 
Corporation interested in the little people, and the little things.' Yet, simultaneously, 
it set its key national news bulletin - on which prime time evening programming 
conventionally depends - half an hour later than the NZBC at 6.30pm, in line with 
Melbourne research on metropolitan meal-times, while recognising that this would 
disadvantage rural viewers and generate complaints - which it did (TV -1 Board 
minutes, 1976). 
76 
3.5 Public Culture and the Cultivation of Publics 
Overall,there was a shift from an implicitly rural to an urban audience. This is 
evident not only from the kinds of new local programmes which were produced: apart 
from news placement, both channels diversified, for example, into the previously 
untried areas of long-running soap operas, which emphasised urban and local values -
one was set in a factory (TV-2's 'A Going Concern'); the other, TV-l's 'Close To 
Home' depicted a local suburban community. It was also evident in the crucial 
recognition (and celebration) of diversity (Boyd-Bell, 1985): there was an emphasis 
on difference, social variety, non-conformity, challenge and confrontation which can 
all be regarded as urban, metropolitan concerns (Tonnies, 1955; Frisby and Sayer, 
1986) rather than provincial and traditional, hierarchical and authoritarian. 
The challenge was mounted, for example, in a' new children's programme, 
'Gizago' which, apart from using a title which abandoned standard English in favour 
of a child's spelling, was fronted by an unkempt adult called Stu dressed in an untidy 
school uniform, who was widely accused of inculcating bad habits in younger 
viewers through his speech and behaviour. Programmes such as 'Edwards on 
Saturday' aimed, for the first time, to reproduce a sophisticated, late-night chat show 
format. This did away with the formerly implicit idea that there was a natural 
national bed-time of 11 pm when close-down arrived; it also began to introduce 
varieties of people and ideas not formerly countenanced by the NZBC, and provoked 
widespread controversy as a consequence (NZ Listener July, September 1975; NBR 
Investment Supplement, August 1977). Current Affairs programmes became far more 
extensive, especially on TV -1 They also became more openly confrontational, with 
sharp questioning by often young interviewers of established authority figures. 
Again, this continued to provoke wide public debate (Christchurch Press, 14 August 
1976; NZ Listener June 1976). 
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These initiatives suggest something of Newcomb and Hirsch's (1987) idea of 
liminality, in the destruction of established boundaries (and see Bernice Martin's 
(1984) analysis on this point), yet they were also tied to an image or rhetoric of 
localness or community by each channel. In short, this combined set of values 
produced contradictory images which spoke to contradictory communities 
simultaneously in an effort to accommodate them. For example, TV -1 's 
confrontational programme, 'Fair Go' was modelled on the urbane English 
programme, 'That's Life'. It tied together small-scale consumer complaints within an 
explicitly metropolitan framework, and also appealed to a deeply-held, traditional 
egalitarian ideology - the idea that everyone, regardless of station, has the right to 
reasonable treatment, or a 'fair go' in the New Zealand phrase. The same strategy is 
evident in 'Clobber Shop' - a reference to the Great New Zealand Clobbering Machine 
(Mitchell, 1972), but was, in fact, a short-lived complaints programme about 
television. 'Today At One', the mid-day half-hour magazine programme, initially 
appealing to a house-bound lunch-time audience became retitled 'Good Day' and 
attempted (unsuccessfully, in this case), to shorten its title to the familiar Kiwi 
greeting 'G'Day'. Nonetheless, it was indicative of the attempt to tie the local and 
rural to the metropolitan and national. So, too, in some ways, was the parodic figure 
of Fred Dagg, a laconic cow-cockie in gumboots who appeared on TV -1 current 
affairs programmes to lampoon national mores. This new diversity of programme-
types reflected, in part, not only the new possibilities available to programme-makers, 
responding to the absence of close administrative controls under which they had 
previously worked, but also reflected their own backgrounds and pre-occupations. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a majority of programme-makers came from an 
urban background themselves. In fact, staff with a rural background or experience 
had to be actively recruited for such rural programmes as 'Country Calendar'. 
(Interestingly, this programme still became one principally aimed at townsfolk and 
had to be supplemented by a specialist farming programme which, as TV -1 's 
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Director-General complained in a memo, was then scheduled in such away that 
farmers were rarely able to watch it despite its high agricultural reputation). 
4. SUMMARY 
1974-76 was the period which saw programme-makers rise to dominate the 
television system. What this chapter has set out to demonstrate is the complex set of 
linkages which their prominence revealed, and how this impacted on television's 
broader social setting. The key linkage, however, is between the risks and 
ambiguities inherent in television broadcasting and the claim by programme-makers -
and particularly producers - to be able to manage this uncertainty successfully. What 
this chapter attempts to show is that the programme-makers set out to institute 
different strategies which were founded in perceptions of their environment as 
comprising both market and state elements. Each channel, in effect, emphasised 
either one element or the other: Television One adopted a more noticeably 
institutional stance, while Television Two adopted a more explicitly market 
orientation. Each of these strategies reflected both the resources available to them 
(facilities, plant, staff and location) and the regional ideology in which they were 
located. This combination of understandings and opportunities was then translated 
into the production of nationwide ideologies, reflecting the organisational ideologies 
out of which they arose (and, as indicated, were managed). In crude terms, these 
approximated to a high and a popular culture (although, in fact, the distinction is less 
clear - more especially for Television One) - when it is closely scrutinised. TV-I, in 
particular, appears to have worked to an agenda which was set by implication by its 
predecessor, the NZBC: it was an attempt by professionals to demonstrate the fruits 
of their expertise when freed from administrative control, and they attempted to 
pursue a number of objectives simultaneously (as the 1976 Annual Report to 
Parliament triumphantly announces) as a consequence. 
79 
Yet these strategies also bred conflicts in time between the channels: both 
channels were seeking the maximum commercial return from the advertising market 
both for revenue and to demonstrate their competence and credibility, 
Once the initial strategy of each channel was formulated it did not alter 
markedly until the amalgamation of 1979. On the contrary, the intervening period 
served to heighten the differences and remove ambiguities at the same time as it 
intensified channel rivalries. This, in tum, served to undermine the claims to 
legitimacy and credibility which both channels sought to promote, and sharpened 
competition over access to internal resources and the allocation of state funding. 
The second issue, which arose repeatedly from 1977-79, also began in this 
period. This involved the question of complaints about programmes, and how they 
should be resolved, both internally and publicly. Together, this issue, and that of 
channel rivalry, formed the two major political and social threats (or publication 
issues, as Engwall (1986) terms them), faced by television. These formed the basis 
for fresh claims from administrators to manage them where, they argued, 
professionals had failed. These, plus the intensifying financial issues, are the subjects 
which are taken up in following chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1974-76: EMERGING TENSIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four set out the kinds of strategies and claims advanced by 
programme-makers in the creation of a competitive television system. The focus, 
however, was intentionally limited to the activities of the two corporations as 
producers of programmes. What this underemphasises is the rapidly developing 
tensions in the total broadcasting system. Some of these began to emerge as a result 
of the original structures produced by the working parties from the Adam Report, or 
from shortcomings of the Report itself. Others arose from the wider social and 
institutional setting in which television operated. 
What this chapter discusses are two sets of issues. One has to do with the 
development of internal organisational pressures and tensions which, in turn, 
generated, the other: public discontent and political opportunities. Each of these is 
considered in turn. They are then related to the broader questions of organisation, 
profession and culture. 
1.1 Internal Organisational Pressures 
During the 1974-76 period, four major organisational dilemmas can be 
isolated, each containing a cluster of sub-issues. These were (a) financial issues; (b) 
problems of transmission extension; (c) presentation problems (i.e. problems of 
programme production and scheduling) and (d) interchannel rivalries. 
1.1.1 Financial Issues 
As outlined above, broadcasting worked, in effect, with two budgets. One was 
the year-by-year operational budget which incorporated all the normal matters of 
income and expenditure. Controls for this were delegated at different levels 
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throughout the corporations. The second budget was for capital expenditure - the 
Capital Equipment Programme (CEP). It covered major items of expenditure: studios, 
transmitters and major building projects or alterations. Amounts over $500,000 
needed Ministerial approval and projected expenditure was vetted and approved by 
the Treasury and by the Cabinet Works Committee on the basis of 5-year plans which 
were scrutinised, again, on a yearly basis. Finance for the CEP could be borrowed 
from Treasury, but only by way of the National Development Loan account, at 10% 
interest. It was these loans which provided broadcasting with its major debt burden, 
amounting to $30.9 million by the end of the 1976 financial year, of which $16.9 
million was borrowed during 1976 itself. With a tiny announced surplus of $220,000 
in 1974-75, and $104,000 in 1975-76, it was widely recognised that broadcasting was 
faced with a severe problem of repayment, especially since its major capital 
programme was by no means complete (and see the NBR Investment Supplement, 
26.3.75: 'Cost Will Be The Biggest Test'). 
The reasons for the loans were straightforward: they were to pay for second 
channel transmission coverage (expected to be 75% of the country by 1977), 
completing the switch from monochrome to colour transmission, major studio 
development for TV -2 in Auckland, and the completion of TV -l's Avalon facilities. 
While the Chairman claimed that the original funding by Labour and the Treasury 
was 'inexpert' (The Evening Post 13:10.76), it was evident that broadcasting was 
severely underfunded (and see the Parliamentary debate on this point, NZPD 
1976:4396,4406 and 4409). Nonetheless, it enabled National to criticise broadcasting 
for overspending. 
Financial issues, therefore, emerged in two tiers, reflected in the budgetary 
process. One, the CEP, reflected the problems of capital expenditure and the linked 
question of a key resource dependency, closely controlled by a public sector agency, 
which constantly demanded thrift, tight financial management and detailed 
information flows in return for access to its monopoly of loan finance, (BCM 75/16/8; 
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75/20/2;75/25/4; 76/6/38). These pressures fed into the second tier of financial issues 
which concerned three linked questions of (i) debt servicing; (ii) allocation 
procedures, and (iii) monitoring procedures. Because these were constantly in a state 
of irresolution, tension and ambiguity, coupled with genuine liquidity problems, it 
enabled administrators to claim a state of crisis which only they could resolve by (i) 
an access to and understanding of the activities and attitudes of external financial 
agents; (ii) technical skills (of centralised management, monitoring and financial 
control procedures) to solve severe and apparently deadlocked problems. In short, 
they argued to be able to reduce the acute financial uncertainties by an appeal to 
established occupational skills reinforced (in the case of the new Chairman and Board 
members) by expert figures drawn from a wider professional/managerial community 
beyond broadcasting. 
1.1.2 Transmission Extension 
This second issue was linked to the first. The availability of loans directly 
affected the rate at which transmission coverage could be extended, as noted. The 
reduction in the CEP demanded by the Treasury therefore affected broadcasting - and 
primarily TV -2 - in two ways. First, it limited advertising income to the speed at 
which new audiences could be brought into being - and which had consequent effects 
on the level of marketing rates and advertising strategy. Secondly, it fuelled the 
debate over complementary programming: although the channels were meant to 
programme competitively, if a popular programme was shown on TV-2, it provoked 
protests from the 25% of the population which could not receive it. 
In turn, these two consequences generated particular kinds of 
entrepreneurialism. TV-2 became noted, and criticised, for inventive schemes to 
capture advertisers: respondents mentioned, amongst others, the Million Dollar Club 
which admitted large advertising account holders to a club distinguished by its special 
privileges, and the Rubber Rate Card which, it was alleged, was a scheme whereby 
advertisers were sold audiences in marginal or even non-existent transmission areas. 
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On the other hand, it encouraged pressure for interim television coverage 
through privately-funded translators. Televiewers Associations developed throughout 
the country (The Christchurch Press 15.7.75) pressing for low-cost translators which 
they would fund themselves. This also generated direct political pressure that led to 
meetings between MP's and the Broadcasting Council, and eventually to a scheme 
which saw interim systems approved for a number of provincial centres built to 
broadcasting engineers' strict specifications (BCM 76/9/4; 76/10/16). This was to be 
an important development: metropolitan centres were, generally, the fIrst to receive 
coverage but provincial centres often represented politically marginal seats which 
could hold the key t6 electoral change. Moreover, provincial seats were increasingly 
becoming the preserve of the National Party (Levine, 1979:91-93). This prompted 
considerable political pressure for the extension of transmission over other 
broadcasting priorities. 
In general, while transmission did not provoke major discussion at the Council 
level, it did with the TV-2 Board (TV-2 Board minutes) and it was to have long-tenn 
consequences for priorities. 
At the same time, it underscored the presentation issue - and hence the 
state/market ambiguity about the best fonn of provision of services. If viewers could 
not see preferred programmes, then they were also unlikely to see the benefits of a 
purportedly market arrangement for broadcasting. Consequently, the uneven of 
provision of transmission facilities fed into pressure for an even allocation of other 
(programme) services nationally. There is one other interesting subsidiary point. This 
was that the demand was for the provision of service, not for the perceived cultural 
quality of the service. The demand was for access to TV-2, virtually regardless of 
whether what it screened was good or bad. As Mayne commented, on the higher 
degree of coverage demanded of radio than television in New Zealand (1985:27): 
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'Conclusion: physical signal coverage has always been more highly regarded than the 
content of the transmission.' 
In sum, then, if transmission issues were driven by financial issues they, in 
turn, influenced matters of publication or presentation. 
1.1.3 Programme Issues 
Two kinds of issues developed within this area: one was to do with 
programme scheduling; the other was to do with programme content. 
1.1.3.1 Programme Scheduling 
The key issue with scheduling was complementary programming. Channels were 
regulated to prevent the running of like-against-like; yet the definition of similarity 
was left up to each corporation. Two problems emerged. Despite a committee 
charged with avoiding programme clashes, there was still dispute over how the 
categories were organised (BCM 75/17/14). There was also criticism over common 
junctions - occasional common programme starting-points on the channels which 
enabled viewers to switch without missing the start of the opposition's programme 
(BCM 74/11/9; 75/20/37; 75/24/7). Criticism was both internal and external, and 
widespread (Boyd-Bell, 1985:149). 
At root, all the disputes - over complementary programming, common 
junctions, inter-channel rivalries (see below) and the question of whether popular 
programmes should only run nationally (on TV-I) involved the same ambiguity: state 
or market provision. Programme-makers were neither free to pursue a purely market 
policy - to schedule programmes to draw the greatest possible advertising revenue, 
regardless of other considerations, as in the American or Australian model (Browne, 
1987; Windschuttle, 1985). Nor were they free to invoke a special understanding of 
the public interest, as in the British model (Garnham, 1973). What they were, in fact, 
obliged to do, was to shuttle between the two models, constantly threatening to upset 
one or both sets of clients. As a result, they could neither appeal to, nor 
accommodate, the interests of a particular elite on the basis of public service provision 
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as, for example, with the BBC; nor could they create a hierarchy of market priorities 
and judgements over which they could assert control. 
If they could never fully satisfy the demands of cultural or advertising patrons, 
nor could they fully develop an occupational mission: the claim to interpreting and 
articulating notions of a New Zealand culture and identity was always undercut by 
ratings and scheduling priorities. 
This led TV-2, for example, who were always more vulnerable to financial 
pressure, to try to combine these antithetical elements. One typical strategy was to 
produce cheap local talent quests ('Opportunity Knocks', 'Smile' and 'Ray Colombus 
Presents'), or various low-budget, soCially responsible, audience participation shows, 
ranging from current affairs ('Friday Conference') to Telethon. 
Yet, these pressures were to produce evidence of intra-occupational conflict 
(as will be shown) and was translated into the status hierarchies of 'older brother-
younger brother' channels. 
1.1. 3.2 __ --"-Pr-"-'o;;;.,tgr=am=m=e::-C==on=t=e.::.;.;nt 
Issues over programme content can be summarised as issues over moral 
judgement (programme standards), which mostly involved producers, and over the 
claim to independent professional judgement (the question of bias), which generally 
involved journalists. 
The first issue mostly concerned foreign programmes: series such as 'The Box' 
(an Australian soap opera), were criticised as immoral, unnecessarily depicting sexual 
scenes. Often, there was a linkage established, as in the case of 'The Box', between 
immorality and commercial income, which harks back to the dilemma over 
professional judgement, and its implicit appeal to two different clientele. 
The second issue, of professional judgement, had two aspects and needs to be 
treated at more length. One concerned the question of professional competence and 
self-monitoring, especially in the news and current affairs area; the other, the political 
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capital which critics could generate thereby. In effect, these intenningled much of the 
time, and will treated as one here. 
At root, the problems concerned the dilemma of how to develop adequate 
programme-making skills rapidly under difficult operational conditions. It was 
emphasised by the fact that radio and television journalists had only been operating as 
separate occupational groups since 1974, and were still in the process of constructing 
their own specialist occupational identity (and see Tunstall, 1971, on how this might 
be established). However, the problem was far from isolated to journalists, as three 
TV-l memos in 1975, 1976 and 1977 underline. As an ex-lTV senior producer 
commented in late 1975 of producers and directors (TV -1 memo, 21.11.75): 
'It is, I fear, still the day of th'e talented amateur and we must ensure 
that professional attitudes are insisted on by demanding higher 
standards ... There is a need for basic training and re-training in this 
area.' 
A departing producer observed in a report (TV -1 memo, 11.10.76): 
' .. .1 worry that there is so little training for Directors. I am distressed 
to see that there are still Producers and/or Directors who seem to 
avoid passing on knowledge or helping trainees, and I can only 
rationalise this by thinking that these people live in fear of being 
eclipsed by the "Young Hopefuls".' 
A senior BBe producer seconded to be Head of Information Services 
commented in 1977 (TV-l memo, 29.8.77): 
'As I start to develop our production plan for next year I'm brought 
face to face once more without major problem - the chronic shortage 
of good producers and directors .. .In my view we should be 
intensifying our concentration on recruitment and training in the 
coming couple of years. 1978 and 1979 ought to be the years in 
which in the Information area we try to remedy our greatest 
weakness - the shortage of creative, talented, thinking, ideas-full 
producers. ' 
It is worth bearing in mind that these comments are about staff in TV-I, which 
generally inherited the more experienced personnel in the 1974 restructuring. The 
problem was often more critical with TV -2. Invariably, then, these deficiencies were 
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remedied in a way which came close to on-air training. Extracts from the TV-l 
Network Editors' log in mid-1976 are illuminating in this respect (2.6.76): 
'Telecine operator with only two days experience in CR4 failed to 
roll lead item and caused 15 seconds delay after intro. Failed to 
show film after she'd rolled it. TP hit show button. Failed to roll 
and show film on Parliamentary Select Committee. Dougal 
[Stevenson, the newsreader] left on cam for 15 second delay again. 
Failed to have B-Roll cued up in time. Trainee sound op failed to 
play sound tape and as next film was on same reel had to show 45 
seconds mute film.' 
At times, however, problems could develop into questions of damaging 
professional credibility. An internal memo from the Director-General on a Chilean 
story carried on TV-l's 6.30 news is illustrative (TV-l memo, 20.9.76): 
'I am extremely angry about this whole affair. The fact that we used 
an unauthenticated film clip is bad enough. At best this is eviderice 
of unprofessional research, at worst the unbridled misuse of our 
programmes for political ends. Then having reassured the 
Ambassador that we would issue an apology and for that correction 
to have been "forgotten" is not only quite incredible but from a 
Chilean viewpoint sinister in the extreme ... What causes me the 
gravest disquiet is that we can be accused of being amateur and 
intransigent at a a time when we are doing all in our power to 
represent ourselves as fair-minded and professional.' 
The same point about objectivity was made in another TV -1 memo, which 
cited 7 instances of imbalance raised by a sympathetic viewer. The memo concluded 
'that we do have a case to answer' (TV-l memo 30.8.76). 
Coupled with these shortcomings was the intermixing of news and current 
affairs which sometimes made it hard, in the words of the Head of Programme 
Standards, to distinguish what was fact and what was opinion (BCM 76n/21). This 
generated continuing debate over what, indeed, was fact and what comment (BCM 
75/25/20; 76n/21; 76/8/23; and see TV-2's gnomic remark in their 1976 Annual 
." 
Report that 'what constitutes news is a subjective judgement',F.12:4). 
Externally, these difficulties supplied sufficient ammunition for political 
attacks to be mounted, especially on news and current affairs programming. These 
became widespread from the time of the 1975 General Election, and were generated 
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principally by Robert Muldoon, then Leader of the Opposition. The attacks were on 
two fronts. One criticised the duplication of news services - particularly the presence 
of a camera crew from each channel to cover press conferences and political events. 
The other attacked the independence of news journalists. At heart, these reiterated, on 
numerous occasions, the criticism, that programme-makers represented their own 
political interests and not the broader public interest in their framing of events. The 
following press release (3.5.77) by the Prime Minister on TV-l's 'Dateline Monday' 
current affairs programme is typical of the accusations: 
'He says the programme made no attempt at a balanced presentation 
but was simply an "undisguised attack on the government and 
myself' with no attention whatsoever given to a contrary viewpoint.' 
Mr Muldoon says its no wonder the public is getting sick and tired of "this blatant 
political propaganda" and that the credibility of television news and current affairs has 
sunk to an all time low.' 
These charges drew on, and echoed, a strong vein of popular sentiment, as 
indicated by this letter to the NZ Listener (20.11.76): 
'So TV journalists and interviewers have expressed concern that 
proposed legislation may .. .inject political bias into news and 
current affairs programmes. 
As TV staff have had a monopoly on drip-feeding their own brand 
of bias into such programmes in the past, I am not surprised at their 
concern.' 
Aside from direct criticism, the Prime Minister also featured in some highly 
public confrontations with interviewers, which aroused sometimes heated public 
debate. One of the most notable was a current affairs interview with Simon Walker, 
about the allegedly ominous presenc,e of Russian submarines in the Pacific, which 
dev~loped into a struggle to control the interview agenda, with the Prime Minister's 
repeated refusal to answer questions as they were put to him. This provoked intensive 
media commentary (see, for example, the Christchurch Press, 29.5.76; 31.5.76; 
1.6.76; 2.6.76) and viewer reaction (TV-l reported its switchboard to be overloaded, 
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registering in excess of 1000 callers, 324 of them supporting the interviewer's stand -
the Christchurch Press 2.6.76). 
By the time of the Broadcasting Bill the Prime Minister was able to refer to 
broadcasters as 'demented hens' and 'trendy lefties', themes which were taken up by 
conservative media elements (such as the conservative Catholic newspaper, The 
Tablet. November 1976). 
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As with the question of scheduling, then, the issues of a professional 
monopoly of judgement and representation of the broad public interest were called 
into question, both inside and outside broadcasting. The clear implication was that if 
professional self-monitoring was defective it needed to be regulated. Two methods 
were proposed: (a) codification~ in the form of specific regulations and programme 
standards, controlled by the Board or Council judgement; (b) social controls, in the 
form of internal journalism training supervised by the Council. Moreover, these 
shortcomings were used to argue that a single, co-ordinated, centrally-controlled news 
service was more representative of the public service than the duplicative, divisive, 
discretionary activities of the existing arrangements. In this way, occupational and 
partially organisational deficiencies were translated into sources of demand for closer 
control in the form of administrative dominance. 
1.1.4 Inter-Channel Rivalry 
Although competition was largely expected to be confined to a battle over 
what was screened, and when, it shifted rapidly to other areas. Some examples can be 
mentioned. One was over access to resources and facilities. An early, celebrated 
example was over the refusal of one channel to loan a visiting film-crew from the 
other a light-bulb, which consequently obstructed a film-shoot. Likewise, a refusal by 
one channel to organise for an exchange of cumbersome Outside Broadcast vans with 
the other led to the two trucks passing each other on the mountainous Rimutakas en 
route to their venues, 200 miles apart, in each others' centres at Wellington and 
Auckland. 
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More importantly, a dispute arose when TV-2 attempted to charge TV-1 
exorbitant rentals for video-tape recording and transmission time - normally given 
free - at double the rate it charged outside hirers, on the grounds that the exchange of 
these facilities was very unevenly in TV-1's favour (TV-2Ietter, 9.9.75; TV-1 memo, 
17.9.75). 
Although this problem was resolved, it illustrated the problem of inter-service 
charging and the hostility which could rapidly be generated over differences in 
working procedures that arose from divergences in organisational cultures. Both 
respondents and outside commentators reported that these attitudes extended to staff 
loyalties (one news respondent remarked that staff who were found out when they 
were in the process of switching channels 'earned 15 lashes'). Generally, it was 
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accepted that a rhetoric of apparent internal co-operation and efficiency contrasted 
with the disorganised, conflictual and ad hoc approach, especially as adopted by TV-2 
(Mayne, 1985). 
At a more senior level, there were also official disputes. One concerned the 
merits of internal market research over private commissioning where, after 
considerable disagreement (BCM 76/2/15; 76/12/6; 77/3/21), it was resolved to retain 
the BCNZ unit. 
These attitudes bred inter-channel rivalries which extended beyond the more 
gentlemanly competition expressed by the respective Directors-General at the 
channels' outset. Rather, they were exposed in press leaks designed to damage the 
opposition's credibility, but which also tended to fuel a public impression of 
mismanagement and infighting (TV-1 memo, 20.5.75). 
Fundamentally, these conflicts revolved around the same state/market 
ambiguity. Each organisation was tied to the other through the Council and by layers 
of administration, but was also obliged to compete with it. Under these 
circumstances, it was constantly unclear, at every level of organisational functioning, 
where competition ended and co-operation began, and on what grounds. 
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These arrangements also reflected, however, the structural reproduction of 
conflict, and hence the patterning of specific areas of power between programme-
makers and administrators that was created in the original 1974 restructuring. 
Arrangements which suited administrators, such as the centralised management of 
services and resources (particularly through the Council's support services), invariably 
brought programme-makers into direct conflict with each other through the structural 
configurations to which they were obliged to conform. Consequently, they were 
constantly faced both with the public contradictions of state and market and the more 
private contradictions of bureaucracy and market. 
2. SUMMARY 
At root, the sets of pressures generated in the process of television operation 
undermined professionals' claims to authority and competence. The state/market 
ambiguity inherent in the two-channel complementary/competitive arrangements 
fragmented the promotion of collegiality and the idea that the profession as a whole 
represented the public interest. At the same time, an insecure grasp (as an occupation) 
of technical skills, left it vulnerable to accusations not merely of incompetence but of 
serving occupational or interest-group ends rather than national needs. On the other 
hand, the financial difficulties which were rapidly emergi~g enabled administrators to 
claim the advent of a crisis which only they were in a position to manage by the 
application of administrative competencies. 
However, this was not to emerge until 1976. Nor were the most intense 
rivalries, which did not surface until the later 1970s (see chapters seven and eight). 
On the contrary, during this period, there was a sense of discover, excitement and 
innovation amongst programme-makers, coupled with the development of the 'family' 
loyalties prepared for by the Adam Report. As Gregory summed it up (1985:32): 
'There quickly emerged, however, a consensus among broadcasters 
that they were now relishing an atmosphere of creative purpose such 
as they had not previously experienced.' 
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In this light, emerging organisational strains could be interpreted as the 
inevitable growth pains inherent in a new and untried system. Moreover, ones which, 
given time, would resolve themselves within the boundaries of the new relations of 
power. Understandably, this view minimises the wider social setting within which 
broadcasting operated, and the powerful role of the state in defining the shape of.. 
organisational and professional arrangements. The interlocking set of relationships 
which these factors involved became evident in the struggle over the 1976 
Broadcasting Act and form the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE 1976 BROADCASTING ACT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The period from 1974 to 1976 had seen the ascendancy of programme-makers under 
the decentralised three-corporation system. The twelve months of 1976 was to 
emerge as the first serious challenge to their domination with the re-assertion of 
claims by administrators to control of the organisation for its general benefit. The 
claims and strategies promoted by administrators through this period were to persist 
well beyond it, and formed the basic framework for the 1979 reorganisation which 
finally amalgamated the two television channels. Yet both the pressures and the 
available responses within broadcasting were largely shaped by two factors. One was 
the return to a more explicitly centralized, single-corporation form of structure, with 
the three corporations reduced to service arms of the new Broadcasting Corporation 
of New Zealand (the BCNZ). The second was the loss of the corporations' political 
patron. In November 1975, the Labour Government was heavily defeated in the 
general election by a National Party opposition which came to office with a policy 
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aimed at re-centralizing and more closely controlling broadcasting, and with an 
openly hostile party leader. In short, programme-makers lost a patron where 
administrators gained one, a situation which was not to change until 1984 when 
Labour regained power. 
The heart of National's plans lay in the introduction of the 1976 Broadcasting 
Act. Yet its preparation and passage caused, without any doubt, the greatest period of 
turbulence and conflict in the history of New Zealand television. As a result, this 
episode highlights the range and strength of opinions held both inside and outside 
broadcasting about the shape and direction of television. It also highlights the 
linkages and tensions between different internal groupings and their relationships to 
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broader external communities of interest. While the patterns which emerge are 
similar to those discussed in earlier chapters, the period emphasises the diversity of 
viewpoints which were held about broadcasting and the problems broadcasters 
encountered of mobilising them in support of their own particular claims. The period 
also highlights how the perception of external dependencies shaped the internal 
organisation of opinion towards certain decisions. 
This chapter acts, then, to review some of the arguments and observations 
which have been laid out in earlier chapters, especially with regard to the kinds of 
claims advanced by professionals and administrators to be able to manage the 
complex uncertainties generated both by television and by New Zealand television 
production in particular, with its unusual mix of state and market provision. 1976 
illustrates the nature of these complexities and how each major internal grouping 
offered solutions based on their occupational perceptions and organisational positions 
to manage and contain the uncertainties television faced through structural and 
resource decisions. 
Because of the complexity of this period, the chapter begins with an 
introductory chronology which lays out the fairly intertwined sequence of events that 
occurred between November 1975 (the election of the National Government) and 
December 1976 (the passing of the Broadcasting Act). These fall into three phases 
that mark out structural and administrative changes which were put in motion. Each 
is then described in greater detail, in order to give some sense of the shifting and fluid 
nature of the debates as they evolved. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion 
of the relationship between the internal and external pattern of issues which emerged 
-. 
throughout 1976 and their consequences for the competing claims for control of the 
new structure. 
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2 CHRONOLOGY 
2.1 Outline 
Broadly speaking, there are three identifiable phases evident in the events 
which led up to th,e passing of the 1976 Broadcasting Act. It is important to note, 
however, that these constituted by no means the only activity in broadcasting during 
the period. The channels obviously continued to produce and transmit programmes, 
and the consequences of some of these inevitably fed into the restructuring debates. 
The relationship between the two can be gauged by the fact that, while on average, 
the Broadcasting Council listed thirty-three committee minutes per meeting, those 
concerned directly with restructuring constituted only ~9 for the whole year - less 
than 5% of the year's official business. Obviously, these minutes were, individually, 
of considerable importance in terms of the organisation's shift of direction. 
The three phases themselves are as follows: 
2.1.1 Framework for the Broadcasting Bill. November 1975 - May 1976 
This phase began with the revival of the position of Minister of Broadcasting. 
It covered the period over which the Broadcasting Council offered advice, formulated 
by short-term working parties, on the kinds of changes which could be undertaken 
with the proposed Broadcasting Bill. By May, all the reports, with the exception of 
one on News Rationalization, had been presented. 
2.1.2 Key administrative changes prepared. July 1976 - February 1977 
While, to some extent, these changes were separate to specific provisions in 
the Bill, they took up directions implicit in it, and in its sponsorship by the new 
Government. The phase began with the appointment of a new Broadcasting Council 
chainpan who oversaw the development of tighter planning and management control. 
It ended on their introduction at the first meeting of the new BCNZ Board in the New 
Year. Perhaps ironically - and certainly unexpectedly - the chairman died within 
three weeks of this meeting. 
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2.1.3 Broadcasting Bill debate. June 1976- December 1976 
This was undoubtedly the most complex phase of the three and began with the 
public announcement of the Bill's contents. This drew a sharp and growing staff 
reaction, co-ordinated by the Public Service Association (the PSA), which was 
intensified by the Bill's introduction to Parliament in October 1976. This culminated 
in television blackouts later in the month, and the renewal of opposition with the 
Bill's return to the House after a month of Select Committee hearings. Throughout 
this period, and especially when industrial action was contemplated, there was a 
considerable amount of political and public debate. Following three lengthy 
Parliamentary debates in November and December, the Bill's readings were 
completed on December 3. 
What becomes clear on examination is that each stage of this period represents 
a specific stage in the struggle of both broadcasting groups to capitalise on their 
relative positions. The first stage is essentially a defensive one on the part of 
programme-makers, anxious to maintain their existing power. This they do by 
arguing either for the status quo (and the term 'status quo' itself gains considerable 
prominence in the briefing papers), or for a position as close to it as possible, but 
which also conforms to stated Ministerial requirements. 
The second stage prepares for the advancement of administrators. This was 
backed by an understanding of the Government's preferences, the impending changes 
in the Council's membership - already instituted in part by the replacement of the 
Chairman and the presence of three future Board members as regular observers - and 
knowledge of the Bill's contents. It was also fuelled by the continuing conflicts 
between the corporations and Council departments over a variety of liquidity and debt 
problems. In contrast to these two internal stages, the third stage r~presented the 
programme-makers' plea for support from its constituency and the confused, divisive 
nature of the response it drew. 
Overall, however, these stages mark the shift from clear professional control 
to growing administrative dominance entrenched in several key provisions. The 
stages themselves are given in more detail as follows. 
3. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY 
3.1 Phase One 
(Framework for the Broadcasting Bill. November 1975 - May 1976) 
After the appointment of the Minister of Broadcasting in November 1975, it 
was unclear what kind, or even what degree, of restructuring was contemplated. This 
was not to become clear until the New Year, following briefings with the Minister in 
December and January. On January 22, the Chairman of TV-2 reported to his Board 
on the general shape which was emerging after a meeting with the Minister. This 
outlined the relationship between the Government and Broadcasting (TV -2 Board 
paper, January 1976): 
'He, as well as other Ministers, is under really heavy pressure from R.D.M. 
(the Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon), to make savage cuts and I gather 
specific criticisms have been pointed at Broadcasting ... R.D.M. is being very 
hard-nosed with everyone.' 
However, the meeting seemed to reveal a cautiously optimistic outlook: 
'Overall, I came away with the feeling that he is impressed with the new 
structure, its morale and performance. That he wants to make the minimum of 
change but political pressures will require minor surgery ... We have got an 
excellent and sympathetic Minister but we are not yet out of the woods.' 
The primary Government concern was also indicated: 
'He agrees the main issue is the central control but he has no intention of 
disturbing the independence of the three separate identities.' 
Aside from this issue, they also touched on the question of an independent 
complaints committee, the duplication of news broadcasts (which was described in a 
note to the TV-2 Director-General as 'apparently a hot issue in Caucus and Cabinet'), 
and the difficulties of complementary programme scheduling. For his part, the 
Chairman emphasised the importance of independence to the Minister and added: 
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'that he should watch Council carefully for any re-emergence of the old NZBC 
attitude to costs.' 
After verbal briefings and general proposals from senior executives and the 
corporation chairmen, the Minister issued a formal request a month later for advice. 
The specific items were read directly into the first Council meeting minutes of the 
year, on February 25, 1976. His letter revealed the extent to which the framework for 
review had developed. Stressing the urgency of a financial review, to which the 
Treasury would also contribute, he outlined what the focus of the advice should be 
(23/2n6): 
'These changes will be designed to introduce a greater measure of control and 
co-ordination within public broadcasting ... Particular attention should be 
given, in the light of Government's policy, to the powers of the Council as the 
central organisation of the broadcasting structure with special reference to its 
financial authority, its regulatory powers, its staffing responsibilities arid its 
relationships to the Minister.' 
As a result, the Council set up a number of working parties which were to 
produce reports between April and May in answer to specific questions which were 
raised (BCM 76/1/36). The most wide-ranging of these, dealt with by the corporation 
heads and the Council Secretary, covered finance, staff ceilings, terms and conditions 
of employment and proposals for structural changes. Two others concerned the 
rationalization of the news, and personnel matters. 
The key report, however, was from the Chief Executives and recommended 
two alternatives on the shape of prime structural reforms. No agreement could be 
reached at the March Council meeting and it was not until the April meeting that a 
compromise was arrived at. This involved a combination of Proposal A, (essentially 
the status quo position) and Proposal B (which proposed a single, dominant 
Broadcasting Board), and represented, finally, the best judgement of Council 
members on how to reconcile corporation demands for continuing independence with 
stated Government policy of establishing a single Board. In this sense, the conflict 
between the administrators' positions - to centralize broadcasting under a single Board 
- and programme-makers' to maintain the status quo, was simply translated to the 
Council level where it was resolved, albeit imperfectly, through the divided loyalties, 
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expressed in individual papers, by members to their political patrons and the values of 
the present system. The advice to the Government was for a central Board,. the 
BCNZ, but with partially-independent corporations which still managed their own 
programme production and financing. This position was to be reshaped and re-
defined over the next months. 
By April, the recommendations on complementary programming and news 
rationalization were still unresolved. After considerable debate, the complementarity 
issue was left over to the Minister for his decision (BCM 76/3/36). The News 
Rationalization Working Party had produced a majority and minority report which, 
once again, reflected a division· between the status quo and a more centralised 
arrangement. Interestingly enough, though, the composition of the working party was 
very similar to 1974, producing the divisions between an ex-NZBC administrator (in 
a strongly-defended minority report) and corporation news chiefs (the majority report, 
recommending the existing competitive system). After an inconclusive discussion in 
April it was reviewed at a special May meeting, but was finally held over on the 
grounds that its recommendations were so sufficiently unclear as to confuse the 
Minister. 
In the event, a dual news proposal was flatly rejected by the Cabinet in spite 
of the Minister's advocacy (The Evening Post 24/6n6) and news executives were 
obliged to present a single news service plan which, in itself, was to provoke further 
dispute. 
What this outcome indicates was the existence within the Government itself of 
two strands of opinion towards broadcasting. One, which appeared to be 
conservative, authoritarian and, to some extent, populist, attempted to enforce the 
strictest posible control on broadcasting, in keeping with the old NZBC tradition, and 
was advanced largely by the Prime Minister and two ex-Ministers of Broadcasting 
sitting on the Cabinet's Communications Committee. The other, which was more 
liberal, fluid and accommodating of the existing arrangements, was most clearly 
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represented by the current Minister of Broad~asting, Hugh Templeton. In the short 
term, then, the political climate for broadcasting reflected the dominance of one 
group over the other on particular issues, such as the shape of news rationalization. 
However, the broader social cleavages which these two positions suggest are left over 
to chapter nine for discussion. 
Apart from the news rationalization, all the reports were submitted as 
requested by May 1976. They were considered by a Cabinet Committee on 
Communications, which contained two former Ministers of Broadcasting, and were 
reformulated as policies for drafting into the Broadcasting Bill that was announced in 
late June 1976. 
While the submission of reports brought this phase to a close it formed, in 
fact, a prelude to the next phase which began with the arrival of a new Broadcasting 
Council chairman. 
3.2 Phase Two 
(Preparation for key administrative changes. July 1976 - February 1977) 
The arrival of Ron Jarden as the new part-time Council chairman heralded the 
beginning of two major changes of direction. One was financial reform. The other, 
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which was linked, concerned new management and planning procedures. This was 
underlined by the pending replacement of three Council members by Board members 
in 1977 with extensive business backgrounds. Jarden himself ran a successful 
Wellington stockbroking firm. 
The potential for financial reform was already evident. Both the capital 
development programme and the year-to-year operating accounts were under 
considerable strain. By the end of the 1975-76 financial year, broadcasting had 
borrowed $30.9 million for capital expansion (largely, to extend TV-2's transmission 
coverage) which was incurring $2.89 million of interest charges annually (Annual 
Reports to Parliament F.3, 1976). This had to be repaid from an annual income of $56 
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million and by 1976 it was becoming clear that even the interest repayment, let alone 
the loan, was becoming unmanageable. On the other side of the balance, only TV-l 
was producing an excess of income over expenditure: all other branches of 
broadcasting remained in varying degrees of deficit. In any event, a rising inflation 
rate meant that while income rose 21 % over 1976, expenditure rose by 25% (Annual 
Reports to Parliament F.3, 1976). The result was to intensify the debates over most 
components of shared-service and inter-corporation costs, but most particularly over 
the allocation of Licence Fee revenue, which became the subject of repeated dispute 
(at the Council level see BCM 76/3/33; 76/6/12; 76/6/15; 76/6/23; 76/6/29; 76/8/6; 
76/8/11). By April 1976, TV-2 was asking for an increased overdraft to ease its 
liquidity problems (BCM 76/6/13) while, by July, the Council itself faced acute 
liquidity difficulties (BCM 76n/29), as it did again in October when it was owed $7.2 
million of outstanding corporation repayments for various shared-service and 
intercorporation charges. Added to this were continuing dilemmas over the amount 
of advertising time that should be available per week; constant problems over 
complementary programming, and a long-running wrangle instigated by TV -2 over 
its right to commission external rather than internal audience research. 
Under these conditions there was ample opportunity to claim that broadcasting 
was in a state both of financial crisis and internal disarray, and to call for fil1ancial 
and management measures as remedies. This was precisely the strategy which the 
new Chairman adopted at his first meeting in July. As the Council minutes noted 
(BCM 76n/29): 
'The Chairman commented that the broadcasting system was facing a liquidity 
crisis and if operating costs could not be met, the alternative was a greater 
involvement in control by Treasury.' 
At the same meeting, he announced plans for long-range planning for the next 
ten years, calling for reports from the corporations as well as reviews of current 
management planning and information provision, and the state of computing needs. 
By September a Co-ordinating Committee on Management Planning had been 
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established, with representatives from each broadcasting branch and an external 
management consultant (BCM 76/8/2). The Chairman also tabled a summary sheet 
of financial information (BCM 76/8/3): 
' ... which showed that the total cash of $4 million [available] at 1.4.75 would 
be reduced to $0.785 million by 31.3.77. He said that this indicated a 
disturbing trend.' 
He then revealed that he had approached the Prime Minister in writing to 
propose the reclassification of the Government loans as capital grants. He reiterated 
the need 'to act responsibly' in 'a crisis situation' adding that it was necessary 'to 
demonstrate that the broadcasting house was in order' when applying for a licence fee 
increase (BCM 76/8/3). Later in the same meeting it was revealed that the incoming 
BCNZ Board would set budgets from 1977 onwards for each of the proposed 
divisions (BCM 76/8/9) - a right previously retained by the corporations - under 'a 
cohesive management plan' with 'new definitions of targets and objectives' (BCM 
76/8/8). 
Clearly, the shift away from corporation discretion to central oversight was to 
be attained by claiming crisis conditions which demanded immediate attention. This 
was to become a common strategy over the next three years. It was also achieved by 
an appeal to the interests of the system as a whole. This was couched at several 
levels: the notion of financial (and hence organisational) crisis which could only be 
managed by administrative and accounting expertise, championed by a self-evidently 
successful financial figure who was backed by Government policy, supported by 
management review teams and supplied by administrators' data. It also spoke to the 
relief of a pressing external resource dependency (Treasury control of capital 
funding) by the development of a fresh initiative (the capitalisation of loan finance) 
set in motion by a bold approach past the Minister of Broadcasting directly to the 
Prime Minister (who was also Minister of Finance, and an acknowledged 
acquaintance of Jarden's). It also appealed to the general issue of broadcasting 
independence by raising the threat of external control by Treasury if this course of 
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action was not rapidly pursued. That this was regarded as a genuine threat had 
already become evident at a TV-I Board discussion a year before, in September 1975, 
(TV-l Board minutes, 1975). In short, pressures and uncertainties were translated 
into forms of control, reorganisation and moral urgency (in the language of 
'responsibility' and 'order') which favoured co-ordinated administrative procedures 
over the conflictual, discretionary claims of programme-makers. 
The process was advanced by the introduction of the detailed structure for the 
BCNZ (BCM 76/11n) in November 1976. This provided for a central BCNZ Board 
which controlled 5 divisions (the three renamed corporations, a Central Services 
Division, and a Secretary's Division). The last two divisions were to split the 
administrative functions into a day-to-day service (the CSD) and a forward planning 
division (the Secretary's division). The corporations, as divisions, would be overseen 
by a separate Standing Committee which replaced their Boards and consisted of the 
current corporation chairman, one Board member from the BCNZ Board and the 
Service's Director-General. The Directors-General would also sit on a Board of 
Management (BOM) which would act as a regular filtering and advisory body to the 
Board. Overall financial monitoring was taken over by the CSD, as was general staff 
co-ordination between the Services. On top of this, a permanent Finance sub-
committee of the Board was created in November, comprising the three new 
businessmen Board members, and which was to develop financial advice from data 
supplied 'from financial executives' (BCM 76/11/6). 
Because the Broadcasting Bill was not passed until December, these proposals 
were not introduced until the first meeting in February 1977. Besides the new 
structure, the meeting also introduced a number of other changes which reinforced the 
move to centralization. Amongst them, six Board sub-committees were established, 
and information flows to these were re-routed, streamlined and improved. Above all, 
a central principle which had emerged intermittently was clearly enunciated: the 
objective of total independence from Treasury control by the 1977-78 year. This was 
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to require, for the first time, expenditure cuts, as had been can:vassed in a lengthy 
discussion in December (BCM 76/12/5): 
IMr Stannard said ... There had to be cost savings - an increase in licence fees 
or advertising income was not enough. In his experience, the product would 
not suffer in a time of financial stringency ... Mr Stannard said that the primary 
objective was for the Corporation to live within its income. I 
This was a very different emphasis from that of the preceding years. It 
reflected not only new priorities, but new Board membership, new ties between 
Board members and the executives who would advise them, and new emphases based 
on the concept of broadcasting as a single unified unit. It also indicated that 
independence was to be seen as a concrete, achievable goal and one founded on 
financial principles rather than as a self-evident, inalienable right. Once again, these 
definitions reflect the emergent claims of an administrative/management perspective 
which was now in a position to advance its claims through domination of some of the 
key structural elements of the new system. The emphasis on cost control was, in fact, 
to become a central theme over the 1977-79 period. 
3.3 Phase Three: Political and Public Perceptions 
(Debate over the Broadcasting Bill, June 1976-December 1976) 
Political criticism bore on two major points, which reflected the internal 
pressures discussed above. These were: (i) administrative and managerial 
shortcomings, and (ii) questions of professional legitimation and public 
accountability. Both of these themes have been touched on before, but the focus of 
this section is to show how internal problems were translated into a political 
programme, which then shaped the public debate over broadcasting throughout 1976, 
and parti~ularly during the Broadcasting Bill debates. 
The key shortcomings, as perceived by National, were best summarised by the 
Minister of Broadcasting at the introduction of the second reading debate (NZPD 
1976:4388): 
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"The review we undertook confirmed that there had been a marked expansion 
in staffing; it confirmed a lack of financial guidelines, financial goals, central 
accounting, and budget objectives~ and certainly a lack of capital funding and 
a complete failure to accept that cash-flow problems were likely to emerge. 
These problems have ended up at the moment with the system technically 
bankrupt, unable to pay its interest charges, and in difficulty with salary bills. 
In effect - and we must pick this up - a single corporation with overall 
management responsibilities would have handled the problem much better." 
He also pin-pointed the values which the Government was intent on emphasising 
(NZPD 1976:4387): 
"It seemed useful and sensible to set out the principles on which broadcasters 
traditionally operate, particularly impartiality, integrity, good taste, and 
balance. It seemed sensible to emphasise the importance to professional 
broadcasters of operating under a statutory corporation." 
These values were echoed by Barry Brill, National's Chairman of the Select 
Committee who, in the ~ill's first reading, expressed the second Government theme 
(NZPD 1976:3037): 
"The Broadcasting Council is at present the only state corporation for which 
no Minister is responsible. Members of Parliament, representing their 
electorates, can ask questions on behalf of those who own the corporation, and 
be informed that the Minister cannot answer because the information is not 
available from the Corporation. It is not available to its own 
shareholders ... These are matters for which this Parliament can be accountable 
only if the Corporation in turn accounts through the Minister." 
Although this represented National's two-fold analysis of broadcasting, 
members linked the themes together, loosened the frames of reference and vivified 
their claims in an effort to mobilise popular support for the Bill's proposals. At heart, 
the claims attacked broadcasters' financial competence and professional legitimacy. 
However, reaction to the Bill's contents was evident even before the Bill's 
official announcement on June 22. A week earlier, Christchurch broadcasters were 
reported to have reacted angrily to the broad plans in a pre-release briefing with the 
Minister of Broadcasting (The Dominion 15.6.76). The formal announcement itself 
marked the first in a series of often confused stages through which the debate passed. 
After the announcement, where the plan for a single Board was outlined, and new 
Board members were introduced (The Evening Post 22.6.76), there was growing 
reaction. The Association of Broadcasting Journalists (the ABJ) cautiously deplored 
the statement on the same day (The Evening Post 22.6.76). Over the following week 
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there was a vote by Christchurch and Wellington PSA members, led by the ABJ, for 
industrial action (The Evening Post 24.6.76) and possibly a strike. The Auckland Star 
(24.6.76) reported signs of production staff resignations which was followed by a 
threat to blackout segments of forthcoming Olympic Games broadcasts (The 
Dominion 26.6.76; The Press 28.6.76) This threat produced a split in PSA ranks, with 
Wellington-based staff (i.e. mostly non-Avalon or TV-I members) rejecting the idea 
at a meeting, and urging the PSA to protect their conditions of employment by 
holding talks with the Minister. 
This hiatus marked the end of the first stage, a little over a week after it had 
begun. The second stage was in August. In between, the Council Secretary, Keith 
Hay, had publicly outlined broadcasting's financial problems in a report that 
emphasised borrowing of $30 million in 2 years (The New Zealand Herald 9.7.76). 
The second stage, however, repeated the division between television staff outrage and 
internal PSA staff differences. 350 staff, mostly from TV-I, paid for a half-page press 
advertisement ('A Backward Step for Broadcasting') opposing centralization (The 
Dominion 10.8.76) while, at the end of August, the Wellington Action Group - an 
association of the Council's administrative and engineering staff - announced its 
formation, and its opposition to direct action. It also opposed any possible plans for 
redundancies, but not the restructuring as it had been announced. Nonetheless, the 
PSA broke off talks with the Government, claiming some confidential proposals were 
unacceptable, and that the 'the general tenor' was a return 'to the old NZBC' (The 
Dominion 31.8.76). By this time, there had been mixed press reaction, ranging from 
approval for the existing system's performance (The Dominion 28.7.76) to outright 
condemnation (,Let Them Eat Pavlova' The New Zealand Herald 10.7.76). A readers' 
poll by The Evening Post suggested strong opposition to the threatened blackout, 
mainly on the grounds that it was irritating and pointless. 
In September, in the last stage before the Bill's introduction to Parliament, the 
PSA inserted a large press advertisement, 'A Giant Step Backwards' which 
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highlighted the connections between the present restructuring plans and the old 
NZBC arrangements. The PSA also emphasised the responsibility of its action and 
its opposition to 'monopoly' and political control (The Dominion 27.9.76). This drew 
criticism from Government Ministers that broadcasters could not consider themselves 
an 'elite of employees' unaccountable to Parliament - a view voiced more mutedly by 
the Council Chairman himself. In early October he gained wide publicity by 
releasing details of broadcasting financial problems - the 'Sink or Swim' crisis as it 
was termed (The Evening Post 13.10.76). 
What became evident through this period was an attempt by both major 
broadcasting groups to test the waters of public opinion before the beginning of 
Parliamentary debate. The revelations by the' Council secretary and the chairman 
emphasised the urgency of broadcasting's financial problems (and implicitly the need 
for responsible management available through the centralising solutions proposed by 
the Government). The PSA emphasised the moral responsibility of its actions. In 
other words, both groups appealed to different conceptions of the public interest and 
attempted to organise, consequently, different publics around each broad claim. 
Simultaneously, there was a gradual coalescence and mobilisation of internal groups 
around the crystallisation of the issues themselves. 
The Bill's first reading on October 13 signalled the most intensive stage of 
public debate. It was here that National's central claims were set out, with the 
addition of the accusation (NZPD 1976:3048) that broadcasting freedom meant only, 
in effect, 'the freedom to write cheques'. This claim was repeated during the debate 
on the Select Committee Report on November 30. By the second reading on 
December 1, these claims were broadened to become charges of 'massive expenditure 
by broadcasters who were now seen as intent on making "political capital" out of their 
circumstances' (NZPD 1976:4396). They were, by implication, 'stirring' - creating 
public discord - and were said to be opposed to the clauses of 'good taste and decency' 
(NZPD 1976:4396 and 4404). Moreover, they were accused of indulgence, 
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extravagance and of being overstaffed and overpaid (NZPD 1976:4408). The point 
was colourfully summarised, with regard to news, by the Member for Eden (NZPD 
1976:4409): 
'I emphasise that when one actually counts the words the news broadcast 
represents only half a page of newspaper content - and it takes 338 people to 
produce it." 
Programme-makers' counter-claims had revolved around the imposition of 
political censorship and control, but what this and similar media commentary (see, for 
example, The Christchurch Press, 13.6.76) illustrates is that they were effectively 
marginalised and presented either as irresponsible, uncontrollable spendthrifts, or else 
as deviants - opponents of the established moral order. As the member for Eden 
remarked (NZPD 1976:4407): 
' .. .it requires the observance of good taste and decency - and by crikey that is 
necessary in some areas of broadcasting.' 
In spite of these criticisms, the PSA Central Committee pledged itself to direct 
action on October 18, (PSA Newsletter, No.2, 1976). This was followed by 
stopworks and prime-time blackouts on TV-I and TV-2 (Otago Daily Times 23.10.76, 
The Christchurch Press 27.10.76, The Dominion 27.10.76). Preceding the TV-l 
blackout, a full-page broadcasters' advertisement was inserted in The Dominion wich 
carried a banner headline proclaiming 'We're not doing this to you, we're doing this 
for you.' This produced negligible public support and indifferent public reaction, 
apart from some unenthusiastic television reviews, such as a satirical commentary on 
the look of the blank screen in The Christchurch Press (29.10.76). On October 29 the 
PSA's Wellington sub-group passed a narrow vote of no-confidence by 154-131 on 
the PSA's actions, from which radio broadcasters immediately dissociated 
themselves. The direct action also drew criticism from both the Prime Minister and 
the Leader of the Opposition. Also during this period, staff action resulted in TV -I' s 
Director-General having to read the network news himself one evening (Boyd-Bell 
1985:151) which, for the first time, publicly created distance between the channel's 
management and staff. 
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By this stage, the main areas of contention had become clear and fonned the 
principal representations to the Select Committee Hearings. These revolved around a 
small number of the Bill's 99 clauses. The most disputed of these (clause 20) 
required the new corporation to have regard to government policy - and was 
strenuously opposed on the grounds that it conferred direct political control over 
broadcasting. It was frequently linked with a group of clauses (25, 67, 68) which 
removed decisions on public complaints from programme-makers' hands and placed 
them, in the final instance, with a new Broadcasting Tribunal. 
There was also opposition to new programme standards which were to be 
'generally acceptable to the community' (NZPD 1976:3034), and to several clauses 
(39, 40, 97) which limited discretion over recruitment and employment. None of 
these clauses were removed, although some were considerably amended, during the 
debate. 
The Bill received 80 submissions, 35 of them presented orally (NZPD 
1976:4306), with representations from all sections of broadcasting. Within 
Parliament, its progress encountered stiff resistance with long debates at each stage of 
its progress, and divisions being taken on each key clause during voting. In all, the 
Broadcasting Bill occupied 105 pages of Hansard and was considered to have 
produced the most intensive and exhausting Select Committee hearings in some 
members' experience,(NZPD 1976:4300-4320). Nevertheless, it completed its final 
reading on 3 December in spite of opposition from a meeting of almost 1000 people 
in the Wellington Town Hall led by broadcasters and academics where, it was 
asserted 'the guts will go out of broadcasting' if the Bill was passed (PSA Newsletter, 
December 1976). The Act came into being on February 1, 1977. 
What emerges from these events is the development of two broad camps 
which attempted to marshal support around several shifting and sometimes indistinct 
issues. The key claims advanced by the Government and its supporters were the need 
for accountability (to Parliament, principally), centralization and tighter financial 
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management, allied to an insistence on loosely-defined moral standards. 
Broadcasters argued primarily that the Bill was a move to direct political intervention 
and signalled a return to an old, discredited NZBC system. Both sides appealed, then, 
to the public interest, but in different terms. The evidence suggests, however, that a 
crucial point was reached with the decision to adopt strike action which was seen 
both to isolate broadcasters and to split their ranks. In some circles (both inside and 
outside broadcasting), direct action appears to have been regarded as slightly 
improper. As the Christchurch Press commented, journalists should be concerned 
with 'conveying news' not with the new administration, and they should not let 
'agitation' over 'unconcluded changes' lead to their own forms of 'political 
interference' or 'a reluctance to do their job for their audience' (~9.6.76). 
4. IMPLICA TIONS 
The Christchurch Press commentary is interesting because it signals the public 
transgression of a social boundary by broadcasters. The sense of impropriety it 
articulates was also evident within broadcasting as a whole, (as indicated by branch 
responses in the PSA circulars in July and August 1976). In practical terms, it marks 
a dividing line between the traditional role of broadcasters as anonymous public 
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servants - a role which had been developed primarily within radio (Gregory, 1985) -
and a new perception of broadcasters as, potentially, independent social critics. In one 
way, this indicated an emergent sense of independence or professional autonomy. In 
another, it brought to light a previously unrecognised element in the construction of 
the moral order: a widespread assumption of paternalism - that public servants should 
adopt an attitude of deferentiality and avoid criticising or confronting their political 
masters, (CI~veland, 1980). To do so - to be confrontational, questioning or merely 
non-acquiescent in a society which a number of commentators have viewed as deeply 
authoritarian (Baldock and Lally, 1974; McLaughlin, 1976) - was to invite being 
labelled as a deviant: as a 'stirrer' or 'radical' as, in fact, broadcasters were. 
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4.1 Social Changes 
Although the Government was able increasingly to portray broadcasters as outsiders 
to the social order, this tension itself reflected a growing sense of social cleavage in 
New Zealand, (viz Newcomb and Hirsch's (1987) observation about public 
complaints as indicative of the moral 'fault-lines' in a society). It was signalled by 
often harsh parliamentary criticism which reflected widely-held conservative views, 
many of which had been tapped in National's return to power (viz Levine,· 1979; 
Clements, 1982). Jock Phillips, in an editorial for the NZ Listener identified some of 
the key patterns which were becoming evident, and pin-pointed the ideology of the 
'ordinary bloke' in a commentary which is worth quoting at some length (11.9.76): 
'In the past few years, a large number of New Zealanders have emerged who 
do not fit the "ordinary bloke" image and it is precisely for this reason that the 
stereotype has been hauled out for political purposes. New values and habits 
have arisen. A society of visible diversity has replaced the older 
homogeneity.' 
He also indicated a second source of unrest which was less easily accommodated -
'the rise of an urban culture' (NZ Listener 11.9.76): 
'A majority of us now live in large cities, and cities always encourage 
pluralism and difference ... Suddenly we are faced by new voices - HART, 
SPUC, WEL, CARP. And city growth creates new opinions and habits. 
Affluence itself challenges the old values of thrift and hard work, and 
produces new habits of corruption.' 
He contrasted these celebrants of diversity with the characteristics of the 
typical 'ordinary bloke': 
'The "ordinary bloke" is, of course, male and strictly heterosexual. He follows 
rugby, drinks beer and believes in the Protestant ethic of hard work, thrift and 
material progress. He is modest, respectful of authority and suspicious of self-
appointed experts and rowdy protestors.' 
Then, in a section which seems to echo the Adam Report, he draws the 
contrasts together: 
'The range of voices is exciting. It makes for a dynamic society, one that is 
mature and progressive. But for a country used to homogeneity and social 
harmony, such pluralism is disturbing. It is bound to lead to some social 
strife.' 
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The clear parallels between this commentary and the social turbulence 
surrounding broadcasting are self-evident. The N ationa! Party represented an 
increasingly rural and provincial constituency with what were to become decreasing 
urban connections (Levine, 1979). Its espoused values, as regards broadcasting, 
closely fit the 'ordinary bloke' ideology. Programme-makers, meanwhile, with the 
patronage of the Labour Party, clearly represent - both through their own strategies, 
statements and the expressed aims of the Adam Report - a largely urban patronage. 
Equally importantly, Phillips suggests a linkage between them and an 
emerging, diverse, loosely-allied set of groups, - and a linkage that was all the more 
likely because these alliances and allegiances cut across traditional lines (and see 
James, 1986). However, such groups, precisely because they were emergent, were' 
, . 
difficult both to identify and to appeal to as potential cultural patrons. 
The editorial also implies that a flight to older values was underway: a return 
to the security of homogeneity and ordered authority. In a sense, the restructuring 
designed by the Government was equally a retrenchment: it attempted to secure a 
centralised, hierarchical organisational form that operated according to accepted, 
hierarchically-regulated understandings both administratively and culturally. It 
emphasised thrift, financial control, ordered management (with its implications of 
.' 
deference to authority) and stressed a return to traditional practices: it was for these 
reasons that programme-makers claimed a reversion to 'Aunty NZBC.' In most 
respects, it was intended to be. These values, as detailed, were also espoused to a 
large extent by administrators themselves and highlights the linkages between them 
and their political patrons and the broader social groupings on which this political 
support rested. 
Beyond that, there wa~ a fundamental uncertainty about exactly which section 
of broadcasting were its professional representatives; claims were advanced and 
publicised most visibly by journalists, not producers; not by the TVPDA but by the 
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PSA. In other words, it blurred the identification of a coherent, collegiate body which 
could underpin claims to professionalisation (Johnson, 1972). 
However, we need to recognise the complexity of the decision to adopt direct 
action. In one respect, it may have highliighted an aspect of broad moral order; in 
another, it emphasised the differences, as noted above, between radio and television, 
with television personnel being viewed in many radio quarters (as respondents 
commented), as upstarts, johnny-come-Iatelies or, in Johnstone's (1968) term, 'Flash 
Harries.' In other words, there was a sense not only of a social cleavage, but also of an 
organisational one (and an awkward one in terms of implied status differentials). At 
the same time, it raised a paradoxical occupational issue. Strike action, as the NZ 
Listener noted in an editorial, particularly when organised within the framework of 
the PSA, had strong connotations of union or class struggle (20.11.76): 
'The recent stoppages could only have harmed the broadcasting cause, and 
invited the thought that a collective impulse to inflict wounds on oneself is an 
unconscious form of class subservience in any dispute with authority.' 
This position was difficult to reconcile with the professionalising aspirations 
of an occupation founded on a claim to advocacy of the whole public interest 
(Johnson, 1972). In short, it suggested a sharp contradiction between these actions 
and the successful pursuit of ascribed or status characteristics undertaken by most 
professions (Elliot, 1972; MacDonald and Ritzier, 1988). As a whole, then, these 
events brought together a constellation of issues which ranged around the inter-
relation of profession, organisation and culture. 
From the point of view of programme-makers as a professionalising 
occupation, however, these questions were crucial. In effect, they became locked into 
a battle with the state to constitute an appropriate moral order. More than that, to 
construct such an order successfully was also to construct their own place in it. 
Indeed, it was to construct a coherent idea, and hence practice, of what a media 
profession might be in a New Zealand (and which, in the light of the Christchurch 
Press comments, might contradict prevailing notions of an appropriate occupational 
115 
practice in other branches of the media). To lose this battle, as they did, was to 
damage this particular occupational self-constitution and, consequently, the 
production of an internal moral order (or discourse) around which an otherwise 
diffuse occupational membership could crystallise. In away, then, this period was an 
attempt to construct both a public and an occupational self-identity. In this case, it 
was advanced by one particular element in the occupation (predominantly by well-
organised Avalon programme-makers) on behalf of less engaged members. 
1976, then, saw an attempt, albeit a defensive one, to create three things: fIrst, 
a public organised around a notion of a particular moral order; second, a relationship 
with the state based on this same insistence and, third, an internal occupational order, 
also constructed from these discourses. 
In a sense, the breadth of this undertaking suggests something of the threat 
which many programme-makers saw themselves faced with. This is reflected in the 
passage of events over the year. What began with the initial cautious optimism of the 
TV -2 chairman about managing and minimising chanmge in an organisational 
context was transformed, within nine months, into a major (and in some ways 
unprecedented) national dispute. In effect, a conflict between programme-makers 
and administrators over the definition of what constituted the key organisational 
issues and solutions, (for example over the differing proposals for single or separate 
corporation boards) was translated into a struggle between programme-makers and 
the state over (in part), defintions of the moral order. Clearly, programme-makers 
markedly expanded the area of contestation but only to produce, in both their 
organisational and public spheres, increasingly unified and powerful opposition and 
increasingly fragmented support. 
~ SUMMARY 
5.1 Profession, Organisation and Culture 
It should be clear by now that producers' claims both to organisational 
dominance and to professionalisation were revealed to be vulnerable for a number of 
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reasons. Externally, they faced the twin ambiguities of a disorganised, shifting 
clientele and the problem of how to reconcile the different demands of state or market 
provision. Internally, they suffered from an inadequate degree of occupational 
specialisation that undermined their claims to a professional monopoly of knowledge 
and judgement, coupled with a diffuse occupational identification. Their 
administrative opponents had powerful, organised political patronage, simple and 
clearly identified objectives around which they could mobilise their occupational 
expertise based on the organisational difficulties thrown up by a combination of 
environmental pressures and programme-makers' activities. 
1976 emerged as the fulcrum for change precisely because of its delicate 
balance of pressures and opportunities and was reflected in the degree of 
organisational and social debate which it generated. Broadcasters were caught in the 
moment of change where the alternative resources of power, as defined by Johnson, 
were crystallised (1972:43): 
'it is only where an occupational group shares, by virtue of its dominant class 
or caste, wider resources of power that such an imposition (of the profession's 
definition of the producer-consumer relationship) is likely to be achieved, and 
then only where the actual consumers or clients provide a relatively large, 
heterogeneous, fragmented source of demand. The polar opposite of this 
situation is where there is a single consumer - a patron who has the power to 
define his own needs and the manner in which he expects them to be catered 
for.' / 
These polar opposites formed, in effect, the fulcrum experienced by 
programme-makers. Broadcasting was still developing its advertising market 
component - the heterogeneous, fragmented publics or sources of demand defined by 
Johnson. Yet it was bound to a powerful, unitary patron (represented by the 
Government and public agencies) which controlled its key dependencies - the licence 
fee level, staffing determinations and regulatory conditions. 1976 marked the 
tensions which emerged in the attempt at the exchange of patronage: not just from 
one cultural grouping to another, but from one form of income dependency to 
another. In this period, income tipped 54:46% in favour of advertising over licence 
fee revenue and was to move rapidly in that direction in ensuing years. In short, it 
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was to weaken organisational dependence on the level of state provision in ways 
which would, inevitably, affect other aspects of its performance. The opportunities 
presented by this foreshadowed independence also explain the determination 
reiterated, unusually, in two separate sets of minutes, to seize it as quickly as 
possible, by sloughing off the debt burden. However, this decision was made for 
explicitly organisational, not occupational, reasons. And, to the extent that it was 
advanced by administrators and managers, it elevated their claims to organisational 
dominance based on the application of a monopoly of knowledge necessary to 
complete the project. 
Broadcasting professionals claims, on the other hand, were largely aimed at 
freedom from. social control which, in many respects, did not affect the organisation's 
direction or dependencies in any immediate form. In this way, administrators could 
rightly claim to serve the organisation's interests better than the generalised objectives 
of broadcasting professionals. It was for these reasons, through their social and 
political linkages, as indicated, that financial and cultural patronage was more 
successfully managed by administrators than programme-makers in the context of a 
social climate of incipient conservativism. 
At a more general level, it is possible to see the implications arising from the 
shifting balance of control between administrators and programme-makers. 
Administrators were able to increase the cogency of their claims partly because of the 
consequences of a key leadership appointment in the form of a new business-oriented 
chairman. At one level, this was obviously a result of political patronage; at another, 
the demands made by the new chairman called on the bureaucratic knowledge-base 
commonly possessed by administrators. Although this was in order for the chairman 
to retain organisational autonomy it involved a move towards centralised 
management, as discussed above. More than that, it depended on redefining the 
principal organisational problem as financial. This, unlike the question of programme 
production, was a far less ambiguous dilemma, and one, in principle, at least, 
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amenable to established bureaucratic practices. Claims of crisis merely reinforced the 
urgency of applying accepted (and self-evidently appropriate) solutions. Beyond that, 
administrators were well-placed, both through the areas of control they had staked out 
in the 1974 working parties, and through the limitations and obstacles these placed on 
programme-makers to manage the accumulating financial difficulties. In short, 
administrators, not programme-makers, controlled much of the rate and extent of 
major expenditure. 
On the other hand, programme-makers lost control for several reasons. In 
part, their demonstrated inexperience displayed a failure to entrench and reinforce 
control over their technical definition and management of a knowledge-base. They 
also alienated some external publics (for example, conservative viewers worried 
about moral standards), while being unable to organise alternative publics as markets 
or collectivities from emerging but fragmented urban groups. Moreover, they were 
unable to organise broad occupational or union support because of occupational 
hostilities between radio and television broadcasters, (and the internal divisions 
within broadcasting as a whole. 
In other words, programme-makers' original and defining moral mission 
depended on its recognition and approval either through the existence, or the c:r:eation, 
of a sympathetic public. Yet, it is possible to argue that television's base in major 
metropolitan centres isolated its practitioners from provincial attitudes, while they 
failed to find or address a sufficiently identifiable metropolitan publics. This suggests 
that both channels' strategies - and particularly TV -l's - in their representation of 
national community, as indicated in chapter three, failed to crystallise into 
recognisable realities for those communities who were central in helping to return a 
government that was to become an antagonistic patron to broadcasters. 
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5.2 Implications Beyond 1976 
The organisational features and occupational standpoints which became 
evident during this period were to remain relatively unchanged over the next three 
years. Administrators were to entrench their dominance by an increasingly elaborate 
set of regulations and controls based around claims of recurring financial expediency. 
Broadcasters' professional legitimacy was to continue to be under intensive internal 
and external attack which, in turn, was to reduce their discretionary capacities and 
lower occupational morale and co-operation. The linkages of political and cultural 
patronage were to remain unchanged with the National Party's retention of power 
through the 1978 election. Indeed, the only major difference from 1977 onwards was 
the alterations to broadcasting's structural arrangements effected by the appointment 
of its first full-time, executive Chairman. Nonetheless, his appointment eventually 
helped to accelerate the processes already underway and which culminated in the 
1979 restructuring. These are the developments covered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MAXIMUM OPERATING INDEPENDENCE: 1977-80 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the trends which were implicit in the 1976 
Broadcasting Act, but which were also initiated by the original structuring of the two-
channel system. First, it summarises the implications of the 1976 Act for this period; 
secondly, it describes their consequences for the period from 1977-80, with the 
increasing dominance .of administrative concerns over programme-making matters. 
Finally, it briefly summarises the broader trajectories that shaped the development of 
broadcasting over the period since 1974. 
1.1 Effects of the 1976 Broadcasting Act 
There is little doubt that broadcasters recognised the loss of influence they 
suffered under the 1976 Act. They voiced concerns over two principal matters. One 
was the importance of maintaining the fragile creative environment fostered by the 
'family' concept of channel management (TV-1 Controllers' submission to the 1976 
Broadcasting Bill Select Committee; TV-l Board minutes, 1976). The other was the 
related concern over the equally imprecise question of morale. Senior and 
experienced staff, some of whom had been attracted from overseas in 1975 did leave -
and continued to do so from 1977 onwards. However, it is impossible to determine 
accurately what proportion of broadcasters as a whole they represented, or whether 
they were a significant fraction. Turnover figures for different occupational groups 
for 1977-80, for example, are too crude to indicate any noticeable change. Nor is it 
possible to measure accurately the impact of departures on TV's creative climate, 
although Gouldner's (1957) categories of cosmopolitan and local suggest one means 
of assessment. 
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Briefly, Gouldner proposes six sets of orientations within any occupation, 
ranging from cosmopolitan - those members who, at on extreme, judge their work 
solely in terms of peer assessment and approval on a national or international basis, 
to locals - members who orient themselves wholly in relation to their local institution 
or environment, at the other. In a New Zealand context, cosmopolitan programme-
makers would be those most likely to leave the organisation if their occupational 
autonomy was threatened, while those with less exacting demands, or less options -
i.e. locals - would be more likely to remain. Although the evidence is weak, it 
suggests that cosmopolitan programme-makers did, in fact, migrate (albeit unevenly) 
elsewhere either inside (to public relation or expanding film or video companies 
(Mayne 1985b,c) or outside New Zealand. 
1.2 Structural consequences of the 1976 Broadcasting Act 
The Broadcasting Act produced 2 kinds of structural changes. (a) There was a 
restriction of programme makers' autonomy, and (b) there was an expansion of 
managerial procedures which were embedded in the new organisational form (and 
which are outlined shortly). There was, however, a further consequence, which is 
discussed in the next section. Namely, the structure was an accommodation, or 
negotiated agreement, between the two dominant broadcasting groups. As a result, it 
attempted to effect an amalgamation between hierarchical and collegial arrangements 
in terms of the new grouping of committees, routing of decisions and location of 
decision making-centres. Equally importantly, these contradictory forces produced a 
key ambiguity in terms of the site of final organisational authority. This lay in a gap 
between policy formation and its execution. In other words, programme-makers 
attempted to exploit the inevitable distance between decisions of lay Board members, 
often shaped by the advice of administrators, and their interpretation in practice. This 
advantage only continued providing two conditions were fulfilled: one was that 
programme-makers remained united, both within and across channels; the other was 
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that the void between policy and practice remained unfilled. In fact, neither remained 
unchanged. Internal occupational tensions increased markedly, and the void was 
filled, within three months, by the appointment of a full-time executive chairman, as 
discussed in the next chapter. 
(a) The restriction of programme-makers' autonomy was defined primarily by two 
new bodies. These were an internal Complaints Review Committee and an external 
Broadcasting Tribunal. Together, they imposed potentially new definitions of what 
might constitute legitimate or appropriate programme materials against the previously 
undefined discretionary latitude of broadcasters. 
(b) The expansion of administrators' control can be rapidly summarized. An lines 
of control were drawn into an expl~cit1y hierarchical arrangement, with departments 
referring upwards through the Director-General (sitting on the Board of 
Management), to the Broadcasting Board on all major questions, not just those 
concerned with inter-corporation functioning, as before. 
Aside from a hierarchical structure there was a bureaucratization and 
centralization of broadcasting functions. Principally, budget setting, controls and 
monitoring were centrally directed on information supplied by the Central Services 
Division (the CSD). This included setting broad objectives, allocation between 
, 
services, the relative proportion of capital to operating expenditure, approval for 
major departmental budget levels within the services and setting spending levels for 
individual executives. Clearly, this still kept considerable discretion within the 
services (such as the mix of budgets and the proportions between, for example, local 
and overseas programme expenditure), but the balance was shifted towards 
monitored, regulated and centralised control. 
The same shift was evident with financial monitoring which became both 
more detailed and more intricate. Forecasting became more extensive and report-
scheduling, managed by the BCNZ Secretary, more complex, with reports being 
routed first to the Board of Management, then to the Board and on to sub-committees 
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when required. Some administrative functions were also centralised - most notably, 
control of personnel management, but also legal matters. 
To sum up, then, the organisation was increasingly driven by two central 
issues. One was the question of financial accountability; the other more generally 
revolved around programming policy and the notion of professtQnallegitimacy and. . .. 
autonomy. Financial accountability concerned how the budget was balanced, which 
area was to bear the costs, and who was to determine this policy; programming policy 
revolved about the question of what should be shown, at what times and by whose 
authority. In effect, however, some financial implications flowed into the 
programming area. On the one hand, for example, budget levels would increasingly 
determine programming strategies (in terms of scheduling and provision of local 
versus overseas content, and also first-run versus repeat broadcasts); on the other, the 
notion of accountability would determine the notion of broadcasting as a symbolically 
responsible organisation, as signified by its programme content. Clearly, what gave 
these issues urgency was that the broader social, political and economic setting was 
unstable and was to remain so. 
If these were the two primary issues emerging from the 1976 restructuring we 
next need to trace how their logic developed over the period from 1977-79. Because 
these trends have already become relatively identifiable, the central purpose of the 
following sections is to pin-point and summarise major developments. 
2. 1977-80 
. 2.1. Financial Pressures 
The severe financial difficulties faced by the BCNZ over this period were 
prompted by three major external factors. 
(a) A static licence fee. Revenue from this source rose only to the extent that 
there was a shift from monochrome to more costly colour licences by viewers. From 
1977 to 1980 this shift was uneven and unpredictable (BCNZ Annual Reports, 1977-
124 
1980). Extra income could only come, therefore, from advertising or marketing 
revenue. This, in turn, increased pressure to expand commercial programme 
scheduling strategies, which emphasised audience size over minority programming. 
(b) High inflation and fixed costs. Sharply rising and unpredictable rates of 
inflation between 1976 and 1977 led to an inflation rate of 13.65%. Likewise in 
1978-79, costs rose by 17.6%, but such was the uncertainty over the degree of future 
inflationary trends, that there was considerable confusion over how a 1979/80 rate 
should be set (papers to the Finance Planning Committee and CE 17/11). At the same 
time, some major expenses, such as salaries and wages fixed by regulation, were 
beyond the BCNZ's control. In 1976-77, for example, these increased by 17.5%. 
(c) Conversion of loan finance to capital. In 1977, the Government finally agreed 
to convert existing National Developmental loans of $38,900,000 into broadcasting 
assets on the understanding that, from henceforward, broadcasting would live within 
its income and fund all future developments from operating surpluses. This was a key 
provision because of a very sizable capital expansion programme which still had to be 
undertaken. 
Consequently, the Corporation was faced with balancing continued demands 
for coverage with the re-division of predicted available finance between 
programming-making and capital extension claims. 
The corporation also continued to face acute forecasting and monitoring 
problems well beyond this period. Combined with external financial uncertainties, 
they produced conditions of intermittent crisis. Not surprisingly, then, budget-setting 
involved a series of trade-offs based on judgements of public and political pressures 
for coverage extension against the demands of the service for production finance. 
The upshot of these three economic pressures was a set of highly uneven 
financial results. An operating deficit of $105,000 in 1975 increased to $2.6m in 
1976. However, the Corporation returned a surplus of $4.2 million in 1977, but a 
deficit of $l.4m in 1978, and then a surplus of $3.8m in 1979. 
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2.2 Financial Management 
These financial pressures prompted urgent calls to impose cuts and 
restrictions. Generally, these were introduced by financial administrators and then 
somewhat modified after strenuous objections by the two channels (papers to the 
1978 Board minutes). They also led to the growth of controls primarily to manage 
internal financial uncertainties, particularly with programme-making. The Board 
minutes detail, on numerous occasions, how the combination of internal and external 
ambiguities produced debates, sometimes sharply polarised, over tighter management 
and improved centralised information flows. These appeared, over the three years, in 
March, August and November 1977, February, June, September, October, November, 
December 1978 and February, April, July 1979 (BCM 77/4/17; 77/7/4; 77/7/11; 
77/10/11; 78/1/4; 78/5/5; 78/8/9; 78/9/6/; 78/10/11-12; 78/11/4; 79/l/5a; 79/3/12; 
79/6/6; 79/6/7). Almost invariably, they were based on sudden changes in 
broadcasting's financial position. So, for example, where the services were 
congratulated for turning a deficit in to a surplus in September 1978 (BCM 78/8/9), 
by October, the chairman was demanding 'either wholesale cuts or immediate 
retrenchment' to save up to $lm urgently (BCM 78/9/6). 
/ 
Although the cuts affected all areas of broadcasting, they also worked to 
restrict the discretion available to programme-makers, despite efforts to protect 
themselves. In general, cuts affected either staff levels (the BCNZ imposed a 5% 
'sinking lid' staff reduction: BCM 77/5/33; 77/8/10; 79/7/28) or general service 
budgets. 
While these moves were undoubtedly in response to financial threats, it is also 
important to recognise that they were also the product of shared ideological 
perspectives. The Board had already emphasised the need to live within its income 
well before the capitalisation of loan finance. As the BCNZ chairman later 
commented (Cross, 1988: 39): 
. 'I had detected the need for broadcasting to present itself as a social 
welfare case; my strong preference was to stand on our own feet, 
even if it hurt. The deputy chairman, Jim Freeman, felt just as 
strongly . .' 
He went on to add (Cross 1988:40): 
'Our basic money management was pure Micawber: to spend less 
than you earn is happiness', 
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In simple terms, this is a pure expression of the puritan ethic based on concept 
of thrift, denial and self-discipline, all of which have been indicated in earlier 
chapters. It was also sharply at odds with the outward-looking, expansive views of 
both the Adam Committee and programme-makers. 
2.3 Challenges to Professional Legitimacy and Autonomy 
Challenges to programme-makers' control were mounted on two main fronts. 
One was over the question of public complaints about programmes. The other was an 
effort to manage the environment of public opinion or, to put it differently, the 
definition of public discourse and cultural production. In turn, this meant the 
management and control of what were perceived to be unruly broadcasters, (Cross 
1988). Invariably, this management turned on judgements about what constituted 
acceptable public expression and also the consequences of exceeding these 
boundaries in terms of the response of the broadcasting's political patron, the National 
Party. What also becomes clear throughout this period is that the reconstitution of the 
Board membership and ties to the particular services, shifted Board ideological 
leanings away from programme-makers and towards the managerial views of 
administrators and the newly-arrived business contingent on the Board. 
The attempt to contain and manage professional discretion had four strands. 
These were attempts: (1) to impose an unambiguous hierarchical chain of command 
on programme-makers; (2) to improve codified procedures on editorial questions; (3) 
to impose consistent socialisation to organisational values, primarily through 
journalism training; (4) to introduce more clearly defined financial controls. This last 
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aspect has been discussed above, but it takes on a particular significance here insofar 
as tightened financial scrutiny often appeared to be the only option to non-
programme-makers under the ambiguous circumstances of programme production. 
In this sense, it became a trade-off or a symbolic substitution for production 
values and practices which could not be so readily pin-pointed and regulated. The 
point was made explicitly in a later report to Parliament (BCNZ Annual Report, 
1985): 
'while a sound productivity target has been set, establishing useful 
measures of performance has proved difficult for production quality 
and creativity.' 
However, it was the struggle which developed over the handling of public 
complaints about programmes, and the subsequent organisational pressure for 
increased journalism training, which most fully illustrates the differing perceptions 
and positions of programme-makers, administrators and the Board, during this period 
and symbolises the four management strands noted above. 
Complaints themselves rose sharply from 1977 onwards with the introduction 
of new procedures under the Act. More importantly, their resolution became a focus 
for differing interpretations about the representation of contentious events. There are 
two related matters in this regard. 
One was that the 1975-78 period of National's administration was'widely 
acknowledged to be a particularly turbulent and controversial one (James 1986). 
Journalists, in particular, were exposed to contested definitions of the social order and 
were readily exposed to charges of bias and misrepresentation (Garnier, 1978). The 
traumatic upheaval over the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Bill of 1978 is 
just such an instance (Geiringer,1976; BCM 78/6/12-l3). 
The second matter was that individual complaints could be used to mobilise 
support for an internal redefinition both of the representation of events and of the 
discursive latitude which should be available to programme-makers, and particularly 
to journalists. With an increased stream of potential events, more opportunities 
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invariably arose. Thus, while from 1975 and 1976, 3 complaints were discussed at 
the general Council level, this number more than doubled following the 1976 Act. In 
1977, complaints were discussed on ten occasions; in 1978 on 14 occasions and in 
1979 on 15 occasions. Moreover, both the number of multiple complaints discussed 
on each occasion rose (BCM 78/10/26;79/1/28-32) and the length of time devoted to 
complaints. 
Complaints were the evidence needed to support claims that broadcasters were 
either incompetent or partial in their presentation. In this respect, the chairman's 
comment were typical (Cross, 1988: 34-35,57): 
'The serious deficiencies of the programme were in my view an 
outcome of a lack of journalist training and grounding within 
television; some sympathy had to be extended to those inexperienced 
performers who were trying to use the medium without a strong 
framework of professional control and direction.' 
While this did lead to the introduction of increased training and a Code of 
Practice in 1978, (Wood, 1984) this had always been the preference of programme-
makers (letter from TV-I Head ofInfonnation Programmes to the chainnan, 7.11.77). 
On the other hand, it diminished their overall authority and developed an increasing 
public perception of broadcasting timidity or disharmony (NBR 11.4.79; Mayne, 
1978; BCM 77/11/6). 
Yet there is less evidence that this restricted actual operational procedures 
greatly. The reason lies once again, in the autonomy created by the occupational 
control of a key ambiguity. With a dispute about the prime-time current affairs 
programme, 'Dateline Monday' for example, TV-l's Director-General rejected the 
Complaint Investigating Committee's recommendations that both sides of an 
argument should always be presented in the same programme, and that programme-
makers should work from a written brief (paper to the BCNZ Board: BCM 77/10/4): 
'In my experience written briefs have nothing to do with the realities of 
programme production. That a programme will treat of this or that...is 
determined by the appropriate people from the Controller of 
Programmes' demands. I have never seen a written programme brief in 
the ABC, BBC or lTV.' 
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The point here, as elsewhere, was that the immediate circumstance of 
production dictated appropriate editorial decisions: they were variable and not subject 
to detailed regulation from one case to the next. These arguments were accepted and 
the recommendations dropped. 
In summary, there was a point, defined by the area of ambiguity, beyond 
.' 
which external occupational control could not be extended. Indeed, the degree of 
tension which the complaints procedure generated eventually led to a complete refusal 
by the ABJ, supported by the PSA, to comply with it. After some tense meetings 
between the different parties, a joint review committee was established to find a 
compromise arrangement (BCM 78/5/21; 78/6/13; 79/5/15). 
However, it is wQrth noting that some direct controls were eventually 
instituted. These arose from alleged overspending by TV-Ion an expensive historical 
drama series, 'The Governor', (Boyd-Bell, 1985; Gregory, 1985). After this became 
the subject of a major public dispute, orchestrated by the Prime Minister, it became 
the focus of a detailed inquiry by Parliament's primary financial investigatory body, 
the Public Expenditure Committee. This produced recommendations for tighter 
accounting control that were adopted by the Board (BCM 77/8/8; 77/9/3f). 
Thereafter, budget officers were introduced for all major production areas, and a 
/ 
series of weekly commitment diaries was instituted (TV-l memo, 1.6.77). All major 
series, costing in excess of $100,000, became subject to close scrutiny and final 
approval by the Board. 
In total, the evidence on the control of professional autonomy and financial 
issues suggests a clear shift of control. Where there were defined or identifiable areas 
of operation - generally to do with financial and managerial questions - administrative 
control was slowly extended by the alliance of ideological interests between dominant 
fractions of the Board, top administrators and the Board chairman. Where there were 
areas of ambiguity or uncertainty, then programme-makers were able to maintain 
control of the production areas with which they were concerned. 
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2.4. Internal Occupational Conflicts 
Nonetheless, the solidity of the programme-makers' position was undermined 
by growing internal friction that emerged through intensified inter-channel rivalries 
and intra-channel conflict. Cross described how the rivalries developed (1988:41): 
'the channels indulged in the worst aspects of American or Australian 
competition. They played tricks with their schedules to 'hold' viewers, 
a favourite one being to over-run for about five or six minutes past an 
agreed common junction with the other channel, thus preventing, or at 
least discouraging their viewers from switching. Programmes of social 
and cultural value were finding it increasingly hard to find a place in 
the evening schedules because each channel was afraid of 'losing' its 
audience to the other.' 
Mayne commented (1985a): 
'All this difference in style accentuated the growing gulf between One 
in Wellington and the Auckland orientation of SPTV - One network 
seen by its opposition as run by self-satisfied stuffed shirts, the other 
perceived as the province of the fast-buck wide boys.' 
These circumstances provided the opportunity for further Board and 
administrative appropriation of control organised around appeals to both the 
organisational and the public interest. 
Amongst these, Boyd-Bell (1985:151-2) reported a shift from competitive to 
complementary programming, listing the introduction of a prime-time quota for NZ 
/ 
programmes which were prohibited from competing against each other, and the 
stipulation that 'programmes of substance' should also not compete against one 
another. Three evening 'common junctions' were established to aid viewers shift 
between channels, and transmission hours were cut or extended by the Board, not by 
service decisions. There were also increasing attempts to determine programme 
placements, the level of repeats and advertising content at Board level (BCM 77n/14; 
78/8/21; 78/8/23 ), and even to demand more golf and sports programmes (BCM 
78/3/33). Clearly, these initiatives limited the discretion available to either channel to 
determine its own strategy, or to resolve the conflicts of public service and 
commercial demands internally. 
131 
If this constituted the development of sharp cross-channel practices, there was 
also considerable disharmony within each organisation. TV-2, especially, suffered 
from severe regional production conflicts between departments and between centres 
(NBR 2.11.77), which reflected the pressures of fragmented resources, inadequate 
income and an ad hoc management style. These elements generated the development 
of departments as individual fiefdoms with limited communication and produced 
sharp disagreements, which led to the departure of departmental heads (Cross, 1988; 
Mayne, 1984a and pers. comm.). It also lowered morale, as reflected in the 
production of two virulent underground newsletters: 'Durex Academy' and 'Kitsch-
TV'. 
There were also tensions between technical and production staff. 1977 saw 
the first strikes in broadcasting history, first by Production Secretaries and then by the 
film operators group, over wages and conditions. This was largely an outcome of the 
unrelenting pressure, noted earlier, to expand production with inadequate resources 
and inexperienced staff, (TV-2 minutes, 1975-77). 
It seems reasonable to argue that the limitations on programme-makers' 
discretion described in earlier sections intensified the particular circumstances of 
conflict and competition indicated here. These developments, however, had a two-
fold effect. On one hand, they reduced the internal unity and 'family' loyalty which 
had been a feature of the 1974-76 period. On the other, they provided sufficient 
evidence not only for Cross's claim for the need for restructuring, by pointing to the 
destructive consequences they produced, but they also encouraged the potential for 
organisational allegiances based on a commitment to television as a whole rather than 
to individual channels. This, indeed, formed part of Cross's explicit strategy for 
restructuring, as discussed in the next chapter. 
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3. SUMMARY 
The two major trends which emerge from this period are the development of 
increasingly close financial and administrative management and the attempt to expand 
formal and social controls over cultural production. Programme-makers' authority 
and autonomy were diminished externally and internally. 
This came about externally through their continued depiction as potential 
deviants to a social order defined by their patron as thrift-driven and self-disciplined; 
It did so organisationally by the allied perspectives of CSD administrators and 
dominant elements of the Board. Internally, occupational authority was eroded by 
disintegration of the notion of 'family' loyalty, falling morale, sharp disputes and 
rivalries, and departures by more 'cosmopolitan' members. 
It is not difficult to see that these trends developed, in part, out of the 
implications in the original structuring of broadcasting under the Adam Report. 
Administrators expanded their dominance through claims to be able to control key 
financial ambiguities through the application of a specific knowledge-base. They 
were able to do this because they were well-placed, as a result of their initial 
bureaucratic manoeuvring, with the very first working parties in 1974-75. This 
placement, itself, was a consequence of their particular knowledge-base, as suggested 
in chapter three. 
Yet the very context in which they advanced these claims was ideologically-
structured, through the arrival of a sympathetic political patron. This patron, through 
the considerable power available under conditions of state monopoly control of 
broadcasting, could influence several important areas: the ideological climate (of 
thrift and conservative management); the key pressures facing broadcasting (which 
moved from issues of cultural representation under Labour to financial management 
under National); central appointments (of the chairman and business expertise to the 
Board), and even an appropriate moral structure (which emphasised the hierarchical 
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and the implicitly paternal - an issue discussed in the next chapter - over the collegial 
and implicitly egalitarian or informal). 
Inevitably, these influences were experienced, often acutely, as stresses and 
conflicts within the working conditions of television, as indicated. It also suggests 
how the moral mission articulated by programme-makers began to disintegrate, as 
their authority and discretion disappeared. At the same time, these processes and 
trends are part of a negotiated social order, and the role of the chairman, explored in 
the next chapter, suggests something of the unexpected opportunities and dimensions 
such negotiation, can throw up. 
Indeed, the particular presence of Ian Cross disrupts the emerging narrative of 
a gradual shift of power, by introducing some new features into the framework of 
broadcasting which were a consequence of one particular and powerful individual's 
attempt to capture the administrative machinery. Sociologically, one of the points of 
interest this suggests is the conceptual tension between individuals and social groups 
as useful analytical categories. Organisationally, it sharpens the analysis of expert-
bureaucratic interaction. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE FULL TIME EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN AND THE 1979 RESTRUCTURING 
'Television means so much to New Zealanders because it is virtually the 
only means of our achieving any sense of community as a country.' 
Ian Cross, N.Z. Listener, July 5 1975 
1. INTRODUCTION 
How is one to consider the role of the first full-time executive chairman? To 
date in New Zealand literature there appears to have been division both about his role 
and his intentions. To a large extent, his power lay in his exploitation of the 
opportunities of a highly unusually position which enabled him both to create policy 
and to execute it. In some senses, these contradictions are summed up in the 
ambiguous title of his recent autobiography, The Unlikely Bureaucrat (1988), which 
hints at the uncomfortable combination of entrepreneur and visionary individualist 
with that of faceless executive and functionary, which he develops within the book. 
Yet, in a very real sense, the ambiguities articulated by Cross were also those 
facing broadcasting as a whole and, indeed, are emblematic of some fundamental 
organisational dilemmas. His method of resolving them, as should become clear, was 
to impose what he saw as the most appropriate direction for broadcasting by drawing 
most of the key lines of influence into his own office. The result was to raise 
questions over whether the chairman had become 'a benevolent dictator', 'the most 
powerful broadcasting head in the western world' (N.Z. Listener 10.3.79) or 'a czar-
supremo' (TV-2 chairman, quoted in Cross, 1988: 59). 
Underlying these charges is a sense of a charismatic leader attempting, single-
handedly, to solve complex organisational problems. Consequently, it produces two 
natural focii of attention which are developed through this chapter. First, it identifies 
how Cross utilized existing organisational and social tensions to develop the inherent 
authority of his office. Secondly, it discusses how this process introduced, counter-
intuitively, informal means of organisational control behind the proliferation of 
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centralised, managed and codified arrangements on the one hand, and how it affected 
the pattern of cultural production through scheduling and programme production on 
the other. This emerges, in particular, through discussion of the restructuring in 1979 
which saw the merger of TV -1 and SPTV (TV -2) into the consolidated body known 
as TVNZ. 
What is unusual throughout this account, however, is the existence of an 
apparently charismatic figure not at the birth of an organisation, as is more customary 
(and both Reith in England and Shelley in New Zealand (Gregory, 1985) are typical 
examples), but at a later stage of its existence. Unavoidably, this places strict limits 
on the sphere of discretion available to such a figure, as a frustrated Cross found for 
himself (1988: 164): 
' ... as Chairman and Chief Executive, with management teams supposedly 
reigning over the whole organisation, I found that the state service 
conditions of employment involved a complexity of rules, regulations and 
procedures that really added up to a mutual assistance pact between 
management and staff to maintain the status quo. Ambition and hard-
driving leadership were not encouraged.' 
The consequences of this conflict are explored later in the chapter but, before 
turning to look at how Cross utilised the chairman's office, some indications need to 
be given as to how such an unusual figure became head of the broadcasting system, 
and the basis on which his charismatic appeal was founded. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Much of Cross's background was in writing: he was a well-known novelist, 
and had later turned to journalism, including taking up a journalism fellowship at 
Harvard. Yet, by his own admission, many of his activities had an apparently driven 
and almost visionary quality which he symbolise~ in the persona of an intuitive inner 
voice he has called Jeeves (1988:5-6). After a period in public relations at Feltex, he 
was appointed to edit the Listener in 1973, which 'satisfied that religiosity more than 
anything I had done for a long time' (1988: 6). 
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On the face of it, this was an unusual background from which to ascend to the 
chair of the country's broadcasting systems four years later. He appeared to have 
relatively little business management, bureaucratic or broadcasting experience in his 
favour. Yet, on the other hand, he was widely seen to have revitalised and improved 
the Listener and, as its editor, had been involved with the upper administrative 
structures of broadcasting to which the Listener was attached. In a sense, then, he 
appeared to have married aspects of the state and the market - at least in an 
entrepreneurial form - in this role. Also, his Listener editorials on broadcasting made 
his own views well-known. A year before his appointment as chairman, for example, 
he set out his views on the 1976 broadcasting changes CN.Z. Listener 10.7.76): 
'Broadcasters cannot be their own judges and juries on what they do: they 
must be under a controlling body which ensures that they serve the public 
interest and their own best standards .... .If, however, broadcasters are 
made to feel that they are subservient to an administrative class which 
exercises only negative control over their activities, their present morale 
and drive will fade away.' 
In short, the Listener acted as a platform which his activities and attitudes 
could be gauged. And, in many ways, they appeared to fulfil the contradictory 
criteria required of a powerful chairman. Cross, as a bureaucratic entrepreneur with a 
creative background, and views not unsympathetic to the Minister of Broadcasting 
CN.Z. Listener 29.5.76; 10.7.76), offered the prospect of reconciling the incompatible 
demands of managed independence: the restraint on organisational autonomy 
coupled with a degree of creative licence. 
However, this position was, also, and primarily, an appointment to control a 
state monopoly, and in this respect Cross fulfilled these necessary requirements, too, 
insofar as there was an attempt by the new Government to reassert or extend state 
social control through the new Act. The clearest way this can be illustrated is by 
pointing to the way in which Cross adopted an inherently paternalistic mode of 
authority (as a 'benign dictator') that coincided with the puritanical and deferential 
style of management of broadcasting noted by a number of commentators 
(Cleveland, 1980; Gregory, 1985; Johnstone, 1968). Cross illustrates both the 
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puritanism in his own approach (viz 1988: 240 for example) and evidence of 
deferentiality, in this case with the Prime Minister (1988: 83): 
'Our exchanges dealt at first with the licence fee issue, and he proceeded 
to examine me as though as I was a student at an accountancy tutorial. 
My only defence against that after a few minutes was to fail myself on the 
spot... when a cap, however disguised, should be in my hand, my mind 
retreats into distracted vagueness.' 
In summary, Cross's appointment was at the intersection of, and as the 
expected resolution to, a number of tensions. These centred principally around the 
questions of administrative control and organisational autonomy but also around an 
authoritarian social control and a loosely-organised sense of creative (or professional) 
freedom, all of which could, in some sense, be seen to be embodied in Cross's 
unconventional background. 
In a wider sense, these pressures point again to the fundamental 
organisational dilemmas discussed in earlier chapters. In this context, they emerge as 
the conflict between what Perrow refers to as the particularistic and the universalistic 
(1979: 3-12), or between individual and group categories and its bureaucratic 
rationalisation (Crozier, 1964: 299-300), in which Cross occupied a focal position. In 
an important sense, his role illustrates how Weber's (1947) ideal type of bureaucracy 
always under-represents actual organisational complexities. These crystallise into 
/ 
particular images and configurations of organisational form which are, in effect, 
shifting and incomplete. Here, for example, one could not easily predict someone of 
Cross's background readily filling this position nor, as will become evident, the 
consequences in terms of the patronage relations, which flowed from it. In short, 
where the richness of bureaucratic form is distilled into images, those images are 
necessarily static representations of the confluence of particular social forces (Reed, 
1985). 
If these were the circumstances under which the role and its incumbent came 
into being, they do not indicate how Cross enlarged and developed the authority of 
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the office. How he undertook this, in the face of a rationalizing organisation, is 
explored next. 
3. THE CENTRALISATION OF CONTROL 
It is difficult to dispute the evidence that control was increasingly channelled 
into the chairman's office. The new direction was evident from the long and intense 
discussion of objectives at his first Board meeting. At that meeting, during a 
discussion which excluded the Directors-General, and which was marked 
'confidential' and held separately to the main minutes, he accepted (BCM 77/5/4) 
that: 
'He had been made aware of members' thinking and appreciated that, in 
the ultimate, confirmation of any action he took could be refuted. He 
realised that consultation was imperative but there would be occasions 
when he had to respond without prior consultation ..... even though 
members might disagree with that response.' 
With Board consent, he replaced the Board of Management, with a Chief 
Executives Committee which, unlike its predecessor, was presided over by the 
chairman. He also chaired the finance subcommittee of the Board which by 1978 
had evolved into the Finance and Planning committee. In this way, he gained access 
to, and influence over, the two major advisory committees to the Board which shaped 
.' 
the flows of information to, and policy from, the organisation's central decision-
making area. He also abolished the proposed Secretary's Division, which was 
intended to develop management policy; its functions were effectively subsumed by 
the Finance and Policy committee and later efforts, principally by the Secretary, to 
resurrect it were rejected (BCM 78/9/15). 
The key point which emerged from the changes was that the chairman was 
able to monitor all aspects of the organisation's activities and influence its direction. 
Former Board members and executives also recall his influence over the selection 
and short-listing of key appointments. If the chairman's influence waxed, that of the 
Board appeared to wane, with reports by respondents of the pre-ordering of the 
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agenda to manage for desired outcomes. This was precisely mirrored by, and 
culminated in, the comments of the Commission of Inquiry on irregular contractual 
arrangements (Jackson Report 1984 :66): 
'16. We have been told that Board members were not provided with 
either the interim or final report of the Internal Inquiry, but were merely 
given a "resume" by the Chairman, Mr Cross, at the Board meeting on 16 
August 1983. This we find a most unusual and an almost cavalier 
approach by Mr Cross to his Board. We have seen a memorandum which 
we are told was attached to the papers presented to the Board at that 
meeting but the agenda has no reference to the matter and minutes record 
nothing on it. 
17. Even more surprising was the advice to us by the Chairman that no 
Board member asked for or received a copy of the report although we 
were told that one was available at the meeting. In a situation where the 
problems of TVNZ were, at that very time, the subject of the public 
debate which eventually led to this Commission of Inquiry, we find the 
Board response to its Chairman's report on the Internal Inquiry 
remarkable to say the least and a quite unprecedented· reaction for any 
board in the experience of the members of this Commission. We wonder 
whether the response would have been different had the Board been 
chaired by an independent non-executive person.' 
At the same time as he gained control of the principal channels of access to 
the Board, there is evidence that he developed separate and informal systems of 
control. The Jackson Commission noted that by 1984, all 9 top BCNZ executives 
were directly responsible to the chairman. However,a number of senior management 
executives pointed out that Cross 'had a group of cronies who surrounded him' as one 
c· 
of them put it, and which had emerged since the beginning of his chairmanship. It 
was produced by the existence of two groupings in the administrative area (latterly 
the Central Service Division). Cross as editor of the Listener had been an 
intermittent attender of Broadcasting Council meetings of senior executives run by 
the Council secretary. He appears finally to have been excluded. As a senior 
executive commented, when he became chairman, 'he needed support and had to 
create a separate group for himself.' While the Broadcasting Council grouping 
'would normally have advised him, under the circumstances he was obliged to gather 
others.' Added to that, he was impatient of bureaucratic procedures. As a respondent 
observed: 
'He didn't have mu.ch confidence in many of his executives - he wanted 
really, to be 'hands on'. He was always against the red tape and 
bureaucracy and in fact was "anti-establishment" - something of a 
maverick, but with very high principles.' 
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Another senior executive remarked that Cross 'tended to go by an upfront 
image and judge on charisma'. As Cross himself put it in his autobiography: 
'I also went out of my way to demonstrate my friendship with advertising 
people I had worked with in my Feltex days, reasoning that if I, as 
chairman plunged into the revenue game, spouting Harvard Business 
School bromides, executives had little choice but to follow.' 
In sum, an entrepreneurial instinct, coupled with an urge to intervene as he 
felt appropriate, engendered a blurring of accepted hierarchical arrangements. As an 
executive remarked, these: 
'cut across lines of communication to the Secretary and created suspicion: 
"No one knows who reports to whom. Why is so-and-so seeing them and 
not going through me as he should?'" 
This also reinforced a sense of favouritism. On the one hand, respondents 
pointed to the elevation of a number of individuals of sharply varying competence 
(and see the Jackson Report, 1984 for further elaboration of this point), while, on the 
other, he rebuffed or avoided executives who challenged him. Despite the references 
to Cross's charismatic intentions, however, it is important to add that there was doubt 
expressed by respondents over his actual leadership. A senior executive summed it 
up: 
'His method was to do things by direction rather than by leadership .. .! 
remember seeing him waiting outside Ron Free's door [a former Director 
of Finance and senior member of the CSD] to see him. He was hopping 
from one foot to another on all of his 6 foot 6 frame. He said to me "could 
you just go in and tell him I'd like to see him." He couldn't go in because, 
in some ways, he was an intensely shy man. A leader would have just 
walked in and said "Hi, Ron, how's it going?" But he couldn't.' 
If there were doubts over his leadership skills, there were, too, over his 
charismatic appeal. The opposition by programme-makers to the restructuring plans 
has already been noted but a senior programme executive commented further that he 
found Cross to be 'dissembling': 
'you never knew where you stood. It was his PR background - at Feltex. 
He was never a working broadcaster. He hadn't been through all the pain 
and sweat and the deadlines. He'd done a few Column Comments and 
thought he was one. In fact, he liked PR people around him. 
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As discussed by Longer and Kanungo (1987), one of the fundamental attributes of a 
charismatic leader is unqualified assent to his or her insights based on recognised 
expertise. The evidence suggests this was absent. Consequently, damning as these 
comments appear, they do demonstrate that, as chairman, Cross fitted comfortably 
neither the administrative nor the programme-making groups and that he attempted to 
develop informal, often directly interventionist procedures and to cultivate 
organisational relations based on personal loyalties rather than the formal attributes 
of office. In Weberian terms this marks a shift away from a bureaucratic type 
towards a more patrimonial system of organisation. This point, and the considerable 
consequence which flow from it, are pursued later in the chapter. 
Nonetheless Cross, as described, wielded very sizeable influence within the 
organisation. He derived the legitimacy for this primarily from claims to be acting in 
the larger organisational interest rather than the furtherance of departmental goals. 
His successful regulation of, and call for, increased journalism training in the 
aftermath of a major internal conflict in 1978, initiated by a serious complaint from 
the Prime Minister, is typical (Cross, 1988:34): 
'My argument was that the corporation needed time to clean up its own 
house and could not do this if by public disclosures it pulled down the 
roof over its head. The serious deficiencies of the programmes were in 
my view a lack of journalistic training and grounding. This the 
corporation had to supply before the broadcasting stick was applied to it.' 
Early in the 1979 restructuring he used the proposal of the sale of one channel 
by the Treasury and Cabinet to justify sole control of the organisation'S response 
(Cross, 1988:65): 
'for this reason .... their consideration by the corporation were kept 
confidential to myself and one executive and together we worked 
furiously to jump on the idea.' 
In short, Cross attempted both to speak for, and act on behalf of all the 
organisation's interests, accumulating power in order to do so. Externally, this 
amounted to an attempt to manage both financial and publication ambiguities by 
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securing the information and the respons~ in his own hands. He was explicit about 
this strategy in securing the 1979 restructuring when he claimed strong general staff 
support for his changes based on submissions and meetings to which he alone was 
privy (Cross, 1988:42 and 51; Mayne, 1978). As a result, he was able to capitalise on 
the growing existence of internal corporate divisions (and see Cross, 1988:41-42,51-
58 on his analysis of TV-1 and TV-2 rivalries; Mayne, 1978 for another, largely 
similar account). Moreover, he could bind this to a claim for the urgency of 
organisational reform in the public and organisational interest based around 
alternatives which he could shape through his access to, and control over, the sources 
of policy formation and execution, and internal information flows. 
At a more general level, Cross's chairmanship highlighted several important 
structural features. 
1. An executive chairman could exploit the tension between administrators and 
programme-makers which existed in their contradictory sources of advice to the 
Board. 
2. An executive chairman could also exploit the competitive rivalries between 
the two television channels which, as above, could not themselves offer consistent 
advice to the Board. In other words, the office could exploit two key areas of 
ambiguity which related to the ordering of state versus market-driven activity and 
administratively-regulated versus discretionary, socially-controlled operation. 
3. As a chairman and as chief executive, the office both dispensed and executed 
policy. As Cross remarked on his decisions to develop a studio in Parliament (Cross 
1988:107). 
'These moves by me [as an executive] created pressures on the Board 
which I received as chairman and felt compelled to act upon.' 
In effect, the position became answerable to no-one except the political patron 
which instituted it and it is unsurprising to find that this joint role was not finally 
removed until the Labour Party's return to office. 
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4. The joint role also encouraged the development of informal sources of control 
and of individual loyalty which circumvented the existing organisational structure. 
Paradoxically, then, it reintroduced discretionary areas of control at just the same 
time as the organisation was codifying and reinforcing its formal operational 
procedures. 
5. While it advanced administrators' aim by the centralisation of management 
and the reintroduction of hierarchical systems through the 1979 restructuring, in 
effect it merely shifted the balance of control to a new arrangement of formal and 
informal forces organised around the fulcrum of the Chairman's office (NBR 11.4.79; 
18.4.79). 
6. In broader terms, it produced a more flexible management of broadcasting's 
environment, since the re-introduction of discretion enabled rapid changes to be 
made to the balance of public service and commercial demands by concentrating 
information and responses in the chairman's office. 
In effect, then it concentrated all key aspects of the organisation into the 
office of the chairman, both its financial priorities and its claims to legitimacy 
flowing through the same individual. As the NBR (11.4.79) reported: 
'He argues "why I seem to be taking more power is that I'm the first 
widely known spokesman for broadcasting since God knows when. '" , 
Yet this concentration of control was vulnerable to the same challenges which 
administrators had made of programme-makers: where there were any failures or 
discrepancies, particularly over financial questions, as was to be the case, 
administrators could claim the need for regulation and monitoring. Inevitably then, 
the success of the challenge would determine the position and power of the 
chairman's office. In short, the same primary organisational dilemma for 
broadcasting could and did re-emerge in. a fresh context: the proper extent of 
discretion or control under conditions of ambiguity. How these discrepancies 
emerged and were addressed is the subject of the next section. 
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4. 1979 RESTRUCTURING 
The 1979 restructuring ended the system of competitive television initiated by 
the Adam Report in 1973. As such, it spelled the end of the principal of 'maximum 
practicable independence' of the 1976 Act, and the notion of 'guided' competition 
between two separate channels. The replacement under the wing of the BCNZ, was a 
single corporation, dual":channel network retitled Television New Zealand (TVNZ) 
which espoused the concept of 'co-operative enterprise.' (Gregory,1985:99). 
To some extent, the pressures which contributed to the restructuring have 
been traversed in earlier sections. What is important here is how they were 
interpreted, principally by the Board chairman, as the prime mover of the negotiation, 
both as a set of urgent claims, and as opportunities for -fresh solutions, which 
attempted to resolve the besetting issues of finance and pubiication, at the same time 
as they reinforced the chairman's own position. 
Fundamentally, the restructuring reinforced explicit state monopoly control of 
broadcasting. Consequently, it returned to an approach, as with the earlier NZBC 
system, of managing all its key dependencies and resources through a single, 
centralised organisational form. Gregory gives this summary of the structural 
rearrangements (1985:99): 
'TVNZ comprised a production service, providing local programmes for 
each channel, and a network service which schedules programmes on 
both TV-I and TV-2, makes overseas purchases and arranges advertising. 
The "rationalization" would save operating costs by reducing the 
duplication of resources and effort built into the previous structure.' 
Boyd-Bell commented (1985:153): 
'For the viewer there were obvious gains in the complementary 
scheduling of programmes on both channels, a reduction in the head-on 
ratings battle, and the return of some minority interest programmes to 
prime time rather than the late night and Sunday afternoon ghettos. For 
the system there were advantages in the hoped-for reduction in some 
aspects of public and political criticism. There was real financial 
advantage in attempting a fifty-fifty audience split over both channels, 
thereby maximising commercial revenue from advertising.' 
In brief, then, the changes appeared to resolve the contradictions of public 
service and commercial objectives by dispensing with cross-channel competition and 
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by using the extra income derived from an even advertising split (as opposed to the 
existing 66/34 TV-1 TV-2 split, (The Dominion .26.1.79)) to broaden the range of 
programmes. 
The plan, as developed, appears to have been entirely Cross's initiative 
(Cross, 1988). It was conceived in 1978 and developed in secrecy over the 1978-79 
summer break (Cross, 1978 and pers. comm.). In stressing the urgency of its 
implementation he made three further claims beyond those outlined above. One was 
the implicit threat of the sale of one channel to private television interests (Cross 
1988: 57,65), which was proposed by the Treasury and later promoted by the Prime 
Minister in a series of press articles. The second and the third were related: a claim 
to represent the unarticulated public, and the unarticulated organisational, interest. 
The public interest, he claimed, came as a result of listening to ordinary New 
Zealanders as he travelled the country, working as 'a diligent populist' (NZ Listener 
10.3.79): 
'He uncovered a consensus. But the action was not finally based on the 
bulk of viewer complaint alone. It was based on his experience as 
chairman, acting constantly as a fireman in alarms between the two 
channels.' 
The organisational interest was constructed in the same way: on the basis of 
internal staff submissions about the future of broadcasting, which, utilising the 
authority of the position of chairman, he interpreted as support for his scheme, (Cross 
1988:51): 
'The intelligence of the submissions was impressive. They showed the 
sound character and decency of broadcasting, especially among 
engineering and craft groups. It was this service and those people which 
made broadcasting. Nothing should be allowed to discredit them.' 
In other words, he developed the notion of a dual constituency which, 
combined with the urgency of privatisation and the difficulties of the existing system, 
constituted a powerful rationale for instituting change. Moreover, the organisational 
constituency cut across existing loyalties within the channels and appealed to the 
elements within CSD (especially the engineering groups) which by-passed the 
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explicit need for support from administrators. Taken together, these elements 
constituted a previously untapped set of alliances drawn out by the chairman's control 
of a previously unexploited source of knowledge and by an appeal to the authority of 
his position. 
However, it is an indication of the close balance of power between 
administrators and professionals that the proposal was finally adopted only after an 
exhaustive discussion and the final exercise of the chairman's vote (Cross 1988:61; 
respondents' interviews). Intrinsically, of course, with its commitment to 
management and centralisation, the new plan favoured administrative dominance. 
More than that, it introduced a different ideological framework which was 
acknowledged in the departure of the two standing committee chairman, who were 
also represented the remnants of Labour-appointed Board. As the TV -1 chairman, 
Dick Collins, put it (The Dominion 9.3.79): 
'The restructuring is not the system I have operated under. I was 
appointed to establish an independent corporation for TV -1 and I have 
carried on because the service was still independent. Now it's back 
centralised as under the N.Z.B.C.' 
In fact the negotiations involved a more complex distribution of power than 
the statement indicates. The principal changes involved (and see Gregory, 1985): 
1. a shift of production control to Auckland and a centralisation of network 
control in Wellington. This, in effect, cut across the loyalties of production staff to 
particular channels. 
2. an intermediate line of control from the Director-General of Production 
Services to the heads of production departments through a Controller of Production 
Planning and Development. This was in contrast to the direct line of control from the 
Director-General to regional station managers. 
3. The amalgamation of all currently separate news, current affairs and sports 
areas under one Controller responsible directly to the Director-General of the 
Production Service located in Auckland. 
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4. The re-introduction of regional news with the appointment of regional news 
editors and producers responsible to the Controller. These arrangements produced a 
number of tensions. Not only were producers distanced from direct representation to 
the Director-General, but they were expected also to make 'bids' to the Controller of 
Programmes over where their programmes might be scheduled. The TVPDA argued, 
unsuccessfully, that (The Evening Post 12.5.79): 
'Production Departments should decide what productions they wish to 
make and they should be serviced by the service Departments who would 
supply finance, manpower etc. We are worried that it will end up the 
other way round.' 
As will be discussed, this was not altogether to be the case. The other conflict 
they faced was that production and technical resources were controlled by the 
regional managers, who also enjoyed direct access to the new' Director-General. 
Consequently, programme-makers faced a number of checks to their discretion over 
programme production, requiring vetting, organisation and scheduling by other 
agents before production could be approved. 
The re-organisation of news services highlighted one key conflict with the 
shift of news to an Auckland base under a former TV -2 head, and which exposed the 
continuation of inter-channel rivalries. The action itself raised an outcry (NZ Listener 
6.10.79), principally from TV -1 staff, on the grounds of political interference 
(Gregory, 1985). More centrally, it indicated that the differences between two 
different organisational centres was not resolved, and was fought out largely through 
attitudes to the redistribution of TV-1 and TV-2 staff in the new system. In crude 
terms, the difference can be reduced, as discussed in earlier chapters, to a contrast 
between a public service versus an entrepreneurial ethos (viz NZ Listener 19.5.79; 
The Dominion 9.10.79) and was mainly expressed by programme-making staff. 
Working practices, as such, were not particularly an issue. Rather, the tension was 
exerted through symbolic and affiliative dimensions (Mayne, 1984). There were, for 
example complaints from within both channels about the loss of TV-1's logo, and 
TV -2's 'eye' symbol, the jingles and the close-down kiwi cartoon (latter transferred to 
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TVNZ). Indeed, this same character and his/her cat were depicted in an unscreened 
cartoon shedding a tear over graves marked with TV -1 and TV -2 logos, before 
driving off in a hearse bearing a TVNZ number plate. 
The confirmed persistence of these loyalties is worth commenting on. That 
they did persist is unequivocal (Mayne, 1985:29): 
'Behind the scenes, the ghosts of SPTV and Television One are still 
locked in battle as Auckland and Wellington vie for position and 
television decision-makers can, by rough rule of thumb, be classified into 
categories reflecting the rival attitudes to television of the pre-1980 era.' 
This conflict, and its affiliative divisions, were also to feature in the 1984 
Commission of Inquiry (Mayne, 1984). However, their implications - which were 
considerable - are left over to the next section. If the restructuring divided staff 
loyalties and dismissed the direct control of programme makers, it is also 
consolidated the power of the chairman. As Edlin commented (1979:6): 
' ... his organisational structure, by creating a horizontal division in place of 
the present vertical split, will leave a vacuum at the top executive level 
which Cross inevitably must fill. 
By creating two horizontal levels, each with separate functional 
responsibilities, an overlord is made necessary to determine priorities and 
to co-ordinate the activities of the two divisions.' 
In effect, this produced wide discretionary latitude in order to respond to 
rapidly fluctuating external pressures. But, given broadcasting's close relation to the 
/ 
state as a whole, it raised the question of vulnerability to 'political abuse'(Edlin, 
1979a:6); especially when there were known to be political priorities for broadcasting 
development - notably the extension of transmission services to provincial electorates 
(NBR 11.4.79). The further implications of this discretionary latitude have been 
discussed by Gregory (1985: 105-112) and will be dealt with at greater length in the 
next section. 
One last major consequence of the restructuring was the new shift of direction 
signalled by the appointment of top executives. 'The team ... consisted largely of TV-2 
executives' which, according to Cross, 'had demonstrated a far greater affinity with its 
New Zealand audience' (Cross, 1988: 106). It also exhibited, as noted, a strongly 
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entrepreneurial bias, based on sponsorship, contradeals and marketing that 'had a 
strong element of hucksterism' (Cross, 1988:56), although some commentators 
observed that this approach gave it ' a mana out of proportion to its financial 
contribution,' (Mayne, 1985:29). What it also did, of course, was to reinforce the 
conflict between public service and commercial objectives within a new framework. 
Mayne (1985:29) makes the point explicit: 
'Like its predecessor networks, TVNZ opted for expedient methods of 
broadcasting the local presence on-screen, hence the initial obsession for 
live sport and live entertainment - both relatively cheap forms of local 
production yielding more on-screen minutes to the dollar than drama or 
the like. And both these forms of production lend themselves to 
entrepreneurial and sponsorship deals.' 
There were, in fact, three reasons for this strategy. One was an attempt to 
increase local programme presence as part of the new emphasis on the public interest. 
The second was a shortage of operating funds, as indicated and now with an extra 
burden in the form of heavily expanded regional news resources (TVNZ Production 
Plan, 1980; NZ Listener 10.2.80) The third was the limited availability of production 
expertise. As the Director General of the Production Services commented (N Z 
Listener 16.2.80): 
'Production expertise, already depleted by a slow but steady exodus 
overseas, will be spread even more thinly. "A lot of people with limited 
production experience will be getting big chances" says Martin.' . 
This point bears further comment. The restructuring appears not only to have 
highlighted the loss of experienced staff, it also indicated the existence of severely 
depressed staff morale(NZ Listener 16.2.80). A planned total staff walk-out at an 
early address by the BCNZ chairman on the restructuring at Avalon failed when only 
programme staff departed and other personnel remained (The Dominion 22.5.79; 
Cross, 1988). The ABJ itself was split and there were reports of losses of staff (The 
Dominion 4.4.79) and widespread demoralisation (The Dominion 26.5.79), 
culminating in the erection of signs at Avalon titled, after the local railway station, 
'Wingate Weekend Television' (NZH 22.11.79). The degree of unity shown in 1976 
by programme-makers disintegrated not only because of the growth of the internal 
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organisational pressures and appeal to alternative allegiances, but also because 
programme-makers were unable to mobilise public support. There were at least two 
reasons for this: (a) externally, the reorganisation was not such an explicitly public 
and legislative act as 1976; (b) internally, the potential threat of job-loss had been 
specifically excluded :as a restructuring issue (Edlin 1979a,b), weakening the basis of 
potential widespread support for a public campaign. 
4.1 Summary of the Restructuring 
The restructuring demonstrates both the internal shifts and external or public 
consequences of the perceptions and control exercised over key ambiguities. At root, 
the reorganisation was an attempt to solve all broadcasting's major pressures 
simultaneously by introducing forms of routinisation and stability through the 
extinction of cross-channel competition and the reintroduction of the contradictory 
aims of a managed commercial environment and an emphasis on public service 
priorities through complementary, broad-based, New-Zealand oriented scheduling. 
Its effects, ironically, were merely to reintroduce contradictions in different 
organisational areas. Routinisation limited programme-makers' discretion and led to 
the loss of experienced staff and the restriction of local content production. Financial 
pressures re-emphasised the conflict of scheduling by elevating entrepreneurial 
priorities at the same time as efforts were made to reintroduce minority programme 
choice. Programme-making staff lost occupational discretion in the allocation of 
programme production and scheduling at the same time as discretion increased at the 
level of the Board chairman. In brief, neither the routinisation-discretion problem 
nor the commercial-public service problem was resolved; rather, both were 
rearranged with the tensions reorganized to produce greater decision-making control 
in the chairman's position. 
These, in turn, affected the production of culture which reflected existing 
entrepreneurial ambitions but which were now elevated to a confused public service-
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commercial fonn of output which was expressed through a high volume-low cost 
strategy which, by virtue of its available resources and limited expertise, was bound 
in general to be more cautious and less adventurous. In this sense, the risk-taking 
aspirations of the Adam Report were exchanged for a fonn of cultural management; 
certainly, there were no claims offered in any announcement of the new system to 
extend production boundaries. The Director General of Production Services"remarks 
in this light were revealing in that his 'short lecture [on the changes] doesn't exactly 
bubble with optimism' (NZ Listener 6.10.79). 
These changes aside, there is one other major consequence of the 
restructuring to be dealt with. This charts the shift of organisational control from 
fonnal to informal means and is discussed in the following sections. 
5. RELATIONS OF PATRONAGE AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
These first emerged in TV -2, primarily through the pressure to develop 
markets as rapidly as possible, combined with the need to innovate intensively, in 
order to create an identity and a set of programmes that legitimated it as a separate 
public service entity to TV-I. Simultaneously, it possessed a lean administration 
with limited accounting, monitoring or financial controls. Moreover, a sizeable 
/ 
proportion of its staff, particularly in the programme area, were new, often young and 
with minimal administrative experience. Respondents recalled numerous anecdotes 
about ill-considered or ambiguous decisions where resources or facilities were 
committed then revoked, where basic paperwork remained incomplete or contractual 
obligations were misunderstood and where administration was only partially 
undertaken, even for major projects. This, coupled with a programme-making 
ideology which viewed the task of administration as pedantic o,r secondary to the 
purpose at hand (see the Public Expenditure Committee (1977) findings) provided 
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conditions for the emergence of characteristics similar to Weber's (1947) concept of 
patrimonialism. 1 
The key linkages lay in the acquisition of direct programme sponsorship to 
develop particular projects under conditions of strong, often personal allegiance to 
projects or project leaders which was heightened by sharp inter-departmental 
rivalries. In short, individual producers were able to acquire extra-organisational 
resources which they could dispense as a means of patronage either to broadcasting 
staff or to potential performers. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to ask 
why this affected only certain programme areas, and only TV-2. 
In fact, the answers have already been partly suggested amongst the pre~ 
conditions to patronage. TV -1 did not face such intense demands for income; many 
areas of staff - particularly in current affairs and information programmes were 
strongly opposed to the notion of sponsorship; many staff, being drawn from the 
NZBC, were strongly imbued with a more disinterestedly corporate ethos which they 
passed on to new recruits. Administrative controls were, although tightly stretched, 
well-developed and more closely tied to NZBC procedures through continuity of staff 
and proximity to the BCNZ control centres. There was, in any event, a more co-
ordinated, coherent sense of inter-departmental co-operation or understanding 
/ 
reinforced by the close spatial relationship of the Avalon building and the broader 
political and public service ethos of the Wellington region, as opposed to the 
decentralised Auckland outlook indicated in earlier chapters. 
In brief, the opportunities were available in Auckland where they were not in 
Wellington. Even in the development of TV-1's major (and highly controversial) 
series, 'The Governor', the eventual decision by the producer to abandon his key 
1 Patrimonialism is a concept which Weber (1947) refers to as a monarchical form. 
It is, therefore, more properly a state form rather than a bureaucratic form - and little 
discussed, in either case, by Weber or other commentators (Collins, 1986). 
Nonetheless, the general notions of the particular financial ties and informal relations 
to a leader are useful here and applied, in the absence of more developed discussion, 
as the best available means of highlighting an unusual set of relationships. 
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administrative control instrument, the forward budgeting system, a decision which 
contributed significantly to cost overruns, was not translated into emergent forms of 
patronage. Significantly, the events of 'The Governor' are invariably treated as 
isolated to the period in all available respondent and organisational narratives. In 
contrast, with TV-2,similar features are more commonly viewed as signifiers of TV-
2's 'character' (Mayne, 1984:16): 
'SPTV was Auckland - and branch office Christchurch - with all the 
razzamatazz and rogue disrespect that sums up "Aucklandness" in the 
self-esteem of all true isthmus-dwellers.' 
That the Entertainment department in TV-2 became the principal focus for 
patronage is straightforward. Entertainment programmes are generally the most 
closely.entwined with performers and client companies of any in broadcasting, by 
virtue of their demand for skills and finance beyond the organisation's own resources. 
More than that, most programme-makers develop patterns of allegiance based 
primarily on the collegial organisation of the occupation (where under the uncertain 
conditions of production, programme-makers with similar sympathies or perspectives 
are likely to attempt to continue to work together). And it is the development of 
these close informal relations which, in the presence of external patrons, provides the 
conditions for nest-feathering (Perrow, 1979) or patrimony to emerge. 
In the E~tertqinment area, financial relations to outside agencies in the form 
of sponsorship, contradeals, gifts or other inducements being commonly greater and 
more widespread than in many other departments, act as essential lubricants for a 
show's success (such as the provision by companies of large and attractive prizes in 
quiz shows). Invariably, this produces a form of environmental dependence for a 
broadcasting organisation (Turow, 1984), but also a source of ambiguity between 
agency, organisation and producer over how, and by whom, transactions are to be 
controlled. For programme staff it presents opportunities to gain additional status, 
power or resources (though, generally, money). For performers, it is the opportunity 
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for status or exposure and pursuant career enhancement through television 
appearances - or, at its extreme, the development of a casting couch mentality. 
Two conditions exacerbated these features in New Zealand. One was the 
virtual creation of a light entertainment industry as a small, tightly delimited market 
under the two-channel system and particularly in the talent quest area. As the TV-l 
Director-General remarked in an interview (NZ Listener 15.2.75:14): 
'One wonders, however, if New Zealand is a light entertainment country 
except in certain specialist areas ... .!t has no tradition, like the end-of-the-
pier and music hall comedians in England. Here television has been the 
leader. Kevan Moore's shows in Auckland and "Popco" in Christchurch 
led to local live venues springing up, and now the brewery people have 
started an entertainment circuit. Create the vehicle and you get the trade.' 
The second was the importance of t~levision as a monopoly, particularly from 
the time of TVNZ's establishment, as the Commission of Inquiry commented 
(Jackson Report 1984:53): 
'The television network in this country is a monopoly. It is also the best 
medium for professional stage performers to be publicly seen. Should an 
artist be refused access to television he or she is effectively debarred from 
exposing his or her talent to the best advantage. The "That's Country" 
show is currently rated the top television production in its class and 
country and western entertainers would consider exposure on that 
programme to be an essential step in the promotion of their artistry.' 
It was a conjunction of the factors outlined above in the "That's Country" 
series which led to a major, highly public debate in 1983 after two entertainers were 
dismissed amidst considerable controversy. This was followed by an internal inquiry 
which failed to stem continuing public debate and criticism and finally led to a 
Government-instituted Commission of Inquiry that reported in April 1984, (under the 
title of the Jackson Report). 
However, it was the ability of the Entertainment department to enforce 
monopoly control over the labour market of entertainers which produced silence from 
potential informants to the Commission of Inquiry. Indeed, the commissioners 
commented directly and somewhat laconically on the relationship between the artists 
involved and Trevor Spitz, the show's producer (Jackson Report 1984:63): 
'The parade of entertainers at the Christchurch hearing, all entirely 
supportive of Mr Spitz and all dependent on the goodwill of Mr Spitz for 
their continued employment on the "That's Country" show, left the 
Commission wondering whether this Mr Spitz is larger than life.' 
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The Commission was not slow in pointing out other obstacles which faced 
prospective witnesses, both inside and outside broadcasting, that hampered the 
production of evidence to the extent that, finally, only one television producer was 
prepared to give clear and damaging testimony (Jackson Report 1984:63): 
'In effect any persons wishing to give evidence to the Commission against 
the Corporation or its management employees, had to - one, risk the ire of 
their peers - two, meet their own legal costs or proceed without counsel -
three, face the inevitable torrid cross examination from three or more 
sources, all funded by the Corporation. Any employee who chose to 
challenge the authority of, or even criticise a senior executive, ran the risk 
of having a closing of ranks against him or even his contract terminated, 
or at least not renewed. In all the circumstances perhaps it is little wonder 
so few came forward.' 
Perhaps ironically, the sole hostile witness, a former TV -1 producer, suffered 
just such consequences as those indicated by the Commission (Mayne, 1984: 17): 
'Kemp is now reported to have been given a poor personnel assessment 
(by a panel including some of those whom he had criticised) and no 
longer has any programmes to produce in entertainment. He had to pay 
his own legal and incidental costs .. .' 
The reason to dwell on this organisational aspect is because of the light it throws on 
the tension between state and commercial orientations on the one hand, and its 
relationship to the tension between administrative and professional ideologies on the 
other hand. The former Chairman's comments in his recent book are illuminating in 
this respect (Cross 1988:211): 
'The idea that such a productive group of people should be kneecapped by 
the corporation for some carefree sloppiness of administration was quite 
out of the question; the (Corporation) board accepted that it was essential 
that the spirit of the department should be maintained even as 
administrative disciplines were put in place.' 
As all parties agreed, "That's Country" was a highly successful programme 
locally and also internationally, having been sold to the United States for over $1 
million (Cross, 1988:211), a very considerable sale in TVNZ's terms at the time. 
The difficulty lay precisely in how 'the spirit of the department' was to be maintained 
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within administrative requirements. Cross amplified his own view later (Cross, 221-
222): 
'The Commission apparently could not understand that a light rein is 
sometimes required to maintain the creative drive of highly individualistic 
people who are producing good results.' 
To pursue this kind of solution, however, prohibits, almost by definition, 
administrative codification, and hence the 'administrative disciplines' which he 
claimed were to be instituted. 
If this retained the central ambiguity on one level - how to give programme-
makers freedom without giving them autonomy (or enabling them to invoke the same 
discretionary claims which this degree of liberty invariably permitted them to do), it 
did so on another level, too. Several of the Commissio~ of Inquiry's most damning 
criticisms were aimed at broadcasting's central leadership, in other words, at Cross 
himself and are worth quoting at length (1984:64-65): 
'10. All of these matters lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the top 
management of TVNZ is lacking in administrative skills and the capacity 
to remedy ills. It has allowed a system of delegation and non-intervention 
to run riot to the extent that the organisation is controlled by producers 
and trained artists, very skilled in the artistic field, but who, on the 
evidence are ill-equipped to attend to business and administration matters. 
Mr Martin's blind support of producers and of the Head of Department 
and his lack of supervision of delegated tasks led to his ignorance of what 
was going on in major areas of TVNZ .. .' 
We thought that some of the top executives were somewhat vague 
or at least uncertain of their job specification, which was not clearly 
defined in any document. A problem seems to be that in staffing the 
Corporation with artists instead of administrators, the incumbents are 
unsure of their functions ... 
12. The Corporation's organisation chart submitted to the Commission 
shows the lines of communication and authority of these top executives 
with 9 persons directly responsible to the Chairman. The Commission 
did not examine the management structure in depth but the information 
received by it and the evidence given left us in no doubt that either the 
structure was fundamentally wrong or the people were not equipped or 
sufficiently competent to perform satisfactorily within it, or both.' 
Two points need to be made. One is that the majority of top positions were 
filled by ex-TV-2 executives and programme staff, and certainly all those subject to 
intensive criticism by the Commission (Mayne, 1984a). 
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, Secondly, the majority of th~se executives reported directly to Cross. What 
this did, in effect, was to tie together two organisations' arrangements which 
supported each other in a structure that, implicitly at least, reinforced the patron-
client relations inherent in the earlier TV-2 organisation. As a consequence, this 
patronage became embedded at the pinnacle of the organisation structure, a hierchical 
structure which - although created for putative reasons of efficiency - had in effect, 
been subverted through the complementary discretionary requirements of both 
chairman and executives. 
This in turn, reveals, the highly unusual organisational transformation which 
had been effected to meet the demands of public service and commercial operation: it 
enabled the 'continuance of forms of discretionary activities underneath a veneer of 
administrative scrutiny, thereby fulfilling both requirements simultaneously within 
the maintenance of a monopoly framework. In a very real sense, this is a form of 
organisational aberration, since it suppressed the regulatory and monitoring functions 
of the corporation. Yet it served to ameliorate the considerable and contradictory 
demands of state and commercial requirements. How enduring the drive for 
professional autonomy and discretionary was can be gauged from the Commission's 
description (1984:25): 
, 
'Mr Martin, Director-General of TVNZ, said in evidence that TVNZ's 
management and organisational policy is based on the belief that TV 
functions best when responsibility is delegated as closely as possible to 
the programme makers and those who must employ and monitor the 
administrative framework. We would not accept, nor we hope would 
senior BeNZ management, that this philosophy relieves those in higher 
office from the responsibility of ensuring that adequate administrative 
checks and balances are in force and that the controls are in fact working.' 
In actuality, the lack of scrutiny also affected areas beyond the Entertainment 
Department. One was Sales and Marketing where the Controller, another TV-2 
executive, was criticised for highly improper commercial dealings with an ex-TV-2 
producer over the making of an advertisement (Jackson Report, 1984:46-49). A 
second was the employment of, and administration over, contract staff with the 
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obvious implication that the short-term hire age which took place contributed to the 
enlargement of patrimonial authority (Jackson Report, 1984:23-24,42-43). 
Interestingly, the Commission, an appointment of two accountants, made a 
major recommendation that TVNZ should be reorganised into a public limited 
company. The irony, of course, is that while that adequately reflected commercial 
concerns and emphasised accounting and financial priorities, it ignored television's 
public service dimensions, as Cross readily pointed out (1988). The recommendation 
was quickly dismissed although subsequently, as recent events have shown, this has 
been the direction in which TV has moved with its incorporation as a limited 
company in late 1988. 
The importance of the Commission of Inquiry, and the issue of patron-client 
relations, is to highlight the linkage between state and commercial demands, and 
between programme-makers and administrators' relationships in a way which enabled 
programme-makers to maintain, in spite of structural change, a submerged but 
implicitly powerful position by virtue of their control of a key ambiguity: the 
production process. This emerged throughout Commission of Inquiry's report and 
was reproduced in the continuing conflicts between administrators' and programme-
makers' roles as one submission illustrates (Jackson Report 1984:68): 
'Mr Simpson on behalf of the PSA in his final submission said "It is no 
secret within television that there are certain 'no go' areas which the 
accounting and personnel systems cannot penetrate. This is because 
producers called to account for irregularities complain, through their 
Heads of Department, to the Controller and the Director-General, secure 
in the knowledge that they will be backed up to the full provided they can 
convince their Head of Department". He went on to say - "those within 
the structure who challenge this method of operations are given short 
shrift". What we have seen and heard leads us to agree with that view.' 
This led, as the Commission of Inquiry commented, to 'a lack of 
accountability' and led to a series of conflicts between programme-makers and 
administrators throughout the organisational structure, (such as that between the 
relative authority of local station managers and programme producers (Jackson 
Report, 1984:65). Behind this lay the continued claim to the professional control of 
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ambiguity which, in essence, is no different to that raised in the Adam Committee 
some ten years earlier, (Jackson Report 1984:68): 
'Various persons from the Director-General down were careful to support 
the theory that the total control (including financial) of the shows must be 
left in the hands of the producer. Each producer is supported by a TPA 
(Television Producer's Assistant) and from what we heard neither had 
little if any business or accounting training.' 
What this enabled,in effect, was the creation of a space where professional 
autonomy was largely absolute, while the actual production of programmes was 
underway. Money, resources and facilities could come under the control of 
professional authority for the duration of a programme's life (Jackson Report 
1984:66), while the ambiguities involved in the production process - the professional 
preserve - continued to be managed. It was around this mystique that professional 
. 
authority, and ultimately the organisation structure, albeit in an aberrant form, rested. 
At root, what the arrangement typifies is the institution of an informal, 
occupationally-based form of control which operated through the satisfaction of two 
implicit sets of interests. One was the chairman's aim to co-ordinate and exercise 
broad control through his own office outside, or at least in tandem with, formal 
structural arrangements. For this to operate satisfactorily meant eluding or sidelining 
administratively-codified monitoring procedures. This was in order to gain the 
discretionary latitude he clearly felt to be necessary in advancing the organisation's 
interests. (Cross, 1988). The other, and similar, goal was to retain sufficient 
discretion necessary to maintain control over the production process. This 
arrangement involved an implicit exchange: producers lost control of overall, explicit 
organisational direction through new structural arrangements which favoured 
administrative domination. Yet this abandonment of the most public and formal 
dimension of programme-makers' control reinforced their influence over informal 
procedures, as noted. Ironically, then, administrators gained formal control as 
programme-makers strengthened their informal control, both processes taking place 
about the fulcrum of the chairman's office. 
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Nonetheless, informal control diminished overall power for programme-
makers who had, after all, enjoyed both formal and informal control in 1975. The 
process of loss, however, was unevenly shared between different groups of 
professionals. It rewarded principally those with an 'entrepreneurial' orientation, who 
generally came from TV-2, over those with a more public-service outlook. As Cross 
put it (1988:56): 
'One could understand what made TV -2 tick, however. Their marketing 
style had a strong element of hucksterism which manifested itself. in 
audience claims that would not withstand too much analysis, and 
promotions notable for their sheer trumpery, cavalier exuberance and a 
tongue-in-cheek playfulness.' 
Mayne commented in an overview of the period (1984: 12): 
'SPTV, meanwhile had already been forced by its competitive weakness 
to woo advertisers through sponsorship and other incentive deals; with 
the overall finances of the BCNZ becoming ever shakier, such 
entrepreneurial revenue-earning techniques became fashionable, giving 
the SPTV management a mana out of all proportion to its financial 
contribution .. .' 
If we return to the distinction between cosmopolitan and local orientations, 
there is a case for arguing that the new structure elevated locals: those who were 
content to not to contest the formal and public direction of the organisation but 
remained, nonetheless, within its career structure. Cosmopolitans, on this 
formulation, were likely to be those who either left the organisation, or who were 
bypassed in the reallocation of the key positions. Put another way, the consequences 
of professionals' inability to retain autonomy over the definition of their professional 
project - over what constituted the boundaries of professional knowledge (the 
innovative, exciting programming of the Adam Report) - meant they were likely to 
leave or be overlooked under the new imperatives of entrepreneurship which, since it 
was organisationally-defined was, by definition, externally imposed. As Barnett and 
Docherty comment in a British Broadcasting Research Unit study of New Zealand 
television (forthcoming): 
'What was missing, in short, was that vital component of the public 
service television system which promotes television's cultural richness 
into the years beyond the present - the ability to take risks .... One retiring 
Executive mourned the passing of people in TV "with visions of 
innovation and quality".' 
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In that sense, the entrepreneurship of "That's Country" was of a financial 
rather than a professionally-defined nature. It reproduced a conventional foreign 
format to represent a variant of American popular culture - country music sung by 
New Zealand stars (and see Novitz and Willmott (1989) for one commentary on the 
cultural significance of this) - which it sold to southern US television stations. On 
that reading, its professional content was conventional with an appeal to a 
conservative, traditional audience segment (country music lovers) and an 
entrepreneurialism fo~nded primarily op the success of its overseas sales. 
Consequently, then, the diminution of professional control also reflected a restriction 
of programme range through the elevation of local priorities which accorded with 
dominant priorities of administrators and the chairman (in other words, organisational 
priorities over cosmopolitan preferences). 
There is one further and final way of considering these matters which is in 
terms of Jamous and Pelloile's (1972) distinction between technical competences and 
social values. It is the tension, as Atkinson puts it, 'between the tacit and the 
technical (often expressed as "scientific")', (1983:238). The importance in this 
context is that the distinction enables us to identify the technical as the interaction 
with the unknown: the 'virtualities' as expressed as by Jamous and Pelloile (1972). 
While the discovery and articulation of these virtualities can define professional 
practices through the operation of new or developing competences, it also endangers 
the profession'S unity and area of dominance by the extension of its knowledge. It is 
balanced, therefore, by a defensive posture of tacit agreement: the profession 
attempts to maintain its ideological coherence and internal agreement by emphasising 
the necessary mystique - which only its members possess by virtue of professional 
membership - over the operation of codes of judgement through professional 
experience. This argument seems to parallel that of professional broadcasting, where 
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there was an apparent abandonment of the boundary-defining activities of 
professional knowledge in favour of an assertion of social values - the tacit 
knowledge - inherent to the profession. 
If this is the case - and the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive - then 
the 1979 restructuring marks a particular social moment when one formation, and one 
concomitant disposition of the profession, is deposed by another, more defensive 
formation, with a subsequent alteration in organisational membership (where 
members, according to Hirschman, 1982, may exit, voice or show loyalty), and sets 
of publicly articulated claims. At the same time, it combines with a broader 
organisational posture which emphasises social values of restraint, responsibility, and 
close fiscal management. Simultaneously, it also combines an implicit exchange 
. 
which establishes acknowledged, if limited, areas of mutual discretion between 
chairman and profession in the shape of informal control processes revealed by the 
Commission of Inquiry. The profession, in short, cements its internal occupational 
control at the moment it loses control of its organisational role and does so in terms 
which involve both an implicit rearrangement of professional orientations and, by 
extension, a rearrangement of cultural production and priorities (which will from 
thenceforward emphasise the conventional and the known over the hazardous and the 
contestable ). 
Yet to adopt this posture is to conceal the nature of professional activity, as 
programme-makers did in this context. The arrangement, as it developed, had the 
sense of an implicit compact which, in contrast to the competitive conditions of the 
market, could not stand close inspection. And, indeed, it was from the small but 
developing market, organised initially around advertising and a tiny film industry 
(Report of the Steering Committee, 1988; Royal Commission Report, 1986) and 
finally articulated in the contest for the third channel, that fresh demands for access 
and examination were to come increasingly during the 1980's (May, 1985; Mayne, 
1984b; 1985c). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter, necessarily, has covered a great deal of ground. What it has 
sought to describe is the existence of a number of contradictory forces and the 
unpredictable consequences which flowed from them. On the one hand there is 
evidence of the classic bureaucratic strategy to rationalise, centralise and universalise 
organisational management with unavoidable consequences for the collegial 
association of programme-makers. On the other, there is the powerful creation of the 
chairman's office which, while it moves in tandem with administrative centralising 
strategies, cuts against them in creating informal ties and, broadly speaking, quasi-
patrimonial sets of relations that favour some groups of progpamme-makers. 
The importance of this, in terms of organisation theory, is to mark the 
bureaucratic limits imposed on charismatic leadership (however ably it is undertaken) 
such that it is forced to work against other prevailing organisational currents and can 
attain domination only through irregular, informal and unusual channels. This degree 
of dominance is achieved by pursuing another classic bureaucratic strategy of 
gathering together a group of followers, but with the unforeseen consequences for 
organisational actors, of developing highly dubious patron-client relations (that 
Perrow (1979) dubs nest-feathering) in the context qf the ~mall, monopolised labour 
market of entertainment programmes. The revelation of these activities served, in 
turn, to tighten bureaucratic rationalization further through the mechanism of an 
external Commission of Inquiry. 
At the same time, this sequence of events raises a further point of interest for 
organisation theory. Generally, as Perrow argues, organisations move from 
traditional to rational-legal forms of bureaucracy (1979). Here, on the contrary, there 
was a dIstinct attempt to move, at least in part, in the reverse direction: from the 
universalistic to the particularistic. The explanation for this lies partly with the 
ambiguous demands placed on, and arising from, a central culture-producing 
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organisation, as discussed in earlier chapters. But a part of the explanation lies 
beyond the organisation itself. 
Broadcasting was part of a highly-developed and closely-managed small 
national economy directed by the state (Mascerenhas, 1982). As Gregory (1985) and 
Wood (1984) describe it, broadcasting itself displayed a hierarchical, authoritarian 
and paternal pattern of management throughout its history. Yet the new structures 
instituted in 1974 upset this pattern with their emphasis on innovation, autonomy and 
collegiality. In an important sense, then, the return of a conservative government in 
1975 signalled an attempt to recapture, through the mechanisms of the state, the 
earlier pattern of social and formal control of which Cross's appointment was a part; 
Under the conditions of a managed economy with the protections from the 
competitive conditions of the free market, it presupposed a reversion to a traditional 
bureaucracy with its extensive social control implications (viz Baldock and Lally, 
1974). However, television's operations were increasingly embedded in a 
competitive market and, in a way, Cross's attempt to manage it (through the 1979 
amalgamation) merely underlined the contradictions which this produced. It was also 
symptomatic of the pressures being placed on the national concept of managing 
markets and their concomitant social management, which were swept away with the 
, 
Fourth Labour government in 1984 (Boston and Holland, 1987). While this led to 
deregulated national and media markets, it also dismantled the prevailing systems of 
social and state control and the ideological patterns which accompanied them. (And 
these developments are discussed in more detail in the next chapter). It is not 
surprising, then, that these patterns coincided with Cross's leaving office. 
The point to arise from this is, of course, that traditional bureaucracy in the 
form described here can only be maintained within a larger, but similar, ideological 
and institutional framework. With its dissolution, or rearrangement, prevailing 
patterns of hierarchy, authority and paternalism are harder, if not impossible, to 
maintain. In a sense, then, Cross's incumbency might be seen as a holding-pattern, 
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symbolic of a larger set of national practices and beliefs which were increasingly out 
of step with emerging international and technological pressures. Some of the 
implications of these pressures are discussed in the next chapter. 
PART THREE 
BROADER ISSUES AND TELEVISION 
. 
TO 1989 
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CHAPTER NINE 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND TELEVISION IN THE 1980's 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From 1980-89, Television New Zealand experienced a relatively stable 
organisational structure which was not subject to the same large-scale restructuring as 
the previous six years. It was, however, threatened with the disappearance of its 
monopoly of the frequency spectrum through the introduction of private television. 
Indeed, the passing of the 1989 Broadcasting Bill, the development of satellite 
systems and the introduction of the private Television 3 network ensured that public 
television would be faced with considerable, well-organised competition and a 
deregulated environment previously unknown in New Zealand broadcasting history 
(Farnsworth, 1988). Between 1960 and 1989, however, it had faced two main 
pressures: continuing uncertain financial pressures which had increased its 
dependence on advertising revenue (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1986; 
Tribunal Report, 1987), and attacks on its two-channel broadcasting monopoly by 
private interests (Boyd-Bell 1985). Internally, there has been a continuation of public 
service - commercial tensions. More recently, these have been intensified through 
external demands for significant levels of Maori programming (Fox 1988, Royal 
Commission on Broadcasting, 1986), but also by the demands of a variety of minority 
social groups (Farnsworth, 1988) and other interests (Maharey, 1988) critical of 
Television New Zealand's prevailing commercial and public service arrangements. 
This chapter assesses the developments between 1980 and the beginning of 
1989 in terms of the tensions and ambiguities which have been outlined in earlier 
chapters. It also presents a broader historical context within which television and, in 
fact, broadcasting as a whole, has developed in New Zealand. Using Williams' (1975) 
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concepts of culture and technology it also aims to show briefly how these developed 
locally in comparison to the circumstances in Britain, the U.S. and Australia. 
Lastly, given the extreme rate of change which has over-taken the New 
Zealand broadcasting media during 1989, some consideration is given in the 
following chapter, to the impact of deregulation on the television sector. In particular, 
it discusses some cultural issues to do with the recent debate over post-modernism 
and how these might be integrated into the themes which have been developed 
throughout the thesis. 
2.. RECENT ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES 
,-
In late 1988, Television New Zealand undertook a series of managerial 
reforms initiated by its transformation into a State Owned Enterprise. These involved 
a reduction in its administrative overheads and staffing and a reduction and 
redeployment of its programme and production activities. In essence, these shifted 
scheduling and production to a more overtly commercial stance in readiness for 
private competition: several programme areas, e.g. drama, documentaries and 
information programmes, were heavily cut back in favour of external, commissioned 
productions; national news and current affairs expenditure was boosted. Auckland 
, 
production was shifted to new, technologically sophisticated facilities and new links 
were established to major foreign networks and satellite broadcasting companies. In 
tandem with these moves to promote high-profile programme genres, scheduling was 
reorganised to traverse the key prime-time period of 6.00p.m. to 1O.OOp.m. with the 
placement of national news at 6.00p.m., a controversial current affairs programme at 
6.30p.m., and a general news and current affairs programme from 9.30-1O.00p.m. 
Telev~sion One was explicitly promoted, until 1989, as the information channel, and 
Television Two as the entertainment channel in a way which echoes the competitive 
arrangements of the 1970's and suggested a very loosely attempted elite/mass culture 
division of the audience (and see Lealand, 1988a). 
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All of these strategies were aimed to protect Television New Zealand's 
position in an increasingly competitive market environment, but they also re-ordered 
the continuing conflict between commercial and public service objectives. 'Quality' 
programming which drew small audiences, the problem of maintaining varied, high-
cost local programming and of serving minority audiences all cut against Television 
New Zealand's ability to maximise advertising income, especially in circumstances 
where none of its competitors were similarly constrained. It is the consequences of 
this deregulated framework which has led to growing pressure, primarily organised by 
professional interests (Lealand, 1988, Mayne, 1985e), for local quota regulations. 
Whether or not these are imposed, however, they will only ease, and not remove, the 
fundamental conflict of objectives. 
What this account does not explain, though, is the mix of commercial· and 
public service elements which, as noted in the Adam Report (1974) and by Barnett 
and Docherty (forthcoming), is peculiar to New Zealand. The next section considers 
the political, economic and cultural factors which have led to the formation of the 
particular New Zealand television environment and also, more generally, to the 
specific arrangements of the media sector as a whole. 
3. ORIGINS OF NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING FORMATION 
Mundy (1982) in a comparison of early United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australian broadcasting systems, discusses the differences between the British system 
of 'public service' state regulation and control and the American practice of minimal 
involvement under a 'free enterprise' arrangement. Between these two extremes he 
places the mixed Australian system with its 'supportive, regulatory and limited 
involvement of the state' (Mundy, 1982:283). These differences he explains (Mundy 
1982:281) by: 
' ... the relations between elements of the ruling class which are ultimately 
responsible for political 'outcomes', such as these different arrangements 
for the control of broadcasting and it is, principally, the nature of the 
class struggle between fractions of the ruling class which dictates the 
mode of state intervention .. .' 
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Following Williams (1975) and Nairn (1977), he argues that the recent 
development of English national culture emerged from the existence of a well-
developed communications network spread over a small geographical area, and 'the 
hegemonic alliance between finance capital and the patrician aristocracy which 
formed the "unusually compact ruling class" and contributed to the character of the 
British state' (Mundy 1982:293). While these conditions were mostly absent in the 
United States, so were they in Australia (Mundy, 1982:297): 
'which had been federated for only one generation, was not characterised 
by a unified ruling class and had a profoundly ambivalent attitude to 
national culture, due to its ex-colonial status.' 
Instead, an initially weak media industry was developed by the penetration of 
American capital, with only loose regulation by the state. Its public service sector, 
under the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, was promoted primarily by 'rural 
capital, as represented by the Country Party', to provide services to remote areas, and 
by a small, urban, cultural elite (Thomas, 1980) which linked pastoral capital 'with the 
Imperial connection', so that 'Australian Broadcasting was articulated with both these 
interests', (Mundy 1982:296). 
This framework is helpful for understanding the development of New Zealand 
broadcasting. Unlike Britain, it is a geographically awkward country that is difficult 
to link with a communication network, nor does it have a single nationally-unified 
patrician ruling class (Gibbons, 1981; Gregory, 1985). On the other hand, its 
development has been different to Australia and two recent accounts, by Wood and 
Gregory, are useful in understanding how this came about. 
Wood argues (1984:55) that early New Zealand with its: 
'predominantly rural, dispersed economy - characterised by small capital 
with low levels of industrialisation and urbanisation - was regulated by a 
centralised and interventionist state.' 
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In essence, the state acted prior to 1900 to promote all forms of national 
communications which it was beyond the means of small capital to do by itself. Yet, 
until the late 1920's it acted only in a regulatory role (Hall, 1980) in a way which 
controlled the activities of small operators. 
Post-1930, the state appears to have acted more directly, not only to regulate 
but actually to constitute its subjects, in a sense. Although Wood (1984:58) and 
Gregory (1985:15-18) differ on the date, they both agree that the state took over 
control of radio 'in the public interest' which, Wood asserts, enabled the ideological 
identity of 'the people' to be invoked to legitimate the Government's actions 
(1984:58). This appeared entirely reasonable at the time, as Gregory notes (1985:16), 
and particularly with the election of a Labour Party in 1935 committed to centralised 
intervention on behalf of the workers, small manufacturing capital and the small 
farmer class who supported it (Wood, 1984:60, but see similar accounts in Gibbons, 
1981; Martin, 1982 and Olssen, 1981). 
Its reasonableness was grounded in a cautiousness towards the potential social 
hazards and deviance which a widespread private radio system was perceived to 
represent, and which enabled Gregory to identify specific cultural orientations 
(1985:16): 
'Caution may have been politically expedient; in a strongly Calvinist 
society it was strongly desired.' 
This attitude, he argues, enabled the controversial and hazardous political 
process to be largely contained by broadcasting live parliamentary debates which 
thereby produced a manageable representation of political conflict within the limits of 
the Westminster model (and see Smith (1976) for a similar British analysis). It also 
enabled the process of Government to be perceived as separate and superior to the 
parliamentary bear-pit, working 'unhindered by public debate and disputation' 
(Gregory, 1985:16). Yet this simultaneously inscribed the operations of the state (the 
'cabinet and departmental machinery') as paternalist, authoritarian (Gregory 1985:16) 
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and constitutive of the national identity, as is evident in this elision by the Minister in 
Charge of Broadcasting (quoted in Lipson 1948:482): 
'This Government is certainly going to see that broadcasting is controlled 
by the people ... we, the people, the representatives of the people are going 
to control broadcasting .. .' 
A fuller historical summary of radio's development is given later in the 
chapter, but it is sufficient to note at this point some of the cultural implications of 
this form of state control. One is to indicate the absence, as Gregory himself does 
(1985), of a critical intellectual fraction who might have mobilised either opposition 
to this particular form of state ideological hegemony or to attempt alternative 
constructions of national identity - a role which Perry (1987) and Eldred-Grigg (1987) 
argue they were not to undertake successfully until a considerably later period. 
A second implication arises from the apparent contradiction between the 
paternalism and authoritarianism of the state (and see Wynn, for a view of the state as 
'strongly disciplinary and paternalist' in the interests of 'order, efficiency and control' 
(1984: 115», on the one hand, and the widespread ethos of egalitarianism on the other. 
(Baldock and Lally, 1974; Pearson and Thoms, 1983). As Griffen remarks, the 1930's 
saw a conjunction of these seemingly countervailing tendencies so that it became 'the 
time when Government advanced social levelling' to a significant degree (1986:122). 
However, the exact nature of this relationship appears unresolved in recent discussion., 
Various commentators, for example, have linked an egalitarian ethos to a strongly 
dominant lower middle-class (for example, Olssen, 1981), or to the petit bourgeoisie, 
in tandem with a small haute bourgeoisie class (Gibbons, 1981). However, Griffen 
(1986), following Pearson and Thoms (1983), argues that an ideology of community 
and individual opportunity blurs the clarity of this relationship while retaining an 
impression of social homogeneity. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests an uneasy (and 
unclear) relationship between these two classes and one which, under given 
circumstances, enabled them to dominate different occupational strata (Gibbons, 
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1981, for example, suggests the lower middle-class capture of the state school system, 
and an early gentrification of the universities). 
Whatever the case, widespread state intervention combined with an unusual 
combination of paternalism and egalitarianism formed a powerful means of social 
control. Gregory notes that Shelley himself was not immune from it, having to deny 
he was leading the country 'out of the wilderness of lowbrow entertainment into a 
highbrow promised land' (quoted in 1985:24). If this led to extensive deference and 
caution towards their political masters from all forms of the media up until the 1970's, 
their political masters were, simultaneously, displaying powerful signs of 
egalitarianism as a way of conforming to the electorate's expectations (Cleveland, 
1980). This point is taken up again later in the chapter. 
On the whole, then, and with the apparent absence of any strong sub-cultures 
(Gibbons, 1981), apart from those of Maori groups (Parsonson, 1981), there seems to 
have developed a pervasive sense of homogeneity in New Zealand (see Sinclair's 
(1960) contemporary description and apparent concurrence with this attitude, for 
example). James describes its general cultural expression up to the 1970's as 
Imperialist and 'timid, dull, unimaginative and unproductive' (1986:20), a set of 
criticisms which echoes those of the developing post-war intellectual and artistic 
middle class (Eldred-Grigg, 1987; Gibbons, 1981; Perry, 1987). 
Nevertheless, this homogeneity masked sets of fissures and cleavages both 
within pre-war (OIssen, 1981) and post-war society Dunstall (1981:424), for example, 
lists pressures based on sex, age, cultural origins and aspirations, while Shuker (1989) 
has recently outlined the moral panic created by emerging youth groups in the 1950's 
and 1960's. 
Yet, it was not until the 1970's that clear evidence of widespread social cha,nge 
emerged to upset existing and widely-held assumptions about prevailing social 
patterns. In one account, Ovenden summarises this change (1980:59) as: 
' ... the movement from producing to servicing industries, the growth of 
city life and environments, increases in higher education, the emergence 
of value-laden issues having to do with the preservation of the 
environment, and changes in sexual and social mores.' 
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This period also saw the expansion, according to a number of commentators, 
of the educated middle-class (Ovenden, 1980; Clements, 1982). As Dunstall 
(1981:406) summarised the pattern by the 1970's: 
'In the trend away from farming (and possibly from urban manual labour) 
towards white-collar occupations, New Zealand showed signs of 
becoming a post-industrial society, characterised by a service economy, 
by the pre-eminence of a professional and technical class, and by "the 
centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and of 
policy formation for the society", (Bell, 1973:12-26).' 
It was also this expanding educated middle class which Perry sees as receptive 
to the artistic critique, noted above, of New Zealand egalitarianism, such that they 
'have appropriated the thesis that New Zealand culture and social life are deeply 
flawed in order to affirm the rightness of their [own] social claims' (1987: 173). In 
some accounts, then, this produced two discourses, or one discourse with two strands: 
contrasting notions of a metropolitan, liberal, elite and heterogeneous community 
with that of a small-town, egalitarian, hierarchical and homogeneous community (see 
Eldred-Grigg, 1987, for another elaboration of these images; Martin, 1984, 
summarises broader sociological parallels which such contrasts suggest). 
Apart from these changes, there was also a significant concentration in the 
formerly dispersed fields of private media ownership (Cleveland, 1980). The number 
of newspapers had dwindled from 67 in 1910 to 33 by 1980, with 70% of these 
controlled by three monopolies (Simpson, 1984). 
Because this concentration produced, for the first time, the capital nec~ssary 
for national networking, the 'mass media bourgeoisie' could challenge the state's 
monopoly of broadcasting, which had origi~ally been legitimated in terms of its 
intervention on behalf of 'a capitalist society based on small property' (Wood, 
1984:76-77). It was this factor which led to bids by private conglomerates for both 
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the second and third television channels (Boyd-Bell, 1985; Gregory, 1985; Wood, 
1984). 
Under these circumstances, public broadcasting faced increasing pressures. 
One was an increasing difficulty in representing a neutral ideology (Simpson, 1984; 
Wood, 1984) by appeal to a middle ground, which was reflected in part by the rise in 
complaints during 1977-80. Another was the mobilisation of populist pressures, 
particularly by a charismatic National Party leader. According to James (1986), this 
drew on the older community of discourse, noted earlier, which emphasised the 
virtues of close, parochial and egalitarian relations and was focussed against 
broadcasting, and against journalists in particular (Garnier, 1978). A third pressure, 
which recalls the complicated class relationships noted earlier, and was also strongly 
represented in the National Party, was for the strengthening of paternal social control 
which was transmitted through regulation and Board appointments and embedded in a 
centrally controlled, managerially-oriented organisational structure, (Simpson, 1984). 
These demands have been traced by Simpson through the continued dominance of 
business and political elites on the NZBC and BCNZ boards at least until 1982, who 
describes them as 'an example of elite hegemony at work' (1984:219). 
It was in the face of these pressures that professional groups attempted to . 
organise themselves. As discussed in earlier chapters, both television journalists and 
producers had only recently formed themselves into specialist professional groupings 
(Wood, 1984:95), were generally young and inexperienced (viz Campbell and 
Cleveland, 1972; Lealand, 1988b) with often very limited technical or production 
skills, (Johnstone, 1968). 
Wood goes on to argue that they managed these pressures, and pirrticularly 
those represented by the state, by 'the development of media professionalism' 
(1984: 100), which he defines as cohering 'around a corpus of discursive practices' 
(1984:99) that emphasise codes of 'balance' and 'neutrality', He goes on to argue that 
this is (1984:189): 
'a process of cultural incorporation, winning that consent which makes 
existing forms of domination seem both natural and legitimate' 
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and that the process of textual organisation and representation, especially through 
news and current affairs programming, embeds a form of ideological hegemony that 
ena~les broadcasting to function 'as an ideological state apparatus.' (1984:189). 
The evidence reviewed so far, of course, suggests a more complex picture. 
First, that inside broadcasting there was, in contrast to Wood's implication, a 
continuing process of negotiating the social and ideological order, which was cross-
cut by the organisational setting and internal coherence of particular groups. 
Secondly, that determining and representing an effective ideological hegemony was 
an uncertain and confused process, and one which had to account for specific cultural 
factors. Programme-makers were confronted, on the one hand, with a long-standing 
traditional ideology, reinvoked by the Prime Minister's populism, which emphasised a 
non-specialist, sociable, mateship-based, 'she'll be right' ethos (McLennan, 1988; 
Perry, 1982). On the other hand, there was an ideology expressed through the 
business and administrative fraction (Smith, 1962) which stressed the importance of 
hierarchy, centralization and close management control. Neither was conducive to the 
formation of an autonomous specialist occupation. Under these circumstances, 
, 
without forfeiting the notion of a dominant ideology, the definition of an ideological 
state apparatus seems a limited, over-resolved image to capture the cultural and 
organisational conflicts surrounding television, particularly during this period. 
The point at issue is that controls and regulations were imposed from 1977 
onwards in an increasing effort to make programme-makers conform to the prevailing 
dominant social order, even where elements of that order were internally self-
contradictory (James, 1986). However, programme-makers. did not constitute, in 
themselves, the broadcasting system, as implied by Wood (1984). On the contrary, 
the chairman attempted increasingly to speak for them, and to act as a paternal 
representative, both encouraging and publicly criticising their activities (Cross, 1988), 
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while, for their part, programme makers attempted to pursue a very different 
professional mission, largely as laid out in the Adam Report. 
For present purposes, though, the point is clear. The development of 
broadcasting in New Zealand is similar to, but not the same as, Australia. One 
difference emerges through the relationship of geography and capital. While both 
countries experienced difficult terrain and a small population, in Australia this was 
overcome by the influx of United States capital. Because this did not occur in New 
Zealand, it became the prerogative of the state to intervene. While this extended its 
dominance, it also placed considerable financial burden which enabled local capital, 
through the application of pressure, to play an important but subordinate role in the 
development of broadcasting's cultural form. 
This was reinforced by a second difference. This was the existence of a more 
cohesive, dominant state than Australia. While it retained the same colonial, 
Imperialist connections as its counterpart, it also represented the ideology of the 
dominant class fractions, as indicated, which controlled it. It was only with the 
widespread social reorganisation of the 1970's that this settled social order came 
under serious challenge. 
To make these points clearer however, they need to be pursued in greater 
detail and with more clarification of a historical perspective. 
4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
Williams draws out the central relationship in the introduction of broadcasting 
as follows (1974:32): 
", 
'The key factor ... was that the directing impUlse came from the 
manufacturers of broadcasting apparatus, and especially of receivers. 
Yet because of the general importance of radio telephony there was 
always another kind of pressure, from political authorities: questions of 
the security and integrity of the nation-state were implicitly and at times 
explicitly raised .. .' 
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These two forces were equally present in New Zealand. As elsewhere, with 
the introduction first of radio (Hall, 1980) and then television (Gregory, 1985), there 
was a conjunction of amateur operators and small entrepreneurs which subsequently 
drew down widespread government regulation on the basis of protection of the public 
interest. For both media it led to the institution of a powerful form of public 
authority. With radio it led to the establishment of the privately-operated Radio 
Broadcasting Company from 1925-1931, and subsequently to various forms of state 
control (Sullivan, 1987), while television began under the public ownership of the 
New Zealand Broadcasting Service before its reincorporation as the N.Z.B.C. in 1962 
(Gregory, 1985). More importantly, the tension between these two pressures 
influenced the shaping of broadcasting's organisational form through the 
characteristics of its cultural form. 
In radio, the clearest expression of this relationship emerges with the 
introduction of the ZB commercial stations in 1936-1937 under the National 
Commercial Broadcasting Service and the community stations from 1949. Until that 
time, the conflicting objectives of state arrangement and commercial development had 
been the subject of continuing and sometimes volatile strains, as illustrated by the 
notorious Government jamming of lZB (Hall, 1980 and see Wood, 1984). With the 
separation of the Y A and ZB systems, an arrangement which still persists, these 
tensions abated, but created distinct cultural arrangements in the process. As Sullivan 
(1987:30) commented: 
'The ZB's were entertaining, exciting and determined to bring happiness 
and make a profit in the community they served' 
ZB stations were a national network of metropolitan stations which carried 
advertising, in contrast to the Y A network which was national and non-commercial. 
In effect, the arrangement created a split between high culture and popular culture 
broadcasting forms. The ZB network (and later commercial extensions) rapidly 
gained large audiences for its innovative, locally responsive and entertainment-
oriented programming. The Y A's and particularly the later YC Concert stations 
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offered a strongly Reithian schedule mainly of talks, plays, lectures, serious and 'light' 
music (Hall, 1980). Harcourt and Downey (1976:106) comment that the respective 
directors of the services, Professor James Shelley and Colin Scrimgeour, reflected this 
contrast: 
'To Shelley broadcasting was a sacred trust. To Scrimgeour it was a 
medium for personal contact, for reaching out to embrace the common 
man.' 
Nonetheless, these arrangements reflected the emergence of a small, well-
organised, high culture elite on the one hand, who have remained sufficiently 
organised even to the present day to prevent any commercial intrusion on their 
schedules (through the Friends of the Concert Programme, for example). On the 
other, the' ZB and X station arrangements produced a fonn of small-scale popular 
capitalism which merged a powerful sense of regional identity with the interests of 
local retailing. The extent to which this was true is illustrated by Hall's description of 
the development of a local symbol, the dairy cow on Waikato's lXH station. 
Introduced as an anonymous cow on the breakfast session it was named 'Mooloo' by a 
child and became the mascot for Waikato's provincial rugby fixtures, eventually 
becoming 'a pivot of its defence' of the Ranfurly Shield from 1952 (Hall, 1980:179). 
As a promotional device it drew gratitude from the local Chamber of Commerce, and 
suggests a symbolism which effectively wedded local sentiment, regional identity 
through the dominant cultural fonn of rugby, and small-scale, provincial capitalism 
by means of the organisation of the broadcast medium. 
Nonetheless, these arrangements functioned within a highly regulated 
framework, which closely conforms to Williams' analysis of community broadcasting 
(1975:36). This was particularly evident with news: no independent service existed in 
New Zealand until 1962. Instead 'news' as such was transmitted as a strictly 
controlled Government outlet with minimal broadcasts. These mostly carried state 
press releases, cribbed newspaper stories, BBC wire cables and rural stock prices 
(Sullivan, 1987) which reflected the combination of pressures from the state 
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(Gregory, 1985), the interests of the press - themselves closely allied to succeeding 
conservative Governments - and rural capital. In short, the same sets of dominant 
interests noted earlier were rearticulated in the shaping of the news service. 
Nonetheless, it also exemplified the operation of a profoundly paternalistic 
state, an aspect of which Wood (1984) in his generally Althusserian account, takes 
insufficient notice. This factor is highlighted by Gregory and is best illustrated by the 
13-year Directorship of James Shelley, an avowed Reithian who insisted 'that what 
was broadcast had to be the best available' (Gregory, 1985:24). 
This enabled him to develop a concept of professionalism, especially in radio 
drama, by his insistence on high standards, his own prominence in New Zealand 
cultural and social elites, his linkage to Imperialist elite values and, indeed, his own 
competence as a performer (Collins, 1967:119, quoted in Gregory: 198536): 
'you knew his was the voice of authority, of learning, of experience.' 
If these values underlined a high culture service, then the paternalism it 
advanced, supported by the impact this acculturation had on the Government's vote-
catching (Gregory, 1985:28-29), also shaped the formation and limits of community 
services. Local radio was to be 'an instrument for developing the cultural life, artistic 
endeavour and civic consciousness of towns and districts' (Shelley, quoted in Hall, 
1980: 178). In essence, this was a policy of quietism and implicit social control, 
which was aided by the absence of a news service. It was certainly not intended to 
enable a popular voice to establish its own identity and possibly, therefore, its own 
forms of dissent. 
These arrangements are important for the impact they were to have on 
television. At the broadest level, cultural form was shaped by the pressures of 
dominant class fractions articulated through the organisation of party politics and 
represented through the separation of high and popular cultures organised and 
regulated by a paternal state. The authority for these arrangements was drawn from 
social elites who, themselves, drew on the authority of superior cultural forms of 
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British Society, and particularly on a BBC model adapted and modified for New 
Zealand circumstances. Organisationally, the cleavage of high and popular culture 
also separated the conflicting objectives of commercial and public service objectives. 
Yet, still, it created hierarchies with an implicit superiority, based on cultural 
authority, of public service over commercial services, which extended to sections of 
the staff (Hall, 1980:114): 
' .. .in the National Service engineers and technicians called the tune; in 
the Commercial Service, programmers and announcers, or 
"personalities". "You can't do that" prevailed in one case; "we are going 
to do this" (previously unheard of though it might be) in the other.' 
More even than that, a notion of professionalism was linked to the 
administrative hierarchy, via Professor Shelley, and to the cultural elite. It was also 
subservient to it. And with the absence of a news service it also explicitly excluded 
journalists who, until 1962, did not, to all intents and purposes, exist (Sullivan, 1987). 
TELEYISION :TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM 
Television's introduction in 1960 reproduced the same elements as radio. 
There was initial pressure from local manufacturers, in the 1950's, anxious to avoid 
the end to the boom in radio receiver sales; the generation of strong popular demand 
through well-publicised travelling demonstrations; the production of a core of amateur 
technical enthusiasts through Auckland's Seddon College and the dilatoriness of the 
state to commit itself (Boyd-Bell, 1985:61-72). 
With its eventual introduction, television again reflected the tensions between 
commercial pressures and the integrity of the nation-state (Williams, 1975:32). Both 
of these were evident in the wide range of opinion held within the returning 
conservative National Party in 1960 and were finally expressed as a compromise 
which introduced a public corporation that carried advertising and could institute 
private radio stations (Gregory, 1985). At the root of this arrangement was the 
formidable problem of cost: rural and provincial regions demanded transmission 
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coverage which it was beyond the capacity of local capital to provide (Wood, 1984). 
Advertising both satisfied small capital and defrayed some of the costs of pUblic1y-
financed coverage; television was therefore, in every sense, a pragmatic decision as 
Gregory points out (1985:39-41). Yet the very absence of real public discussion 
(Gregory 1985:41) also blurred the cultural arrangements which it was expected to 
fulfil. Most prominently, television's technological form: its complexity and its cost 
embedded the commerciaVpublic service dichotomy at the centre of its operation. 
These two factors also served to distance it from local community: television in New 
Zealand has always been a primarily metropolitan institution. However, while it 
initially represented the same imperial and paternalistic motivations as radio with, for 
example, the highest level of British programme iinports in the world during the 
1960's (Boyd-Bell, 1985), television also reflected the same tensions as radio before 
the cultural separation of the YA and ZB networks. Outside the organisation, the 
result has been, until the recent deregulation of broadcasting, a continual flip-flop of 
objectives with growing private pressure for second, and subsequently third-channel, 
ownership (Boyd-Bell, 1985). Notably, private applicants for the third channel made 
it clear that their ability to provide nationwide coverage was dependent on piggy-
backing established public transmission facilities (Mayne, 1986). 
Within the organisation, prior to the Adam Report, it led JO continuing 
tensions with unclear and shifting boundaries between high and popular cultural 
programming. Most obviously, this led to a predominance of foreign programme 
scheduling at the expense of local production development. Again, as with radio, this 
led to the dominance of administrative priorities of engineering and technical 
extensions over programme demands, (Hall, 1980; Gregory, 1985). Because, 
incidentally, of broadcasting engineers' monopoly of technical knowledge, and a 
difficult terrain, it led to the development, as several respondents noted pointedly, not 
just to a,gQQd service but to a supremely excellent and highly expensive service. 
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These priorities implied loosely high culture arrangements which, as with the 
YA system, was widely depicted as dull and unadventurous. It also led to popular 
pressure, organised around television producers, for increased local production. 
Again, cost and technological specialisation contributed to its low visibility. As the 
programme-maker Ian Johnstone commented during this period (1968:27): 
'I am always amazed at the technical complexity of television ... The 
contrast with radio, where two men can keep a station on the air for 
twelve hours at a stretch, is marked. It takes a team of about 15 experts 
to man a transmission shift. .. The achievement of an evening's 
transmission without mishap is a nightly miracle.' 
This made staff 'almost certainly the cheapest element in television' but with 
local production being 'the Cinderella. of television' the result was inadequate support 
for production development (1968:24-27). As a consequence, specialisation was low 
and the turnover of experienced staff high, increasing internal tension and pressures 
for change. 
The same relationship existed between journalists and administrators, as 
Gregory (1982) has detailed, but with news and current affairs journalists attempting 
to develop alternative representations of public events to official Government 
accounts. As with producers, journalists were hampered by a low degree of 
professional autonomy and specialisation (Gregory, 1982). 
These tensions were exacerbated not merely by highly codified administrative 
arrangements as discussed both earlier, and by Gregory (1985), but also by 
organisational and cultural hierarchies. Tunstall (1971) points out that journalists 
exhibit a low degree of formal hierarchy as does Elliot (1977) about other 
programme-makers. Yet both groups cut across clearly differentiated and stable 
hierarchical organisational patterns within New Zealand television (viz. Johnstone, 
1968). Equally importantly, their attempts to develop professional autonomy cut 
across notions of professionalism developed within national radio, but which was 
subservient to the existing organisational precepts of hierarchy and deference to 
(administrative) paternal authority. Television programme-makers did not conform to 
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these pressures; as Johnstone (1968) points out, they were generally young and, as 
Gregory notes, journalists, in particular, tended to challenge concepts of authority as 
part of their professional ideology (1985). 
In these ways, the existence of programme-makers challenged the existing 
order and could appeal to popular demand for local programming. However, because 
of this tendency to represent, however loosely, a sense of popular culture, they also 
invoked a further cultural hierarchy within the broadcasting organisations themselves, 
which once again, also hearks back to the technological requirements of television. 
Johnstone (1968:33) frames it as the difference between high culture radio and 
popular television: 
'There is considerable rivalry between the two. Television tends to 
regard radio as the millstone around its neck. Radio looks on television 
as a "Flash Harry"; gimmickry and pseudo-broadcasting. There are basic 
differences .. .it is reasonable to expect a radio man to have quite a lengthy 
working life. This is not so in television. Those with overseas 
experience speak of men of 40 and over being regarded as "squeezed out 
as lemons", no longer able to keep pace with the medium.' 
To summarise, the conflict between commercial and public service objectives 
also compounded opposed sets of cultural and ideological differences, raising 
profound ambiguities about the organisational structure and forms of representation 
which a television network should embrace. Invariably, these ambiguities, activated 
by the expense of the medium, which would not allow for the separation of objectives 
as in radio, could only return to cost as the one clear determinant for decision-making. 
In other words, apparently pragmatic initiatives in introducing television - national 
coverage and commercial pressures - were the determinants of cultural form. In turn, 
these were the determinants both of organisational and occupational formation and· 
consequently of the development and management of representational modes in the 
shape of programming and production strategies. 
The comparison of radio to television, then, reveals not only the continuities of 
cultural articulations but also the contrasts which, as indicated, are founded on 
technological differences. It explains radio's continued stability of broad 
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organisational form and the constant changes within television which led the former 
chairman, Ian Cross, to dub it 'the battered baby of broadcasting.' Moreover, these 
differences also explain radio's steady bureaucratization (Cross, 1988) since 
administrators, as discussed, were the guarantors of social order both by their linkages 
and by the similarity of their values to those of do~nant elites (Simpson, 1984). 
Programme-makers, on the other hand, could make no such sirriilar claims 
with success. On the contrary, having been linked with popular aspirations, they 
actually forfeited that possibility to a large extent. And, as discussed, they inherited 
contradictory, disorganised support. 
The professional claim to dominance, however, was based on a claim to 
represent all aspects of the cultural spectru~ by invoking the broader concept of the 
public interest. This, in itself, is a relatively well-known strategy, as Burns (1977) 
describes it, for example, when he notes the move within the BBC from public service 
to professionalism. To invoke this notion as a body, however, programme-makers 
depended on one key condition: the existence of a transmission network. Prior to 
1968, no such network existed in television. Instead, programmes were generally 
transported down the country for replay in the four metropolitan centres (Boyd-Bell, 
1985). While this heightened a sense of locality and provincialism it prov~d little 
tangible advantage for the television professions over press or radio outlets. With the 
institution of a microwave transmission network, though, a national news service 
became possible and programmes could be broadcast instantaneously throughout the 
country. Programme makers were also consequently, put in touch with each other and 
could identify themselves as part of a national as opposed to a local service. As a 
result, editorial power - cultural decision-making control - became centred in their 
hands because of the magnified consequences of their acts on a national basis. These 
consequences were redoubled by the fact that, at this stage, much programming was 
live, given the inadequacies of current video recording development (Armes, 1988). 
Programme-makers were, then, the only group able to control the medium's 
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immediacy and liveness, which partly explains both the Adam Report's emphasis on 
this quality and Johnston's (1968) observation that practitioners 'were squeezed out 
like lemons' by 40: it was in fact, a tricky, high-pressure business. 
These occupational advances were brought about by technological changes, 
and were reinforced by internal occupational developments: principally, the formation 
of the TVPDA in 1968. They also highlighted another aspect: how the profession's 
new authority might be maintained. Browne (1987) points out that the concept of 
'network' is not only a physical entity, it is also a metaphorical figure, which 
represents the joining of socially and geographically disparate social formations into 
one common, national voice. This is represented as the a:uthority of the public interest 
that may also weave in 'the interaction of audience and advertiser' (Browne 
1987:592): 
'The discursive authority, then, that generates and sustains television 
seriality is, in an extended sense, the complex, dispersed figure of the 
network, and as such is extended in space to the subjects that it addresses 
and is extended in time to cover the habitual socially formulated 
requirements of subject maintenance.' 
In brief, it gave producers the opportunity to manage the production of what 
Anderson (1983) describes as 'imagined communities'. This is the sense which 
individual viewers (or readers of newspapers) have of sharing a simultaneous 
common experience with thousands or millions of invisible others in a 'mass 
ceremony' that is 'incessantly repeated at intervals throughout the calendar' (1983:39). 
The almost sacred implications of this power arise precisely because 
broadcasters alone control the monopoly of knowledge about what other parts of this 
discursive network might value or wish to have articulated. In this sense, they are 
guardians of a public interest (over what is morally appropriate, symbolically safe or 
collectively approved). 
Yet, this autonomy is only vouchsafed by some degree of separation from the 
state. Given the tight social controls imposed in New Zealand, programme-makers 
consciously sought to expand the hitherto under-utilised commercial possibilities of 
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television. As Perry observes, it was an attempt to balance 'the communal and the 
commercial' which he sees as most vividly symbolised in the production of Telethon 
(1984:101). 
The attempt to accomplish this was through conscious changes in scheduling 
patterns and, from 1975 onwards, with the introduction of commercial symbols - via 
Australian and British commercial models, in terms of image, marketing and 
presentation. 
These were enthusiastically endorsed (NZ Listener, 12 July 1975) as new 
forms of self-advertisement explicitly designed to capture advertisers under new 
competitive conditions. So, for example, TV-I in its opening programme emphasised 
its connections to other national commercial networks - no longer the BBC; it 
reinforced its presentation, publicity and marketing sections; introduced departmental 
heads from Australian commercial networks (notably Bill Munro, the Controller of 
Programmes), and openly embraced commercial virtues with such enthusiasm that it 
produced intense public criticism and a review by TV-2 of its own introductory 
commercial strategy. In total, these changes represented a shift of emphasis rather 
than anything more radically commercial. However, they represented an attempt to 
build a pattern of professional authority based on the twin concepts of network and 
commodity. This was enhanced by their ability to introduce new programming forms 
organised around their commercial potential. Principal amongst these were the 
introduction of Australian and American soap operas, unknown on New Zealand 
television prior to 1974, which were scheduled in new afternoon slots to woo 
advertisers for shift-workers and women working at home. 
In fact, the shift towards commercial patterns of programming masked a 
number of complex processes. It may have served to provide a fresh footing for the 
establishment of a strong sense of autonomy and authority, but it was also a symbolic 
turning-away from established routines and practices - a form of defiance, almost, or 
deviance in the face of national paternal authority. In that sense, with its links to the 
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state, it was an internally contradictory strategy. Moreover, as a 'culturally central' 
phenomenon, in Perry's phrase, television seeks to locate and represent 'the middle 
ground of New Zealand life' (1984:101). Yet, as he also acknowledges, such ground 
is inherently unstable insofar as it represents popular culture, because its relation 'to 
the dominant social order is characteristically a complex pattern of opposition, 
accommodation and evasion' (Perry, 1989:139), which is hardly a promising footing 
on which to develop a consistent sense of authmority. 
In other words, an attempt to found a separate sense of authority and 
autonomy through these symbolic means involved a complicated and ambiguous set 
of relations. These were hardly resolved, as we have seen, with the return to a 
managed envii-onment, with fresh tensions emerging between a paternalistic chairman 
and confrontational programme-makers. On the contrary, the move to a more 
commercial footing released new issues and problems. 
1980-1988 
The return to a managed environment had several important consequences. 
Externally, it re-awakened pressure from local capital for private television. This 
came predominantly from two rural newspaper consortia whose revenue had 
increasingly come under threat from the growth of television advertising (Tribunal 
report, 1985; Boyd-Bell 1985:186). In the short-term this increased the pressure for 
centralised BCNZ management since, for example, one leading proposal, which 
received considerable if fluctuating Government support, advocated privatising one 
channel (Boyd-Bell 1985). 
The alternative was the development of a third channel, a proposal supported 
by the Government's Communication Advisory Council in 1982, but rejected partly 
because of the $60 million cost of establishment and of reorganising a tightly-packed 
frequency spectrum (Royal Commission Report, 1985), and partly because of an 
anticipated backlash from rural electors denied access to the new channel (Boyd-Bell, 
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1985: 188). The final arrangement, broadly agreed to by both political parties, was for 
'a regionally-based, privately owned third channel' (Boyd-Bell, 1985:189). It was this 
agreement which led to the end of the public monopoly of broadcasting but also 
foreshadowed broader changes - principally, the international growth of new media 
systems such as satellite broadcasting, but also the dismantling of the import licensing 
system (Boston and Holland, 1987), that had contributed heavily to the dominance of 
the state in New Zealand society (Oliver, 1979). These changes, in themselves, have 
clearly signalled major shifts in New Zealand's relationship to other nation-states 
which are beyond the scope of this analysis. More pertinently, however, they indicate 
a shift in broadcasting from the paternalistic, public responsibility pole towards an 
.. 
American 'public freedom' deregulatory and com~er~ial ideology (WilliaI?s, 1975) 
which, in itself, underpins a shift from a local, culturalist small-capital perspective to 
a multi-nation industrial policy as a number of recent commentators have argued 
(Mattelart, 1986, Hoffmann-Riemm, 1986; Maharey, 1988). 
Underlying these movements was a re-ordering of the tensions between public 
service and commercial objectives with a conflict which shifted from within 
broadcasting (and radio was also increasingly exposed to the same privatising 
pressures - see Gregory, 1985; NBR 17.6.85, and particularly Mayne, 1985 on cross-
media ownership), to the context of an emergent media industry. This was perhaps 
best illustrated by the simultaneously sitting of the Broadcasting Tribunal to award a 
private, third channel to one of four competing conglomerates, and the hearings of the 
Royal Commission on Broadcasting and Related Telecommunications to determine 
the future shape of the public interest in an implicitly non-monopoly context. 
What the two sets of deliberations emphasised was the ambiguous bases on 
which a new allocation o,f broadcasting goods might occur. Generally speaking, these 
polarised between the provision or acquisition of services based on the ability to pay 
(argued by the Treasury and supported by the presiding Government Officials 
Committee as the framework for new legislation), or based on some form of 
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acknowledged right or need (which has led, for example, to the retention of two 
public television channels, the YC radio network and the introduction of a 
Broadcasting Commission to support New Zealand-made or non-commercial 
production). 
Once again, it is possible to argue, that the third-channel decision represents, 
even with a commercial channel, the same contractory mix of political and 
commercial tensions implicit in the demands made by a protectionist (or paternal) and 
interventionist state. Thus, while the third channel is privately-owned, its warrant-
holders were the only applicants comprised of small rather than big business interests 
(NBR 17.6.87); while privately-owned it was still required to cover all regions of the 
country; while operating as a national carrier, it will come under competition from 
limited coverage satellite companies in 1989 that are jointly-operated by the public 
television system; that, despite being a private operator it was required to schedule for 
all significant minority and ethnic groupings in a broadly parallel fashion to TVNZ; 
that on latest anecdotal evidence, it intends to flout those regulations. 
Clearly, the move to deregulation has been the principal development in the 
1980's. However, it has also been connected with the development of a market for 
professional services. This emerged primarily through the introduction of the two-
channel competitive system which initiated a high demand for the production of 
advertisements, coupled with a successful campaign for restrictions on imported 
commercials (BCM 74/4/11). The resultant boom has received little attention, but it 
is evident that a previously tiny film and video sector has mushroomed. Between 
1974 and 1985 an estimated 13 companies have grown eleven-fold to 142 production 
houses (excluding third-channel contenders), mostly located in Auckland (NB R 
28.2.75; Mayne, 1985b). Throughout the same period, the state-backed Film 
Commission introduced in the 1970's also encouraged the development of private 
film-making (and see the New Zealand Film and Video Yearbooks 1984-87 for 
estimates of the size and range of services), while there also appears to have been an 
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extension of a non-state labour market for journalists with the growth of public 
relations (see Lealand, 1988b for some indirect evidence in terms of journalists' 
perception of opportunities). In short, during the 1970's and 1980's there was the 
development of a substantial private and public professional market. 1 One significant 
aspect pf this emergence was that in terms of Hirschman's (1982) categories of exit, 
voice and loyalty, it was now possible to exit under unsatisfactory circumstances and. 
remain in New Zealand (Johnstone, 1968 and Edwards, 1969 outline the restricted 
alternatives under the NZBC's monopoly labour market). 
In terms of the distinction discussed in earlier chapters between professionals' 
cosmopolitan and local orientations, it suggests that cosmopolitans were more likely 
to take the risks and opportunities of the private market and locals to remain in the 
public system. There is some limited support for this proposition. First, two main 
professional bodies emerged with the continuance of the TVPDA, primarily 
representative of public television, and the newly-formed Independent Producers and 
Directors Guild (the IPDG) which represented private film and video industry 
members. Secondly, the TVPDA emphasised the security of the state system for its 
members, while the IPDG attacked the Corporation as 'stultifying' where there was a 
'fixed level of competence, imagination and ability. The programmes are unescapably 
locked into this closed circuit of creativity.' (quoted in the Royal Commission Report, 
1985: 185) Thirdly, there was wide, implicit, acknowledgement that many of the most 
adventurous professionals had left the Corporation. As Mayne (1984a:37) 
commented, these were 
', .. the people who used to be the movers and shakers in their own right 
inside State Television. But for various reasons they've moved out or 
shaken themselves loose. These are the fellows who will be putting each 
Recent figures give an estimate of approximately 150 independent producers 
and directors and over 600 technicians. Nine production houses can produce 
completed television programmes while a further 15 are regular suppliers of 
television material in a market with an assessed annual tum-over of $40 million in 
1988 (Steering Committee Report, 1988), 
other's past careers in TVNZ on the line when the blood-letting for 
warrants starts in earnest...' 
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Finally, the IPDG launched a major New Zealand quota campaign in 1985 
which re-articulated one of the primary statements of professional mission for 
programme-makers (NBR 7.10.85): the production of New Zealand material in order 
to forge a sense of local identity. As noted in other places, this re-invokes the notion 
of professional practice for the public benefit and reflects a cosmopolitan orientation 
in so doing. 
Clearly, the available evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. Yet there 
is one further point to be made from the pattern of departures precipitated by the 
expansion of managed BeNZ control. This was a clear cleavage of loyalties between 
competitors for the third channel based on pre-existent TV-l and TV-210yalties. As 
Mayne (1984b) points out, Northern Television recruited a significant number of ex-
TV-l high-level personnel; TV-3 recruited ex-TV-2 personnel. The warrant was 
eventually awarded to TV -3 on the basis of its community-based, small shareholding 
structure (Tribunal Report, 1987), a decision which reproduces the same pattern of 
small capital, regional ideology observed earlier in the chapter and which, as 
discussed, was developed by and identified with TV -2 under initial competitive 
arrangements from 1974. 
The last consequence of the re-imposition of monopoly management concerns 
scheduling and programming patterns. As noted earlier, these have divided 
increasingly along information/entertainment lines for TVI and TV2 respectively, a 
finding with which Lealand (1988a:45) agrees. He adds that this may have divided 
older and younger viewers (l988a:45), but it also suggests a crude high/mass culture 
division based, on the simplest reading, on respective education-levels of viewers for 
TV-I and TV-2. 
A second shift from 1980 was in the nature of local production. This was in 
two directions. One was heavily towards screening on TV-I, the 'information' 
channel (Royal Commission Report 1986:204) and away from TV-2. The second was 
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an emphasis on maintaining local content through 'compiled output' - overseas 
material introduced by New Zealand presenters - and through expanding cheap, high 
output production and repeats (e.g. news, information programmes and entertainment 
over drama and documentaries). This, to some extent, reinforced the shift to TV-1 
since much of it was, apart from the one category of entertainment, information-
oriented, (Royal Commission Report, 1986). While The Royal Commission 
commented that, overall, New Zealand content had remained static at about 25% of 
total transmission time since 1972 (1986:205), the Committee for a Code of Minimum 
Standards from which the figures were drawn indicated a decline since a peak of 34% 
in 1976 (Noonan, 1984:27). For comparison, the BCNZ's revenue had shifted from a 
ratio of 52% to 43% in favour of advertising revenue in 1976 to a ratio of 77% to 16% 
from advertising income (Royal Commission Report, 1986). 
Underlying these changes were two trends in representational practice. The 
major one was explicitly commercially driven, and involved the re-conceptualisation 
of audiences as target groups. This had been noted in 1979 (NBR 14.3.79), but it was 
developed through the release of sophisticated audience profiles for advertising 
agency customers. As Mayne (1986:20) pointed out: 
'Pinpointed in the king-sized brochure were "the working woman, the 
new man, the Maori renaissance, prime lifers and new haves", groups 
whose growing social clout and purchasing power are lauded by TVNZ.' 
From these, essentially appropriated social groupings and types, TVNZ went 
on to suggest the basis for the reconstruction of individual identity (quoted in Mayne, 
1986:20): 
'It's not only that marketers and advertisers owe women a more realistic 
depiction of themselves ... the fact is that it is becoming commercially 
suicidal not to .. .' 
In tum, these constructed types suggested broader social cleavages (Mayne, 
1986:20): 
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'In discussing the new haves, TVNZ's sales and marketers did not pull any punches: 
"The traditional New Zealand egalitarian society is on the way out...Rising affluence 
on the upper level and increasing hardship below is splitting a once homogeneous 
society.' 
The information/entertainment division, then, again underpinned an attempt to 
construct a broadly high/mass culture split. But, interestingly, it is was one that was 
entirely predicated on a commodification of the audience intended to produce a 40/60 
break of audience share with maximised revenue extracted by grouping older, higher 
spenders on TV -1 against more numerous, generally younger, poorer audiences on 
TV -2. At the same time, this division also indicated the nature of the cultural elite to 
which TV -1 appealed by the shape of its more literate, information-oriented 
programming. Scheduling, too, was organised to exploit the growth of broad social 
cleavages which, in principle, cut against traditional public service objectives and 
ideologies. 
Some of these strategies, it should be noted, were developed in 1986 and were 
significant because they represented new initiatives in the recent post-Cross era. 
Here, the discourse about managing broadcasting in the public interest was abandoned 
and replaced with a discourse that emphasised notions of limited competition (which 
was, nonetheless, still centrally managed), and where TV-I and TV-2 were given a 
semblance of autonomy and individual control. Although this arrangement appeared 
less paternal and deferential it was, to some extent, because those patterns of 
domination have been replaced by internalised social controls directed not towards 
programming but towards economic objectives. 
In general, therefore, the movement towards a more explicitly commercial 
orientation was evident both inside and outside the public system. Equally evident 
was the ambiguities which these shifts produced. Thus, commercial policies appeared 
to have split local production by emphasising overseas sales potential for expensive 
drama and documentary production (Noonan, 1984; Mayne, pers. comm.) but to have 
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encroached unevenly on cheaper local production (programme-making respondents 
claimed to be highly alert both to their programme ratings and scheduling placement 
and, with children's programmes, to the pattern of programme content and 
surrounding advertising). Likewise, there is ambiguity over attempts to introduce 
'scheduling-driven production' where programmes are developed to fill specified time-
slots for the benefit of commercial objectives (Mayne, 1986), 
.6.J. Summary 
1980-1988 saw two general strategies: one, leading up to the resignation of Ian 
Cross as Chairman in 1986, emphasising a closely-managed, centralised control of 
TVNZ's monopoly: the other, from 1986 onwards, more openly exploiting and 
articulating commercial priorities within a limited form of decentralised competition 
between channels, and predicated on the anticipation of a deregulated media industry. 
Both periods have seen the increased dominance of internal administrative and 
managerial sub-groups, first in tandem with the full-time chairman and subsequently 
advancing their position under the new part-time chairmanship of Hugh Rennie, by 
the rationalisation of administrative and staffing areas following the Jackson Report 
criticisms. This was further secured by the pressure to counter private television 
competitive moves by instituting broad commercial priorities which extended into the 
representational practices of scheduling and production, and by the rationalisation or 
'down-sizing' recently undertaken following the BCNZ's shift to State Owned 
Enterprise status. 
1.. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This chapter has discussed the relationship between national social and 
cultural patterns and the development of broadcasting services. More specifically, 
following Mundy (1982) and Williams (1974), it has been an attempt to assess the 
relationship between technology and cultural form. As indicated, the sheer cost and 
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specialisation inherent in television, particularly given the difficult geography of New 
Zealand, has limited available cultural options and primarily those to do with 
commercial or state priorities. On the other hand, peculiarly New Zealand cultural 
formations have been decisive in determining not only the mix of commercial and 
public service priorities but also the degree of 'openness' on social controls available 
within the system and the pattern of authority. These cultural formations have, in 
turn, therefore, also shaped the opportunities for cultural producers in terms of the 
representational forms which different state and (increasingly) market patrons have 
encouraged or opposed. 
CHAPTER TEN 
TELEVISION IN 1989 
'Okay, no more Mister Nice-Guy! WATCH OUT COMPETITORS!!!' 
... Cartoon in Networks - TVNZ magazine No.3, 1989. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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As the quotation suggests, the new TVNZ which emerged as a State Owned 
Enterprise was a very different being to the ambiguous body which disappeared at the 
end of 1988. As a memo from the Director-General in late 1988 asserted, 'profit will 
be the overriding driving force behind all we do' (no. 898, 11.8.88). And, to underline 
TVNZ's new lustily, aggressive profile', he made the point more explicitly in a recent 
address to advertisers (Televiews 12.9.89: 13): 
'If I can introduce myself to you again now, I'd say, "Hello, I'm Julian 
Mounter, Chief Executive of a private company with a balance sheet of 
around $300 million. Healthy profits which pay shareholders excellent 
dividends. ,. '" 
Elsewhere (Networks 1, December 1988), he defined TVNZ's four new 
objectives as 1. 'Beat the hell out of the opposition'; 2. 'Hack back even further on 
production costs'; 3. 'Exploit new markets for what...is bound to be an incre,asingly 
fragmented market', and 4. look for co-productions and facilities sharing deals. 
Some of the consequences of these policies have been the establishment of 
sub-companies (both the Avalon Studio complex and the transmission section are now 
separate profit-generating facilities (Networks 13, July 1989; Networks 19, 
September 1989); the 'globalisation' of TVNZ through the acquisition of overseas 
television interests (Networks 13, July 1989); the marketing and distribution of video 
footage (Networks 18, September 1989), and the commodification of programme 
materials such as 'Gloss' and the kiwi cartoon figure (Networks 13, July 1989). 
These new strategies serve to introduce the two themes of this brief, final 
chapter. Both arise from the dissolution of the state's monopoly of broadcasting. One 
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examines the consequences this has had, or is likely to have, on the patterns or 
arrangements which have been discussed at length in earlier chapters. The second is 
an assessment of the possible consequences of internationalisation, introduced by the 
expansion of existing image markets, on the production of culture, and are discussed 
under the heading of postmodernism. 
Both themes arise from the fact that most of the original assumptions which 
have informed debates about television and cultural production have been turned 
upside down with the arrival of deregulation. The BCNZ's activities have, in a sense, 
been dispersed throughout a rapidly expanding television sector; there appears to have 
been a collapse in the managed importation of international cultural materials by the 
BCNZ, through the process of deregulation, and public service provision and 
commercial television have been relegated to different cultural arenas. In general, the 
state's centralised management of cultural production, the debates and the production 
of publics which went with it have been dispersed or are being largely re-constituted; 
in other words, the end of the state's broadcasting monopoly has had fundamental 
consequences. What follows is a brief resume of some of the new features as they 
have evolved to November 1989. 
2. THE END OF THE STATE MONO POL Y OF BROADCASTING 
TVNZ's changes have been in anticipation of deregulated competition from 
satellite, cable, TV -3 and community television contenders, with Julian Mounter 
estimating 38 possible contenders in September 1989 (Televiews 12.9.89: 13). 
Although he anticipated only a possible eight continuing competitors in urban centres, 
two consequences flow from it. One is a new set of programming strategies primarily 
aimed to capture the prime-time market with the placement of news, current affairs 
and games shows in the early evening. These have 'already been able to boost 
audience levels and 60% of New Zealanders are now watching television between 7 
and 7.30 each night', figures 'we haven't had for a long time' (Televiews, 12.9.89: 14). 
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It is combined with a concentration on 'quality' local programmes placed in prime 
time that saw over 50% of the top 30 programmes listed as local programmes in 
August and September 1989 (Televiews, 12.9.89: 14). 
The second consequence has been the rationalisation and casualisation of 
labour. As a late September 1989 bulletin announced (Networks 19, September 
1989) announced, there has been an introduction of a job evaluation and performance 
planning and assessment system (PPA): 
'In future, employees will be paid according to their performance, skills 
and knowledge, rather than on the basis of year by year progression 
through a number of grades.' 
This arrangement advances plans originally developed through the private 
television and video sector for a large pool of casual skilled labour with an estimated 
drop-out rate of 15% per year (rrVA Film and Video Training Conference, July 1986; 
October, 1987). It parallels the established floating labour pool in the film industry 
(The Data File, annually updated) which moves, as work becomes available, between 
New Zealand, Australia and the U.S. (John Barnett, pers. comm.) As Barnett 
observed, this tendency is certain to spread to television, initially through advertising 
production (guest editorial in Networks 18, September 1989): 
'In an increasingly international marketplace and specifically under 
CER, New Zealand looks more and more like one market and 
manufacturers and advertisers often view that market as homogeneous.' 
Does this internationalization in the form of 'globalisation', programme flows 
and diffusion of labour markets suggest an inevitable one-way flow of traffic into 
New Zealand with the domination of U.S. television and the introduction of 'wall-to-
wall Dallas' (Norden streng and Varis, 1974; Varis, 1984)? Tracey, in a recent article, 
suggests not, arguing both that 'the structure of distribution is far more complex than 
has been allowed for' and for the persistence of 'wealthy public broadcasters' (1988: 
14 and 22-24). This point will be considered further in the context of postrnodernism 
but it raises the question of the status, under new market conditions, of public 
broadcasting in New Zealand. 
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Briefly, it appears to have been relegated to the new Broadcasting 
Commission. This body, funded from the licence fee (renamed the Public 
Broadcasting Fee), disburses money to individual and worthy projects. However, its 
latitude is strictly limited by the proviso that projects need to have gained screening 
approval from a television channel (Norrish, 1989). On the other hand, it assumes the 
ambiguous role formerly held by TVNZ. As Merwyn Norrish, the Commission 
chairperson, pointed out (Norrish, 1989: 29): 
'What the instructions to the Commission boil down to is that the 
Commission is required to encourage the development of local content 
on television in terms of both quantity and quality, and in terms of 
social responsibility. We are talking about the need for what is done to 
be well done .. .in terms of... quality in concept, scripts, people ... that are 
not merely worthy, but stand to be popular with or make a lively 
impression on a target audience .. .' 
If this sounds very much like the Adam Report of 1974 then it suggests that 
the Commission has been visited with the same dilemmas that previously plagued 
TVNZ. The only difference is that it is also bound to fund those programmes which 
will be broadcast by commercially-driven channels. In this way, although it 
reproduces the public service-commercial conflict, it does so under the clearly 
dominant profit objectives of commercial broadcasting. 
Under these conditions, there is some doubt whether this supports Tracey's 
(1988) conclusions about the diversity of television's cultural form, or those of Perry's 
(1989: 139) about the potential of popular culture in New Zealand: 
'Popular culture's relation to the dominant social order is 
characteristically a complex pattern of opposition, accommodation and 
evasion; it is an index of suppressed possibilities as well as a means of 
securing consent.' 
Yet, to suggest this possibility is to raise the problem of shifts in 
representational practices and, in turn, their relationship to changes in the political 
economy of television. In short, it introduces the question of postmodernism and its 
role in the internationalization, commercialisation and increasing saturation of visual 
images heralded by deregulation and the impact of new communications technologies. 
This issue is dealt with next. 
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3. NEW ZEALAND TELEVISION AND POSTMODERNISM 
Even since the introduction of competition for advertising between two 
channels there has been a gradual re-conceptualization of audiences as target groups, 
as noted in the last chapter .. While this led to a strategy in the mid-1980's of 
developing an information/entertainment split between TV-l and TV-2, with a 
recognition of certain public service constraints (avoiding the placement of similar or 
local programmes against each other), these boundaries and distinctions have been 
erased since 1989. Now, for example, in the interests of fulfilling purely commercial 
criteria, TVNZ is indifferent to running one local entertainment programme against 
another, (,Saturday Live' against 'It's In the Bag'). Although this divides urban from 
rural audiences and slightly younger from slightly older, the self-evident purpose of 
such scheduling is to meet the competition from other forthcoming broadcasting 
audiences. But this prospect, in itself, opens up the possibilities and consequences of 
the endless textuality of television discourse and its implications for the production of 
identities, subjects and spectators. 
This arises in the context of what Wilcox (1985) terms 'consumer culture.' 
While Wilcox considers New Zealand society as a whole, this discussion limits itself 
to the implications for television and the degree to which it is discernible as a 
postmodern phenomenon. Wilcox summaries postmodernism's features as (1985: 
344-345): 
' ... organised around the constitutive features of a new depthlessness and 
a whole new culture of the image and the simulacrum: in fiction ... we 
find the eclipse of the subject, "decentered" narrative modes, the "blank 
parody" or particle, the prevalence of surfaces rather than depths (or 
multiple surfaces of intertextuality), discourses and textual play 
replacing older modernist depth models with their implied dialectic of 
essence and appearance, latent and manifest, alienation and 
disalienation. ' 
Under the conditions of a deregulated broadcasting environment New Zealand 
television appears ripe, with the anticipated introduction of numerous transmission 
outlets from satellite, national broadcast and cable sources, plus the existing 
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circulation of images from film and video production, to reproduce the features that 
Wilcox imputes to other centres of late capitalism. In these societies there is a 
saturation of the image which, Baudrillard (1981) argues, leads to an irrevocable 
cleavage between the social - the arenas of interweaving discourse (here, through the 
television screen) - and the silent majority, the mass of viewers who cannot be 
retrieved except through their endless (and futile) construction and reconstruction as 
coherent social entities by the discourse in the social. Debord (1968) argues that this 
saturation produces the image as 'the final form of commodity reification.' In short, it 
dissolves social groups qua social groups into consumers grasped and constructed as 
images produced through the television apparatus and who are unavailable to 
representation except through the image. The consequences of this may be profound . 
. 
Ann Kaplan, in discussing some of these with regard to MTV, the 24-hour satellite 
rock video channel, (which, in some ways, represents the furthest extension of these 
developments) and points out that (1989: 53): 
'The 24-hour flow is partly responsible for effacing the original address 
to specific, delimited youth rock audiences. MTV gathers up into itself 
the history of rock and roll, rendering the originally distinct subject 
positions merely nostalgic reflection on earlier periods .... popularising 
and trivialising them into a common "pop" dimension; and then 
flattening them out into one continuous present.' 
In this way, both coherent historicization disappears and distinctive 
communities of address. The process of pastiching to which she and Wilcox refer 
also collapses distinctions between elite and popular cultures as part of its decentering 
effacement of boundaries (Baudrillard, 1983). The final outcome, these 
commentators argue, is the positioning of the subject in a perpetual state of hungering 
after psychological plenitude which is constantly promised and constantly deferred, 
by the endless textuality of television production. Kaplan is, clearly, concerned with 
one segment of television, but the analysis has general application, given the endless 
seriality of television as a whole (Browne, 1987). 
It is easy for such a summary, as White (1987) writes of his own summary of 
Foucault's work, to sound like an almost alarmist and reactionary compression of 
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recent theory. Yet how far can be applied to New Zealand and what other features of 
postmodernism does it expose? 
Wilcox, in 1985, was dubious that New Zealand even fulfilled sufficient 
conditions to be considered a postmodern society (1985: 348): 
'One might argue ... that with its small population, its declining 
economy, its high cost of consumer goods, its two television channels, 
its small number of FM stations (not to mention satellite dishes) and its 
relative paucity of billboards, New Zealand is not properly a consumer 
society nor an image/media saturated society. N or is it, with its 
pastures full of sheep, a properly postmodern culture .. .' 
Leaving aside some of the economic and broadcasting changes since 1985 
(Boston and Holland 1987; Radiocommunications Bill, 1989), how could we resolve 
the question? Briefly, and considering only television, New Zealand is rapidly 
. moving towards a circulation of images equivalent to other Western industrialised . 
nations. On the basis of numbers of television sets per household, penetration of 
colour sets, penetration of video recorders and average weekly programme hours, 
New Zealand is broadly comparable to many European states (it has, for example, 
more video recorders, per head of population, than France but less than the GDR; 
fewer programme hours per week than the GDR but more than France - at least 
according to Screen Digest, February 1989, from which these comparisons are drawn). 
It also has a comparable consumption of films (Screen Digest, April 1989). 
But we need to consider more than sheer volume, and look at the construction 
of images. At a level of general circulation of images within programme scheduling 
there has been, as noted, an encroachment of purely commercial strategies. These 
have produced the phenomenon of endless textuality (and associated deferrals of 
satisfactions) through the growth of advertising time (and the endless appeal of 
advertising strategies viz Kaplan, 1987); the endless serialisation of soap operas (viz 
Allen, 1986) whether produced internationally (,Dallas', 'Fa1concrest' , 'Neighbours', 
'Coronation Street') or locally ('Gloss'); the open-ended narrativization of news 
discourses (Fiske, 1988), more recently, of certain quiz shows ('Sale of the Century'), 
and even the expanding process of 'stripping' where certain types of programmes (and 
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notably mini-series) are run night-by-night to capture a particular audience-type ('Dr 
Who', 'Mash'). In fact, even a cursory analysis of recent television schedules shows 
an astounding degree of seriality on the part of TVNZ's two channels. Of the 53 
programmes screened on the week ending on Friday September 29, 1989, for 
example, 47% (25) were serials repeated on a daily basis (varying, for instance, from 
'Aerobics Oz Style' to 'Holmes' current affairs). Only two programmes, both feature 
films, were non-repeating (although, ironically, one of them, 'Oh God; Book II' was, 
in fact, a film serialisation). A similar distribution of programme types was 
represented three weeks later on Wednesday October 18. 
Even within the construction of individual programmes the development of 
postmodernist discourse is evident. Following commentators on the postmodern (viz 
the articles in Foster, 1983), we need to look for the play of surfaces, or depthlessness; 
the decentering of the subject and the dispersal of the notion of essence, and the 
construction of the subject by the television apparatus. To take the last item first, we 
need look no further than quiz shows and entertainment programmes (and see Fiske, 
1987) for the constitution of a specifically television event. In other words, events 
which would not exist if they were not constructed by television. In the process of 
construction, they also constitute the events as subjects, whether as individuals (as in 
, 
'Sale of the Century' or 'Saturday Live'), or as putative social groups ('Top Town'), 
who represent themselves or their communities only through the trope of 
consumption. Perry (1984; 1989) has extended this form of analysis to the signifying 
strategies of recent Telethons. 
Where television represents the 'real' or events outside itself, postmodernist 
strategies are often still evident. Wood (1984) has analysed the way that election 
candidates and the community are reconstituted as spectacle, dissolving their links 
with any 'real' community in a way which recalls Baudrillard's (1981) critique of the 
discourse of the social. So, too, does the persistent use of opinion polls on current 
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affairs programmes to represent the electoral popularity of political parties, public 
issues or individual office-holders. (Baudrillard, 1981: 31-36). 
To illustrate these postmodern processes further we can briefly consider two 
examples. One is the New Zealand soap opera 'Gloss' which indicates by its name the 
notion of the mirror play of surfaces, and the gaze (Lacan, 1979). Like most soap 
operas it is inherently placeless, endlessly defers narrative or emotional closure, and is 
constituted around a medium that itself depends on the circulation and consumption 
of images (a high fashion magazine). It is, in other words, a simulacrum - a copy with 
no identifiable original. It is also pastiche - invoking and playing with the tropes of 
other, similar highbrow soaps (eg 'Dallas' or 'Falconcrest') - but which forestalls the 
positioning of the spectator that would ironise this activity and tum it into parody. 
Obviously, this analysis could be greatly extended, but a second example is 
illuminating insofar as it also serves to suggest some of the limitations of 
postmodernism, or of postmodern analysis. 'Sale of the Century' displays several 
postmodern features: it is organised around the maximum display of consumption by 
its competitors; it evokes a constant deferral of plenitude in the parade of objects 
possessed or rejected by contestants; it is decentered by the impression it gives of an 
(invisible) audience and by being unlocateable - despite the host's nightly farewell to 
some obscure regional area of New Zealand. And so on. In contrast, 'It's In the Bag' 
retains marks of modernity despite being a quiz show. It has an identifiable location 
(eg Tokoroa or small provincial towns), it displays and interacts with a distinct local 
audience who respond positively to their self-identification. Each show is shot within 
the confines of the community's locale (the local town hall or auditorium) and, in 
doing so extends an identifiable sense of social and broadcasting history: the series 
began as a radio show in the 1950's. In brief, it contradicts postmodern tendencies by 
its assertion of locale, community, identity and self-presence. So do other 
programmes (eg 'Fair Go', 'McCormick Country', 'Country Calendar', 'Wild South' or 
'Kaleidoscope'), many of which implicitly privilege a notion of national identity. 
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Simon During identifies phenomena such as these as being part of a strategy of post-
colonialism which he describes as 'the name for products of the ex-colonies' need for 
an identity granted not in terms of the colonial power, but in terms of themselves,' 
(1985: 369). 
During argues that a post-colonial identity can only be produced by 'a self-
reflective and intellectual discourse' which articulate certain specifiable national 
attributes 'as a resistance to postmodernism' (1985: 372, 376). Such a singular 
discourse, of course, activates another form of representation that may simply 
disenfranchise the subjects of its discourse (,ordinary New Zealanders') just as 
effectively as the postmodernist discourse it is resisting (a point made indirectly by 
Eldred-Grigg, 1987). The point is not pursued here. Instead, it is enough to note that 
this post-colonial discourse is vitiated by its insertion into the stream of discourses 
which constitute postmodernism: it becomes merely a text amongst texts. 
Yet, in a sense, it resolves the problem posed by Wilcox. The question is not 
whether New Zealand is or is not a postmodern society but, rather, how we are to 
assess the contradictions of (at least) two antithetical discourses (and see Fox, 1988 on 
the problems, for example of articulating a specifically Maori discourse). Their 
relative dominance is an indication of the social formations on which their respective 
discourses are grounded (viz Perry, 1987) and form a conclusion to this section. 
We have already seen in earlier chapters how programme-makers as part of 
their self-constitution as a professional community articulated an image of national 
identity. As with most professionalising occupations they emphasised their 
disinterestedness by involving a notion of public service and attempted to gain a 
degree of occupational shelter through the state by way of regulation and a monopoly 
over television broadcasting rights. Inherent in these strategies, however, were sets of 
unresolveable ambiguities which saw the gradual dominance of administrators and 
managers within the state system and the development of an alternative professional 
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private sector which finally emerged to challenge the state system with the Tribunal 
hearings for a third channel warrant in the mid-1980's. 
Central to programme-makers' strategies, whether public or private, has been 
the notion of national voice, or identity which, if achieved, would have led to what 
Anderson (1983) terms the construction of an imagined community. However, the 
development of new communication technologies and the world-wide pressures 
towards market-driven deregulation (Padioleau, 1987) have undermined cultural 
boundaries (and hence existing imagined communities) in favour of what Matterlart et 
al. (1984) describe as world-wide image markets. Under these conditions, 
broadcasting becomes just another industrial sector, except on a multinational scale. 
Consequently, New Zealand programme-makers face the same kinds of difficulties as 
Ettema and et aI's (1987) American mass communicators. Their appeal to public 
service is marginalised with the shift of public service functions to the new allocative 
body, the Broadcasting Commission (Christchurch Press: 19.9.89); their claim to 
produce innovation and excellence is marginalised by the displacement of local 
production functions to semi- or wholly-independent production units and is, anyway, 
subjected to international competition for scheduling purely on the grounds of 
satisfying consumer groups through the ratings. Their claim to superior judgement of 
audience demands - to the management of organisational uncertainty - is, like their 
other claims, culturally-based and therefore vulnerable to the alternative claims of 
bureaucratic specialists (eg sales and marketing personnel, market researchers or 
programme suppliers and distributors) where judgement is on the basis of profit-
maximisation (as it is for TVNZ (Director-General's memo 11.8.88, no. 898), and will 
be for all other channels). 
Consequently, the disappearance of the state monopoly of television 
broadcasting has meant the disappearance of programme-makers' claims to 
professional status based on cultural advocacy. It also means the diminution of a 
post-colonial discourse within postmodernism, but with the corollary that it also 
207 
inserts a set of contradictions and tensions at odds with the totalising tendencies of 
postmodern discourse. 
Finally, however, what this discussion attempts to provide is a linkage 
between shifts in institutional practices and cultural discourses. In a sense, recent 
developments have illustrated the reorganisation and rearticulation of a set of familiar 
tensions: economic and cultural imperatives articulated by and distributed within a 
given institutional framework. This, properly, brings us back to the initial sets of 
tensions and ambiguities with which the study began but sees them now displaced and 
reworked within the context of a media sector or industry, rather than just through the 
original organisational form. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In presenting a methodological appendix, particularly of a qualitative study, 
thereis a sense of the researcher 'coming clean' - stepping out from behind an often 
invisible persona to reveal how his or her materials were collected and organised. 
This has been particularly so recently with the reaction to the unruffled 
pronouncements of methodological 'cookbooks' in favour of accounts of 'what really 
happened' (Bell and Newby, 1977; Bell and Roberts, 1984; Bryman, 1988, for 
example). My account largely follows this recent tradition, primarily because it 
appears the most illuminating route to follow, and may highlight methodological 
difficulties rather than merely deferring to methodological authorities. 
However, this approach raises some further questions and so this account falls 
into two sections. One describes the fieldwork process and some of the issues and 
problems which arose. The second briefly takes up some more general problems to 
do with the historical nature of my materials and with the problem of representation 
which they pose. 
2. ACCESS AND FIELDWORK 
The bulk of data collection took place between 1986 and 1989 and, as will be 
obvious from the text, involved not only interviews, magazine and newspaper articles, 
published reports, histories and academic articles (of which some of the most useful 
emerged during the last four years), but also extensive use of broadcasting files. This 
last category was, clearly, central to any detailed account of the period; it was also the 
most difficult to obtain, and some explanation of how I gained access may be helpful, 
especially in view of the emphasis it has received in methodology texts (Brown et aI., 
1976; Bell and Newby, 1977), and the paucity of local accounts. 
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2.1. Access 
My problem was both obvious and fairly typical. My research depended on 
the detailed data available through potential respondents within broadcasting and 
from what I imagined to be extensive corporate documentation. Both, and more 
particularly the latter, required top level permission, especially since few 
organisations, and no broadcasting ones anywhere around the world, as far as I was 
aware, were amenable to researchers fossicking at random through their recent 
records. (See Leapman, 1987, for example). 
My initial attempt to gain access was by a direct contact with the newly-
appointed Director-General of TVNZ, Julian Mounter. He immediately rebuffed my 
request for access even to the BCNZ board minutes for 1979. This might well have 
proved the end of the matter, and the pursuit of this topic, if it had not been for a 
combination of fortune and existing contacts within broadcasting. 
In brief, the Chairman of the Board's wife, in her role as speech-writer for the 
Deputy Prime Minister, needed some material on a Christchurch Theatre for a speech 
on its tenth anniversary. As a newspaper reviewer in Christchurch, I was readily 
placed to supply this through a common acquaintance who was also a friend of the 
Chairman. Suffice it to say that th~ execution of a favour, and the mutual 
acquaintanceship, vouchsafed my reliability and, in a brief interview with the 
Chairman, Hugh Rennie, I was generously granted all the access and help I required, 
possibly short only of some confidential minutes which, he said, even he had not seen. 
This outcome seems to conform to the recommendations by other researchers about 
the patterns and value of opportunism (Crompton and Jones, 1984; Van Maanen and 
Kolb, 1985). However, it also conforms to Burns' (1977) and Schlesinger's (1980) 
access experiences with the BBC. 
Subsequently, as other researchers have found (see Schlesinger, 1980:347-352 
on the BBC), there were further blocks within the organisation itself. Two are worth 
noting. One related to the extraordinary remote-control influence wielded by the 
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recently-departed ex-Chairman, Ian Cross. In particular, two powerful executives 
appeared to act in deference to his sentiments, discussing my activities with him and 
operating a shifting screen which revealed or deflected information about documents 
or evidence that touched on recent activities. Interestingly, this atmosphere of caution 
and surveillance which was very evident up to the beginning of 1987 was largely 
dispelled by the time of a return visit in late 1987, but coincided with a definite 
sensation that the period up to 1980 had suddenly been relegated to history rather than 
being still current. Simultaneously, while this improved my access and decreased the 
caution of interviewees, it produced a new problem of nostalgia amongst respondents, 
who sometimes tended to simplify the complexities of past events. 
The second obstacle was the state of the data. Papers to the BCNZ Board 
minutes were sometimes absent or mislocated. All the documents for TV-1 and TV-2 
were missing; through the very kind assistance of a former executive, TV -l's were 
finally traced to the basement at Avalon's television centre, stored in eight large 
paper-cup cartons. They were chaotic, uncatalogued and incomplete. However, they 
did contain some TV-2 records (most of which are still undiscovered) and, with the 
BCNZ materials, amounted to several hundred thousand pages of rich data. 
2.2. Fieldwork 
The major fieldwork fell into three main phases. I did pilot work and initial 
interviewing in Wellington in August 1986, undertook the main bulk of research 
through the summer of 1987-88 in two bursts, with a further trip to Auckland in May 
1988. I completed data collection in November-December 1988 with a final visit to 
Wellington. 
During the initial ten-day pilot research period in August 1986, I attempted to 
assess the state of available materials as well as doing preliminary interviewing with 
as many, and as varied, respondents as I could manage. 
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However, it was the second research visit in 1987-88 which formed the 
backbone to my internal organisational data collection and coincided with the arrival 
of the missing TV -1 materials. In total, I spent approximately seven week.s, before 
and after Christmas, sorting and analysing documents, interviewing respondents both 
about their own activities and, in many cases, about how to interpret the documents 
and, lastly, in acting as a sociological observer. This last activity deserves some 
comment. 
I had worked in television myself from 1977 up until 1984, which made me 
aware that, in some respects, that the organisation in which I was now participating as 
a researcher was different to the organisation in which I had once worked, and was 
studying. To confuse the (recent) past with the present was to confuse one of the 
objects of study: the process of change, so I felt obliged to treat them conceptually as 
at least slightly different constructs. Nonetheless, acting as an observer enabled me to 
observe how the daily organisational social order was accomplished within structures 
that, broadly, I had experienced myself. Second, it enabled me to compare my 
experiences - and more importantly my degree of recall - from the self-reflexive 
position of a researcher,. with that of respondents still engaged with the on-going 
management of organisational practices and discourses (and see Schatzmann and 
Strauss, 1973; Silverman, 1985; Turner, 1988 for a discussion of some of these 
issues). 
Through this period of engagement and analysis I tended to work extremely 
intensively, transcribing interviews, writing extensive notes and reflecting endlessly 
upon unexpected linkages and tentative patterns. To borrow Turner's (1988) dictum, 
to look closely is to be surprised, and I was, sharing the stimulation and exhilaration 
which he and Glaser (1978) describe in the cycle of observation-analysis-theorising, 
and which made regular fourteen- or fifteen-hour days a relatively painless 
experience. 
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The Auckland trip in May 1988 was primarily to expand my SPTV (TV-2) 
materials, and the final visit in November-December 1988 enabled me to re-interview, 
re-check tentative conclusions and sample the new winds of change, prior to TVNZ 
becoming an S.O.E., and to immerse myself again in the voluminous documentation. 
2.3. Analytical Procedures 
Faced with a mass of discontinuous data and a variety of oral and published 
accounts, often in sharp conflict with each other (see Cross, 1988 and Mayne, 1984 
and 1985, for example), how were these to be synthesized into one relatively 
consistent account? In part, it involves a recognition of the processes of 
narrativization and metadiscourse, that regularize irregular discourses, and which has 
been most usefully discussed by White (1973, 1981, 1987). This is taken up in a later 
section. Beyond that, there are a number of methodological procedures which attempt 
to establish the validity and reliability of data (Bryman, 1988; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Silverman, 1985; van Maanen, 1979) and what follows is a discussion of 
amalgamating data and methodology in my own circumstances. 
In essence, I followed a procedure which has been described as well by Turner 
(1988) as anyone, and which he summarises as a combination of analytic induction 
and grounded theory (although Bulmer and Burgess, 1986, see them as separate 
activities). Some examples will illustrate the process. 
Certain events could be established and certain categories verified by 
reference to published data and written decisions. Principally, these consisted of 
Board decisions which produced changes in sets of organisational activities that were 
independently observable, (such as changes in financial data supplied to the Board), 
or were internally logically consistent (for instance, repeated and escalating demands 
at different Board meetings for 'referral-up' by staff members). 
In these ways, whole and detailed sequences of events could be tracked and 
confirmed by, for example, plotting the passage of particular items or issues as they 
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occurred at programme or production meetings, went through Heads of Department 
meetings, were incorporated or revised in papers prepared for the television boards; as 
they were reworked for the higher BCNZ Board sub-committees; were re-presented as 
background papers for the BCNZ Board and appeared as minutes of Board meetings. 
What these documents represent, however, are certain forms of distributed 
discourse: channels which contained certain kinds of information available in 
different settings for different participants' use. But the sense of these documents was 
limited in two ways. First, they did not reveal in themselves how they should be read; 
in other words, they needed interpretation, preferably by participants, for their 
contextual sense. Secondly, many documents - and especially Board minutes, as 
respondents constantly reminded me - were intentionally obscure or misleading, in 
order to fulfil a variety of organisational purposes. For these reasons, former 
participants became essential as sense-making guides to the documents. They could 
indicate, for example, how specific minutes might act as index to interpretation. So, 
at its most simple, minutes marked 'confidential', or actually missing from files, were 
clearly deemed more sensitive. Intensity of discussion could be partially gauged by 
the sheer length of an individual entry or the difficulty of the minute-writer in 
massagiI}g a sharply-polarised and heated discussion into the opaque terminology of 
surrounding items. Sometimes, verbatim hand-written notes existed to check the 
relationship of formal to recorded accounts. 
On the other hand, interviews with participants were invaluable for revealing 
assumptions and shared frameworks. I could never have understood, for example, 
whether or not a change of advertising systems reflected - as it appeared to - a victory 
of one channel over the other in the TVNZ amalgamation without knowing from a 
working part participant that both channels' experts had agreed the changes were self-
evident and overdue. This particular example can be extended. Only a participant 
could reveal the intense jockeying for position which working party membership 
represented in terms of future careers (to the extent of near physical assault on one 
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over-heated occasion). These examples should illustrate both the specificity and 
significance of members' understandings and accomplishment of organisational 
practices which problematises global accounts of organisational or occupational 
history. 
At the same time, these existing materials, plus some fairly haphazardly-
generated statistical data (itself a consequence of the shortage of administrative staff 
during the 1970's), permitted another level of analysis. This allowed the 
incorporation of quantitative data (for instance, in the form of crude occupational 
categories, turn-over rates of personnel, broad wage relativities and so on) and for a 
re-reading of other documents. Thus, by coding every Board minute from 1974 
onwards, for example, it was possible to see 'waves' of decisions or discussions of 
particular issues over time that could serve to corroborate the intensification of, or 
conflict over, certain debates. This was true of the issue of journalists' 'independence' 
or 'objectivity' during the late 1970's, which could be matched with contemporary 
news accounts and the later memoirs or memories of participants (e.g. Cross, 1988). 
As a result, it was generally possible to interweave qualitative and quantitative 
materials, although always within an interpretative context (see Silverman, 1985; Yin, 
1984). 
2.4. Interviews 
If participants were invaluable sense-making guides to reading documents, 
they were a hazardous source of first-hand information. This was for two main 
reasons. One, some were prone to recall the most vivid and intense events, often at 
the expense of the dull, but vital, background details in which these were embedded. 
Two, memories were unreliable - sometimes intentionally so - and vulnerable to 
understandable lapses in describing incidents that might have occurred at any time 
from 4 to 15 years earlier. Most commonly, sequences of events were scrambled or 
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ascribed to wrong periods, sometimes years astray, motives were attached to innocent 
individuals and post-hoc justification was substituted for actuality. 
So, for example, I learnt of plots during the 1979-90 TVNZ amalgamation, to 
enthrone or unseat candidates for the top current affairs posts - but they were 
inconsistent, uncorroborated and lacking sufficient independent reference points to be 
usable. More unusually, I was told by reliable informants of the endeavours of TV-2 
executives who, allegedly, had the silver nitrate coating from used filmstock stripped 
off and refined down into silver ingots which could subsequently be seen on their 
desk-tops. This was flatly contradicted by a knowledgeable non-TV-2 respondent. 
This particular example is interesting because of the difficulty it illustrates in 
confirming informal accounts. Stories of irregularities within TV-2 circulated when I 
was employed in television and during my research. Yet, in the end, these might best 
be viewed as another signifier of the intense competition between channels and the 
communal identifications which these stories symbolised within organisational and 
occupational cultures (Putnam and Pacanowsky, 1984). Interviews, then, were useful 
but problematic, and my best solution to employing them is to refer to Silverman's 
remarks (1985: 171): 
' ..... we can treat such responses as displays of perspectives and moral 
forms. Finally, such a position is intrinsic to Garfinkel's (1967), 
argument that accounts are part of the world they describe.' 
In all, I interviewed 40 respondents, a number of them on several occasions. 
While they were drawn from all areas of broadcasting: administrative, production, 
engineering and technical; TV -1 and TV -2; Board and employee; external 
commentators and related groups. My process of selection, following Silverman 
(1985), was on the basis of the illumination which individuals could bring to bear, 
rather than on their statistically representative significance. The interviews were long 
(approximately two hours per session) and generally loosely-structured around 
particular themes or issues. Yet, as Dunkerley emphasises, such interviewing is 
inherently subjective, and where its content is historical, it must, as already indicated, 
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focus on the social and cultural construction of values (1988:89-90). In this way it 
arrives on the same footing as historical documents, as a complex form of socially-
constrained discourse. 
3. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION 
One last matter needs to be raised. Beyond the questions of fieldwork and 
analysis, this study is also involved with the production of a cultural critique. As 
Marcus and Fisher define this, it does so (1986:154): 
'by raising questions about cultural hegemony and how meaning 
structures are formed and negotiated by competing segments in a 
socie~.' 
Yet to do so is also to implicate the study itself in the construction of cultural 
meanings. At root, this parallels the way in which Perry (1987), and Eldred-Grigg 
(1987) describe members of an intellectual class producing an account which 
constitutes, in effect, the construction of a particular kind of symbolic New Zealand 
identity (and see Anderson's (1983) incisive account of how this could not be 
otherwise). Inevitably, then, this raises the problems of representation and legitimacy 
- aspects of what Marcus and Fisher refer to as the crisis of representation in the 
human sciences (1986: 1-16). 
In the present case, this raises the question of the accounts's construction: how 
does it ground its own representational practices, and hence its appeal to legitimacy? 
In an important sense, this account is no more 'truthful' than any other (and see 
Bryman, 1988: 2 on this point, in particular). It is and, indeed, cannot avoid being, a 
literary construction. Most accounts implicitly appeal to a notion of truth, or the real, 
yet if recent literary theory demonstrates anything, it is that there is no final truth nor 
transcendent reality (Derrida, 1976; Atkins and Johnson, 1985). Rather, as with all 
such accounts, this is unavoidably a literary device, a discourse, constrained by the 
rules of composition and rhetoric and bound to produce its own tropological strategies 
(Atkins and Johnson, 1985; Miller, 1979; White, 1987). It is a social text, produced 
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within a horizon of social meanings and by the limits of authority that surround the 
production and presentation, in this case, of a doctoral thesis. 
Under these circumstances, a brief word about the literary strategies I have 
employed might be in order. Generally speaking, the text moves between two modes 
of address: the realistic and the ironic (White, 1973). The realistic mode involves 
those sections which develop a narrative and are gathered mainly under Part Two of 
the study. They are organised chronologically and are more intensively 
organisational in focus. The ironic mode is more detached, thematic and discursive 
and is developed in Part Three with an emphasis on cultural discourses. However, 
these are not mutually exclusive categories. Rather, there is a degree of oscillation 
between them, as will be evident from the text. In part, this marks the production 
over time of the text as a text; in part it is an attempt to acknowledge the 'intractable 
contradiction', in the materials and theoretical perspectives that need to be brought 
into conjunction, (Marcus and Fisher, 1986: 12-15). 
How does this illuminate the conditions of adequacy for this study? As 
various commentators point out, social science studies cannot appeal to a general 
notion of authority, nor to a special status as science (Silverman, 1985; White, 1981, 
1987). Moreover, this particular study is subject, through its historical dimension, to 
the interpretative problems of narrative, (Marcus and Fisher, 1986) and the 
reconciliation of the process of emplotment with those of argument and ideological 
implication (White, 1973). How, in brief, can we accede to the 'reality' of the 
narrative and attest to the sufficiency of a representation which, as discussed with 
other accounts of a New Zealand intellectual class, is merely one account among 
others? White (1987) discusses Ricoeur's philosophy (1978) as suggesting one 
solution. Ricoeur argues that human actions themselves have the structure of texts -
moreover, they have the structure of narrative texts. Accepting this, the adequacy of 
representation becomes self-evident (1987:54): 
'Since these actions are in effect lived narrativizations, it follows that 
the only way to represent them is by narrative itself. Here the form of 
discourse is perlectly adequate to its content, since the one is narrative, 
the other what has been narrativised.' 
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White, however, (1987:55) hesitates to concur, arguing there is an irremovable 
equivocation about what constitutes history itself because of the awkward division 
between 'past' and 'present' - which reproduces, in one way, the sensation I noted 
above of the 'present' becoming the 'past' during fieldwork. 
Two other possibilities suggest themselves. White, drawing on Gadamer 
(1979) and again on Ricoeur, suggests that the investment of events with meanings, 
their 'troping', in fact, involves an interpretation or 'translation' from one discursive 
community (who lived the events to be represented) to another (who represent them). 
He continues (1987:49): 
'When this individuality-in-community is established across a temporal 
distance, the kind of knowledge-as-understanding produced is a 
specifically historical knowledge.' 
In simple terms, this is the practice of social science as revelatory and, indeed, 
enables any account to be assessed in terms of 'the meaning, coherence or 
significance' of its tropological procedures. Unavoidably, however, it still does not 
resolve how one account is to be preferred to another except in literary or discursive 
terms which, as Derrida shows (1978) reintroduces problems of authority and 
legitimacy since, finally, these depend on a set of cultural assumptions (and see 
Foucault, 1977; Harland, 1987). 
The other alternative is discussed by Kaplan (1987:29-30) who adopts the 
strategy of acknowledging her situation in academic, cultural and gender discourses 
and argues that these constitute metacritical reading formations which she brings, 
particularly as a gendered subject. These, she argues, produces a sense of difference 
which valorises her account of music television (as· an implicitly cultural critique) as 
one based on an oppositional and resistive reading. As above, this argument is 
vulnerable to a radically deconstructive analysis based, as it is, on an implicit 
privileging of a coherent, centred subject. (Atkins, 1983; Derrida, 1976). 
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Under these circumstances, the best available strategy appears to be a 
provisional one: the purpose of this study is not to resolve the crisis of representation 
but rather to activate a process of interpretation which, within the constraints 
discussed above, reproduces the understandings of one discursive community - that of 
broadcasting - within the framework of another - a sociological community. It adopts 
a metacritical stance towards its materials by attempting, as I have done here, to 
acknowledge its own assumptions, and by emphasising the processual and refractory 
nature of the discourses it examines. 
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PERIODICALS CONSULTED 
~anagement~agazine 
National Business Review CN!lliJ 
The Christchurch Press 
The Dominion 
The Evening Post 
The Listener 
The New Zealand Herald CNZH) 
The New Zealand Listener (NZ Listener) 
The Otago Daily Times 
Broadcaster 
Networks 
Televiews 
TV Kiwi 
BROADCASTING PUBLICATIONS 
(PR newsletter) 
(Internal staff journal) 
(Publication to advertisers) 
(Internal staff magazine) 
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APPENDIX ONE 
DOCUMrnNTSCONSULTED 
COMPLETE BROADCASTING FILES 
RECORD OF COMPLETE MINUTES 
BCORBCNZ 
1976 Minutes and Associated Papers 
1977 Minutes and Associated Papers 
1978 Minutes and Associated Papers 
1979 Minutes and Associated Papers 
1980 Minutes and Associated Papers 
TELEVISION ONE 
1975 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and Papers 
TELEVISION TWO 
Aug-Dec 1975 
Jan-Ju11977 
Jul-Sep 1977 
Oct-Nov 1977 
Feb-Mar 1978 
Jun-Aug 1978 
Feb-Apr 1979 
1975-79 Minutes; Some associated papers 
1975-80 Various papers; memos; internal 
Correspondence; Reports 
COMBINED DIRECTORS-GENERAL MEETINGS 
Minutes Jan 1975-Dec 1976 
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BOMICEC 
1977 Minutes and Papers 
Minutes and papers 
Apr-May 1977 
incomplete 
Jun-Aug 1977 
FINANCE & PLANNING COMMITTEE 
1978/80 Minutes Mar 1978-Dec 1980 
Incomplete 
TV-ONE ARCHIVES 
(NB There is only one file for any entry for which no number of files is given) 
Contents 
BOX ONE 
Personal 
BCNZ 
NZBC/BC 
BOX TWO 
Description 
A.E. Morris 
Papers and Minutes 
Working Party 
Jan-Dec 76 
Jan-Dec 77 
Apr-Dec 78 
74 
No.Files 
2 
3 
7 
Correspondence Oct-Mar 74-75 1 
Apr-Dec 75 3 
Jan-Dec 76 2 
Jan-Mar, 
Jun-Dec 77 3 
Jan-Mar 78 1 
Select Committee and Oct. 76 1 
Review on Broadcasting: (6) 
News 
Review of news 
Submissions to Select Committee 
General 3 
Other files Royal Tour 1977 1 
Legal/general 1 
General 2 
BOX THREE 
TV -1 Corporation/Standing 
Committee 
Minutes and Papers 
Combined Directors-General 
meetings 
BOM/CEC Minutes and Papers 
Apr 74-Jul 75 
Aug-Dec 75 
Jan-Dec 76 
Jan-Nov 77 
1975-1976 
Jan-Nov 77 
2 
3 
5 
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Contents Description ~ No,Files 
Other files TV -2 Correspondence 
TV -1 Open Day 
TV -1/2 Studios 
ABU Sports Working Party 
BOX FOUR 
TV-I Controllers'meetings 1975-1979 
TVNZ Controllers' meetings Feb-Oct 80 
Complementarity meetings 1978-1979 
BCNZ Finance and Planning 
Committee Nov 78-Ju 79 
Jun-Dec 79 3 
Feb-Sep 80 3 
TVNZ CIP Fund Mar-Dec 80 4 
BOX FIVE 
BCNZ Programme Policy 1978 4 
BCNZ Correspondence Jan-Mar 78 2 
Apr-Nov 79 
Jan-Nov 80 
Grey Enquiry 2 
Grey Costs 
Correspondence with Folice 
Correspondence with News 
Hamilton Advisory Committee 
Actors Equity 
Musicians', Writers Guild 
Avalon Creche 
Sales Correspondence 
Advertising 
News Finance, staffing 
BOX SIX 
TV-I Standing 
Committee Minutes and Papers Feb-Dec 78 4 
Feb-Nov 79 3 
Board Various 
TV-I Budgets 1978-1979 
1979-1980 
Various 
Departmental finances (detail) 
Correspondence General from 1978 1978-1981 
Social Club 
Overseas Visits 
Religious Programmes Meetings 
Correspondence Various 
Auckland station 
BCNZ Heads of Department Reports Nov 80-Nov 81 
Other files QE II Arts Council 
CQntents 
BOX SEVEN 
TV-I 
CQntrQller 
DescriptiQn 
Engineering 
Management Services 
Sales and Marketing 
PrQgrammes 
PrQgramme Services 
Departmental Current Affairs 
InfQrmatiQn Services 
Drama 
Finance 
Entertainment 
Sales and Marketing 
SpQrt 
Broadcasting PR Series 
News CQmmittee 
News (plus captiQning) 
BCNZ Current Affairs 
TV CQnference Aug 1978 
TV-I Dunedin 
Dunedin AlteratiQns 
Staff CQnfidential 1978-1981 
BCNZ Tenders & CEP 
PSA/Staff matters 1976 
. Other files TVODA 
BOX EIGHT 
TV -1 Formal CQmplaints 
MiscellaneQus (MQstly presentatiQn, publicity) 
Dunedin visit QueenstQwn 
ThQmas Case (Arthur Allan) 
CQntracts cQpies fQr Alan MQrris 
NZBC Restructuring 
NQ,Files 
8 
3 
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APPENDIX TWO 
ORGANISATION CHARTS 
STRUCTURE OF TilE COUNCIL AND THE CORPORATIONS 
Broadcastln!! Council of New Zealand 
~--~------------~--------------r------J~~----~--------~----------------~----~ /..-------. 
C"lJirman 
TV-'-l 
Chairman 
TV-2 
Chnlrman 
RNZ 
@ @ ~ ~ 
~~ ~__ L __ _ 
~ -- --~~ --
-- --
Chairman 
TV-l 
-- --
---- --
--
----I I 
I I 
I Chairman TV-2 I 
"~ ___________ T __ el~c_vi~si~onScrrv~l~cc __ O_n_c ____________ / 
V 
'I " Television Selvicr. Two / I ~--------~~~~~----~ I 
I I 
I ___ --I 
Secretary 
--
--~-
Chairman 
RNZ 
-I 
I 
I 
"-- Addio NI.'W ZCilbndA '----------vr----~-------r ! 
I 
I 
IV 
*'" w 
19751 IBro~dcasting Act 1974) NZBC restructured into individual 
corporations: TVi, TV2, RNZ and Broadcasting Council. Broadcasting 
Authority (standards etc) absorbed into Broadcasting Council. 
TV!: Operating from Wellington and Dunedin. 
Director-General 
Controller of Programmes 
- Programme Planning' Purchasing 
- News ~ Current Affairs 
- Information Programmes 
- Entertainment 
- Drama 
- Presentation, Publicity ~ Promotions 
- Controller of Sales ~nd Marketing 
- Sales 
- Advertising Traffic 
- Commercial Production 
- Mar~eting Services 
Merchandising 
Controller of Programme Services 
- Film Services 
- Design Services 
- Production Facilities 
- Controller of Engineering 
- Eng! need ng 
- Technical Maintenance 
- Controller of Management Services 
- Finance 
- Office Services. 
Personnel Services 
- Information Services 
Programme Manager, Dunedin 
South Pacific Television (TV2)1 Operating from Auckland and Christchurch. 
Director-General 
- Controller of Programmes 
- Programme Purchasing, Sales ~ Service 
- Information Programmes 
Entertainment 
- Drama 
- Presentation ~ Publicity 
- Editor of News 
Director of Sales and Marketing 
- Sales 
- Sales Administration 
- Merchandising 
- Mark~tlng Services 
- Controller of Programme Services 
- Fi 1 m Servi ces 
- Design Services 
- Production Facilities 
- Controller of Engineering 
- Engineering Planning 
- Technical Maintenance 
- Controller of Management Services 
- Finance 
- E::ecutive Services 
- Personnel Services 
- Property 
- Admi ni strati on 
1980: TVl and TV2 amalgamated into Television New Zealand (amended 
Broadcasting' Act) 
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Production Service and Network Service, one service to make programmes and 
the other to broadcast them. 
Director-General, Production Service 
Controller of Programme Production 
- General L Special Interest Programmes 
- Entertainment 
- Drama 
- Documentaries & Features 
- Childrens Programmes 
- Controller of News, Current Affairs & Sport 
- Controller of Programme Services 
- Film Services 
- Design Services 
- Production Facilities 
- Television Managers: AK, WN, CH, DN 
- Controller of Finance, Auckland 
- Head of Personnel Services, Auckland 
Director-General, Network Service 
- Controller of Pr09ramming 
- Programme Plahning & Purchasing 
- Presentation, Publicity & Promotions 
- Controller of Engineering 
Engineering 
- Technical Maintenance 
- Controller of Finance, Wellington 
- Head of Personnel Services, Wel11ngton 
- Director of Sales and Marketihg 
- Sales 
- Sales Operations 
- Marketing 
- Merchandising 
